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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Frank L. Jones
The passage of the fiscal year (FY) 2017 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) has far-reaching implications for
the Department of Defense (DoD) in two particular areas
for which this study is relevant. The first is that the legislation enacts sweeping changes to how the DoD and its
components, including the Department of the Army (DA),
budget, manage, assess, monitor, evaluate, and report their
security cooperation activities to Congress. The legislation
establishes a “single, comprehensive chapter in Title 10 of
the U.S. Code,” dedicated to the reform of the DoD’s security cooperation practices. Further, as the Chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee notes, “the Department
of Defense continues to place greater emphasis on security
cooperation, to include building partner capacity [BPC].” By
including the term “building partner capacity” in his comments on the law, the chairman uses a more comprehensive term that not only includes the security sector, but also
widens the focus of security cooperation as a whole-of-government effort and makes clear congressional interest in
treating security cooperation as a defense institution building endeavor.
In response to the congressional direction, four of the
study’s chapters address directly the law’s intent and its
provisions regarding security cooperation in general and
Africa specifically. These chapters examine and offer recommendations on the following issues: (1) the concept of
absorptive capacity, which the DoD considers the crucial
first step in security cooperation planning regardless of the
region involved; (2) professional military education (PME)
in Africa as a defense institution building activity; (3) current security cooperation programming in Africa, its aims
and outcomes; and, (4) use of public health engagement in
Africa as a form of military-to-military engagement and a
capacity-building venture in support of the DoD’s policy
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regarding humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, which
contribute to regional stability and U.S. homeland security.
The second major area of the law that is of concern to
the DoD focuses specifically on Africa and links directly
to security cooperation activities in the region. Section
1273 requires the Secretary of Defense, in coordination
with the Secretary of State, to submit to the congressional
defense committees a “strategy for the U.S. defense interests in Africa.” The law indicates that the strategy must
address: defense objectives in Africa; courses of action to
achieve these objectives, to include cooperative efforts with
other U.S. agencies; and “security cooperation activities to
advance defense objectives in Africa.” This study points out
that the success of security cooperation and defense institution building projects relies heavily on clearly defining
U.S. policy objectives at the national, regional, and country
levels, which is not currently the case among some of the
departments and agencies involved in BPC. Moreover, the
statute’s language includes a sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense needs to build a framework for security
cooperation with foreign partners to “ensure accountability and foster implementation of best practices.” The final
chapter assesses where difficulties exist in the interagency
policymaking process that hamper the development of a
collaborative framework and its implementation. Lastly, it
defines what constitutes effective assessment, monitoring,
and evaluation to ensure accountability, and offers relevant
criteria for achieving the legislation’s purpose.
The FY 2017 NDAA is a watershed event for both security cooperation and for the Defense Department’s policy
objectives with respect to its partners in Africa. The law
recognizes specific challenges and opportunities that the
DoD must consider in developing a strategic approach
on the continent that does not principally emphasize U.S.
support to foreign security forces that assist in attaining
U.S. counterterrorism objectives. This is not to suggest that
the current U.S. policy goals or the U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM) lines of effort contained in its theater campaign
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plan are mistaken. However, in view of the law’s provisions, the study proposes that the U.S. Government (USG)
and the DoD concentrate security sector assistance in other
areas where it can be effective in building and sustaining
partner capacity over the long term as well as obtaining
a reasonable return on investment and, at the same time,
remaining consistent with wider U.S. foreign policy and
defense objectives.
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INTRODUCTION
Frank L. Jones
U.S. interests in Africa have expanded in the past
decade beyond such traditional areas as economic
development through trade and investment, democratic governance and the rule of law, and conflict prevention with an emphasis on peacekeeping and rapid
response capacities. The continent is now at the center
of a number of critical security issues. These issues
range from the emergence of potent violent extremist movements (Boko Haram, al-Shabaab and Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria), with the capacity to destabilize fragile states, to a health security agenda catalyzed by the spread of infectious disease with global
impacts (e.g., Ebola and Zika viruses). For the past several years, the U.S. Government (USG), in its national
security strategy and related documents, has stressed
building partner capacity (BPC) as an essential military
mission, especially for the U.S. Army, to counter these
threats and reduce their risk to African governments
and societies.
The term “building partner capacity” is less a term
of art than when it first entered the Department of
Defense (DoD) lexicon a little more than a decade ago.
The most expansive definition of the term appeared
in the 2011 edition of Army Doctrine Publication
(ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, which defined it as,
“The outcome of comprehensive interorganizational
activities, programs, and engagements that enhance
the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law,
and other critical government functions.” This definition denotes that the enumerated actions require
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a whole-of-government approach and interagency
effort.1 Today, the term is understood to mean: “Targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and
performance of the [DoD] and its partners.”2 Regardless of the definition the DoD now uses, the purpose
and means of BPC in Africa remain important because
of recent congressional direction.
The enactment of the fiscal year (FY) 2017 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) brought the importance of BPC into clearer relief in two areas that the
study specifically addresses. In many respects, the
far-reaching reforms that this legislation prompts will
have significant impact on the management of U.S.
security assistance programs and their implementation. First, the law recognizes that security cooperation
initiatives can advance U.S. defense objectives in the
region, but it also undertakes a reform of DoD security cooperation to improve program effectiveness and
visibility.3 To achieve these goals, it creates a single
comprehensive chapter in Title 10, U.S. Code, entitled
“Security Cooperation,” which has the effect of changing the way the DoD manages, budgets, assesses,
and reports security cooperation activities. Certainly,
this revision to Title 10 has an impact well beyond
U.S. defense objectives in Africa. However, given the
study’s focus, the authors attempt to address a set of
BPC activities within the context of the new legislation
and how the DoD, and in particular the Army, undertakes and enhances its mission effectiveness.
Second, Congress directed the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State,
to develop a strategy concerning U.S. defense interests
in Africa. The law specifies several issues the strategy
is to address, to include assessing “threats to global
and regional United States national security interests

xiv

emanating from the continent.”4 The law’s language
suggests that U.S. defense interests are not solely dedicated to countering the activities of violent extremist organizations and that attainment of U.S. defense
objectives in Africa requires a collaborative effort, not
only among the DoD components but also with other
USG agencies.5
To build partner capability in this changed strategic environment, that includes the U.S. domestic environment and Africa, this study explores five elements
crucial to fostering security cooperation and building
sustainable security institutions and capabilities. Specifically, it examines:
• How U.S. stakeholders understand the absorptive capacity of partner nations taking into consideration various factors;
• A comparative analysis of professional military
education (PME) for African security forces in
the current operational and threat environments;
• The use of the military instrument to improve
African public health systems in conjunction
with African militaries and other governmental
agencies;
• The role of U.S. security cooperation activities
in advancing U.S. national security aims in the
current operational and threat environments;
and,
• The interaction between U.S. military personnel
and interagency partners that is necessary to
implement capacity-building endeavors in African nations through a framework that promotes
accountability.
The first chapter examines the concept of absorptive capacity of partner nations and underscores that
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this topic is increasingly important because the NDAA
levies a new demand on those managing security
cooperation efforts. It not only requires the Secretary
of Defense to evaluate the absorptive capacity of a foreign partner’s ability to sustain the training and equipment prior to delivery of such capabilities, but, more
importantly, to evaluate the specific organizational
unit that is receiving such capabilities prior to delivery.
This NDAA language is a dramatic deviation from the
past. Until now, the national security understanding of
absorptive capacity has been limited to a country-level
unit of analysis, typically conducted through a macroeconomic lens and framed through mathematical
modeling. Now, in order to assess an organizational
unit’s capacity, the unit of analysis resides well below
the country-level. A behavioral lens is needed to capture the complex interaction among individual, group,
organizational, and interorganizational behaviors. It
is within this human dimension that the evaluation
of absorptive capacity must take place. Yet, the security cooperation community does not have an analytic
framework from which to pursue such a behavioral
lens for Africa, or any other region where it may provide such support.
This chapter creates an analytic framework for
the DoD, the military services, and other interagency
players involved with security cooperation efforts to
evaluate absorptive capacity within the intent of the
NDAA language. The analytic framework is based
on a set of three-prong, interlinked competencies: a
detailed understanding provided by this chapter of
what absorptive capacity looks like within the complexity of multiple levels of analysis; a detailed understanding provided by this chapter of the perceptual
skill set, called perspective-taking, needed by U.S. and
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other security cooperation providers to detect the full
breadth of absorptive capacity; and the development of
inferential judgment to fill in the normal and expected
limitations of detecting a unit’s absorptive capacity in
especially complex contexts.
With such a framework, policymakers will have
evidence-based knowledge from which to assess risk
in their decision-making process. This evidence-based
knowledge about human behavior will allow policymakers to determine the level of absorptive capacity,
as well as determine under what conditions nations
and units with low absorptive capacity should be supported, what the sequencing of support should be, and
which institutional processes are worth developing
within the assessed risk factors.
The second chapter examines the U.S. military’s
support to African PME institutions and the conduct
of BPC as a whole. As this section notes, the concept
of BPC has been in existence for a little more than a
decade, and there have been numerous programs covered under this rubric. For the most part, these activities have focused on the generation of capability at
the tactical level (i.e., training and equipping) and not
institution building. However, PME has as its foundation institutions and systems, in addition to curricula
and events. Further, as the NDAA language substantiates, the emphasis is now on outcomes or results that
further U.S. national security policy objectives and, in
particular, theater strategic objectives. PME can be an
effective instrument for transforming military capability and generating sustainable capacity, but success
requires the DoD, and the U.S. Army in particular, to
create the means to measure outcomes and results.
Additionally, reliably measuring outcomes requires
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the DoD and its components to have a detailed understanding of African PME systems.
The chapter offers observations based on interviews
and field studies conducted in the past several months,
and reaches three major findings. First, U.S. military
doctrine is robust and provides sufficient guidance on
how to conduct BPC. There is no deficiency in this area.
The second finding is that the doctrine has only been
partially applied on account of several factors. Due to a
lack of resourcing in the generating force, the majority
of BPC-related activities are geared toward the tactical level. Because of this focus, the emphasis is on the
short-term capability generation rather than on institutional development. This approach is understandable.
There is a need to confront immediate security challenges, such as terrorism in several subregions. Additionally, event-driven activity is easier to conduct and
to account for, while institution building necessitates a
long-term commitment and the impacts are not easily
recognizable or measured. These two findings, consistent with the analysis contained in the first chapter,
underscore the difficulty of assessing student knowledge. Even more importantly, education remains the
quintessential example of the transfer of knowledge,
one that occurs over a lengthy period in comparison
to a training event, which may last a matter of days or
weeks.
The third finding is that the DoD lacks an in-depth
knowledge of African PME. This conclusion is based
on travel to four countries, numerous interviews with
African military officers, and discussion of this subject
with North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally personnel to validate the findings. African PME programs
are built on legacy systems, derived from British and
French military education. To enhance African PME
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institutions, an understanding is required of the current foundations so that curriculum development can
proceed; the DoD cannot simply graft its curriculum
or impose a pedagogical approach onto the legacy
system. A more sophisticated methodology is needed.
Given the scope that institution building demands,
neither U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) nor U.S.
Army Africa (USARAF) can accomplish this aim on
their own, despite the view that BPC is a theater shaping activity. Combatant commands are not designed or
staffed with personnel who have the expertise needed
to assess educational outcomes. Instead, the command
must rely on experts located in the U.S. Army and
other military services’ training centers, often referred
to as schoolhouses. Thus, AFRICOM and USARAF are
dependent on an ability to reach back to the institutional Army for support. However, as the Center for
Army Lessons Learned (CALL) noted, the first priority of the schoolhouses is to their respective military
services, and there is insufficient surge capability,
especially qualified personnel, to meet the needs of
the military services and provide support to partner
nations in the various geographical combatant commanders’ areas of responsibility.6 This lack of surge
capacity exacerbates the tactical focus of current BPC
activities. Most importantly, there must be strategic
direction from the relevant military leaders at the Chief
of Defense Staff (CDS) level and a culture of assessment has to be established. As a recent CALL bulletin
indicates: “senior leader engagements are arguably the
most cost-effective activities for making a difference in
immature theaters.”7
The third chapter explores the use of the U.S. military instrument to help improve public health systems in collaboration with African militaries and
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governments. The 2014 Ebola crisis in West Africa
serves as both a case study and as a foundation upon
which the DoD can build, given its engagement in
public health activities on the continent for several
years. The DoD’s global health engagement is consistent with U.S. policy objectives for Africa and the activities intended to build partner capacity. As the Ebola
emergency demonstrated, the outbreak of infectious
disease might not only destabilize the nation in which
the event occurs, but it can also have enormous global
consequences. Moreover, the ability of U.S. partners
in Africa to respond effectively to a complex health
emergency has political, economic, and social implications. For these reasons, the DoD regulations and military doctrine have addressed these concerns directly,
concentrating principally in two areas: preparedness
(which includes research and development as well as
surveillance) and response.
The Ebola crisis is an example of a successful
response, principally because the USG had instituted
programs to combat infectious disease outbreaks in
West Africa for years, including those undertaken
by AFRICOM, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), the Walter Reed Institute
of Research, the U.S. Navy, and the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency. These activities were collaborative
efforts with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and African governments. Thus, there was a framework for response in this particular instance, although
there were a few gaps in coverage. Nonetheless, the
USG’s surge response, to include that of the U.S. military, was a turning point in dealing with the outbreak.
The U.S. Army built treatment units and maintained
an air bridge for the movement of needed personnel
and supplies. The very presence of the 101st Airborne
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Division had a salutary effect psychologically and
helped strengthen the Liberian Government’s morale
and resolve, as well as offering assistance and confidence to the numerous NGOs involved in treatment
of the afflicted. It is important to note that the Ebola
response was truly a joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational event, as it involved joint,
interagency, interorganizational, and multinational
partners.
The USG has learned numerous lessons from the
Ebola crisis, but a few areas would benefit from additional attention. The first is better coordination between
the U.S. military and other U.S. interagency partners
as well as with international organizations, principally the World Health Organization (WHO), to prepare for a worst-case scenario: a disease outbreak that
turns into a slow-onset disaster, as was the case with
Ebola. Second, the USG and especially the U.S. military must incorporate the “Guidelines on the Use of
Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster
Relief” (commonly referred to as the Oslo Guidelines),
which the USG agreed to in 1994, into planning and
training events. Heightened awareness of, and adherence to, the Oslo Guidelines on the part of the DoD
will help mitigate in the future some of the interagency
coordination problems that occurred in the USG’s
Ebola response. Third, AFRICOM should continue to
build relationships with other U.S. agencies, especially
the U.S. country team, and with the CDC and the U.S.
Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s)
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) with
respect to their response systems. Building relationships with WHO and African regional organizations
would be worthwhile as well; the African Union (AU)
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has recently established a Center for Disease Control
that the U.S. CDC helped create.
Lastly, the chapter recommends 11 long-term initiatives the Army and AFRICOM should consider implementing with support from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. As these suggestions underscore, there are significant strategic benefits to supporting the strengthening of African public
health systems as both capacity-building and engagement activities. These benefits include: the access that
joint, interagency, interorganizational, and multinational work on health issues offers; the opportunity for
AFRICOM to enhance the relationships, expertise, and
effectiveness that these partnerships provide; and the
need to be ready to provide humanitarian assistance,
disaster relief, or respond to a disease outbreak.
The fourth chapter explores security cooperation
in Africa from a broad perspective, while linking it
to provisions of the FY 2017 NDAA. Such activities
can be a turning point in the direction of security
cooperation on the continent, but they must take into
account that they cannot be solely the purview of the
DoD, but remain an interagency effort, requiring a
whole-of-government approach. It also emphasizes
that the legislation’s provision for the development
of a defense strategy, conducted in coordination with
the Department of State, is a requisite first step, as it
is the means of forming clear and comprehensive
goals across the entire USG security sector enterprise,
linked to overall U.S. foreign policy for the region.
Moreover, since the Defense Department is now the
principal source of funding for USG’s security sector
assistance budget, it is crucial for the two departments
to: institute a common lexicon; establish priorities at
the regional, subregional, and country levels; clarify
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agency roles and responsibilities; synchronize the variety of assistance programs; and devise implementation
criteria for assessment and accountability purposes
during a time of potentially diminished resources for
the Department of State and the other principal interagency partner in the security sector—the U.S. Agency
for International Development. Unity of effort and the
minimization of bureaucratic friction are of the utmost
importance in meeting the NDAA provisions that affect
the management, monitoring, and evaluation of security cooperation activities. The chapter also addresses
the challenges involved in planning and program execution, particularly as the focus regarding Africa in
both the executive and legislative branches is largely
on counterterrorism. While the concentration on violent extremist organizations in the U.S. AFRICOM’s
area of responsibility is reasonable, as well as the
longstanding interest in building peacekeeping forces
among African states, overemphasis may distract from
key institution building in other areas. When such a
narrowed vision results in critical gaps, then the USG
might be left with a crisis that could have been averted
or mitigated by the Defense Department’s shaping
activity in the region.
The chapter highlights that one of the biggest challenges the Defense Department confronts in the nearterm is building a security cooperation workforce. The
NDAA provides substantial direction for the formation of such a professional program, which is no small
task because it means a major cultural change in the
DoD’s management of security cooperation. The chapter addresses the current organizational structure for
security cooperation management at the country level
and explains why the congressional direction will
require a significant amount of time to implement. It
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also points out, again, that while the Defense Department will be responsive to the congressional requirement, success will require full partnership with the
Department of State and USAID, to include training
their personnel alongside the DoD military officers to
ensure a common baseline of knowledge regarding the
various security sector assistance programs.
This chapter, like the others, also grapples with the
issue of assessing security cooperation activities writ
large, and in Africa specifically. It offers sensible advice
about dealing with factors beyond U.S. control and
the practice of identifying success in program implementation. With respect to both of these matters, the
chapter delves into the formation of the U.S. Army’s
Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB). As is indicated in the chapter on PME, the Defense Department
and Congress should recognize the limitation of this
organization. While it may have a beneficial impact on
tactical capability, this is a limitation in that some of
the most important organizations for security cooperation and defense institutional building reside in existing Army organizations.
Ultimately, as has been the finding in other recent
studies of security cooperation and defense institution
building in Africa, the most essential step is setting
clear, achievable goals to ensure sustainable results or,
if fortunate, solutions. As this chapter points out, and
consistent with the observations and findings in the
preceding ones, there must be a well-defined linkage
between national objectives, theater objectives, and
country-specific objectives. This can only be accomplished by interagency and partner dialogue, planning
(to include understanding a partner nation’s absorptive capacity and institutional strengths and weaknesses), and agreed upon methods of assessment, to
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include accountability in all its dimensions—financial,
legal, and policy.
The final chapter addresses accountability, that is,
the achievement of policy, financial, and legal commitments by the United States and its African partners,
which is an overarching consideration in security cooperation planning and is a central feature of program
assessment.8 This is another area of congressional disquiet. In 2015, the House Committee on the Armed Services expressed its concern “about the lack of strategy
guiding these efforts [security cooperation, to include
BPC] and how effective these are.”9 A year later, that
concern had not abated. Section 1205 of the FY 2017
NDAA provides a sense of Congress that states that
the Secretary of Defense:
should develop and maintain an assessment, monitoring,
and evaluation framework for security cooperation with
foreign countries to ensure accountability [emphasis
added] and foster implementation of best practices.10

Additionally, Section 1252 of the law addresses security
assistance programs, of which security cooperation is
a part. It specifies, “It is the policy of the United States
that the principal goals of the security sector assistance
programs and authorities of the United States Government,” including the promotion of “universal values,”
such as, “transparent and accountable oversight of
security forces.”11 The Commander, U.S. AFRICOM,
General Thomas Waldhauser, shares this concern. In
his March 2017 testimony before Senate Committee
on Armed Services, he asserted that the United States
must remain engaged in the continent, “investing in
the capability, legitimacy, and accountability of African defense institutions.”12
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As these quotes indicate, accountability, in all its
aspects, is not only a USG responsibility, but is an
activity requiring collaboration with African partners
so that U.S. policy goals for security cooperation are
achieved successfully. While internationally recognized accounting and auditing standards or assessment
criteria are in place to determine financial accountability, the methods of determining accountability in the
realm of policy execution are not. Thus, this chapter
focuses on what constitutes accountability, as this concept is ambiguous and requires delineation if it is to be
put into practice. In discussing this issue, the chapter
examines the relationship between these objectives and
accountability. It contends that clarity of objectives is
a required antecedent to identifying and constructing
accountability criteria. It also explains the difference
between internal and external accountability, the latter
an imperative for meeting congressional concerns, but
the former is essential for those managing security
cooperation programs. Lastly, the chapter offers criteria for establishing external accountability measures.
These criteria, when linked to accountability mechanisms, serve as the building blocks for U.S. and African
institutions to use for promoting accountability.
The five chapters address only some of the congressional concerns articulated in the FY 2017 NDAA, but
they are also consistent with DoD guidance. The DoD
Directive, 5132.03, “DoD Policy and Responsibilities
Relating to Security Cooperation,” emphasizes that
security cooperation is designed to advance “specific
U.S. security interests.”13 Moreover, defense institution building, as stipulated in DoD Directive 5205.82,
deals not only with the support of defense strategy and
policy priorities, in such areas as defense education
(the subject of the second chapter), but also recognizes
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the importance of dealing with humanitarian crises
(the subject of the third chapter). Developing a partner
nation military’s capacity to support and work with
civilian agencies responsible for disaster management
and response is a key element of defense institution
building. All of these activities are related because
they shape the security environment, but they must
be achieved in a cost-effective manner, using tools that
evaluate the absorptive capacity prior to program start,
assess the effectiveness of program implementation on
an ongoing basis, and ensure accountability from program start to completion.
The FY 2017 NDAA presents huge challenges
for the DoD and its components, as it now demands
that a system be established that can link foreign and
defense objectives, theater security objectives, and
partner nation capacity and accountability. This task
in its complete sense cannot be undertaken as a solo
act; it requires coordination with other civilian agencies, especially the Department of State and the U.S.
Agency for International Development. With respect
to Africa, the most important step will be formulating
the strategy that Congress requires under Section 1273
of the NDAA. It prompts a critical examination of the
long-range implications of U.S. policy and strategy
toward Africa. The strategy demands a whole-of-government approach and underscores the importance of
U.S. national interests as an essential factor in the formulation of this document, but also in its execution.
It accentuates as well the emerging Trump administration’s foreign policy, a pragmatic policy in which
transactions and the interest of both parties, the United
States and its partners, will be important. These interests and policy objectives need to be defined clearly and
understood by both parties. Congress has the attention
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of the DoD because of the FY 2017 NDAA; it is now
up to the DoD to refine its processes and methods to
meet the legislative intent of enhancing program effectiveness and transparency.14 This study is an attempt
to help in this regard and provide suggestions on how
to respond effectively to the law’s provisions.
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CHAPTER 1
ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY: UNDERSTANDING
THE COMPETENCIES NEEDED FOR ACHIEVING
SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS
Adrian Wolfberg
In November 2016, the U.S. Congress levied a
requirement on the Department of Defense (DoD) to
evaluate the absorptive capacity of a partner nation
prior to initiating security cooperation programs with
its receiving institution, organization or unit.1 This
mandate reflects the consensus of the American foreign
policymaking, military, and think tank communities
that the absence or lack of partner nation absorptive
capacity has a negative effect on improving a partner nation’s stability. Few within these communities
understand what absorptive capacity is, although
everyone claims it is an important factor for achieving
American security-related goals in a region.2 Yet, if the
concept is not understood, then congressional compliance will be an impossible task to achieve.
Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the components of absorptive capacity and determine what it means to evaluate it. Where absorptive
capacity has been a most visible topic is in the economic literature where mathematical modeling is used
to evaluate the causal relationship between foreign aid
and economic growth at the country level.3 To complicate matters, disputes exist within that community as
to whether such a causal relationship even exists theoretically or empirically.4 Can a macroeconomic lens
help answer why a partner nation general officer will
gladly accept military systems or assistance from the
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United States, but only reluctantly consider the bigger
picture of how such systems or forms of assistance fit
upward into their culture and institutions, or fail to
understand how to integrate such systems downward
into their operations? It cannot because human behavior is the object of analysis. Hence, a macroeconomic
approach will not be appropriate for a unit and organizational-level analysis of absorptive capacity.
Given that such an approach is inappropriate,
this chapter uses the lenses of an organizational view
and a competency-based perspective to shed light on
the process of absorptive capacity and the ability to
evaluate it.5 Unfortunately, the literature created by
the foreign policymaking, military, and think tank
communities, and even the economic literature, fails
to define absorptive capacity in human terms, or its
internal mechanisms and external interfaces to others
in organizations, leaving its implementers hamstrung
with questions of how to comply with congressional
mandates in order to make improvements. All that
interested parties know is that something must be
done. However, what exactly must be done? Hence,
this chapter will also reframe the understanding and
role of absorptive capacity in social and organizational
contexts. It will do so by elucidating the meaning of
absorptive capacity, its internal complexity, its external
relationship to related phenomenon (in particular, that
of perspective-taking) and how a combined focus on
both phenomena is needed to develop competencies in
order to achieve sustainable solutions to improve security cooperation. A sustainable solution means that
after the assistance program ends, if the partner nation
is able to self-generate the resources and/or capability
in order to maintain, or even expand upon, the original program intent, then a sustainable solution exists.
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Here, the continent of Africa is used to illustrate the
imperative for developing a deeper understanding of
absorptive capacity, although its application can be
applied globally.
AFRICA AS A COMPLEX POLICY AND STRATEGY PROBLEM
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is the responsible American geographic combatant command for the
African continent (except for Egypt), where more than
$1 billion (fiscal year [FY] 2017) of security assistance
aid is either controlled (i.e., Title 10 funded) by or monitored (i.e., Title 22 funded).6 The conditions in Africa
are, for the most part, typical of complex problems.
Complex problems occur most frequently in social
contexts often intertwined with physical constraints.
Policy efforts at solving complex problems cannot produce optimal or efficient solutions; at best, complex
problems in the domain of policy challenge the notion
of even attaining goals, especially if they are unrealistic and unachievable.7 In terms of strategies that might
carry out policies targeted at complex problems, these
strategies succumb to the characteristics of being a
complex problem.8 Indicators of complex problems
include having many stakeholders, each with their
own agendas; having deep-seated and long-term reasons for the problem; being difficult to sustain forward
progress; having little foundation for building upon
success in the particular context; and having no clear
and obvious answer.9
For those organizations, like AFRICOM, faced with
this double whammy of a complex policy and strategy problem, it becomes imperative to understand
the underlying dynamics of the human system, its
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mechanisms, and its interfaces within its psychological, social, and physical environment. Africa satisfies
these conditions. Outsiders tend to have stereotypical views about Africa, its regions, and its people.10
Americans in particular tend to view Africans one-dimensionally, using tribal affinity as the dominant characteristic to understand differences among peoples;
even though Africans, like anyone else in the world,
have nested and multiple identities and loyalties: kinship, language, region, religion, country, town, school,
profession, and economic class, to name a few.11
While some trends indicate economic progress and
political stability have been made in selected areas of
the continent, Africa is faced with deep-seated economic and historical structural problems that expose
it to vulnerabilities ripe for the spread of terrorism.12
Four such economic structural problems are most pronounced in Africa. First, civil wars are common and,
once begun, the tendency to continue with violence
is difficult to stop. Second, corruption is widespread,
and, again, once a society has become corrupt, the tendency is to continue to be corrupt. Third, many of its
countries are dependent on a single or few resources
from which it can derive financial value, a condition
that makes it susceptible to instability. Lastly, in general, there is low political accountability to its citizens.13
Historically, the tradition of colonial intervention in
Africa has left its ugly mark, making it difficult for the
domestic population to develop its own capacity to
function in an information age.14 Poverty and corruption are rampant, interlinked, and self-reinforcing.15
When combining these economic and political
forces, it makes perfect sense to leverage security assistance aid to strengthen institutions and improve governance, under the umbrella of security cooperation.16
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However, the policy objectives that drive security
cooperation cannot, by themselves, create sustainable
solutions in Africa.17 A commitment by African nations
to their domestic reform is also necessary.18 With these
complex external and internal dynamics at play, it
behooves advocates of security cooperation to be realistic about what assistance partner nations in Africa
can absorb.
A POLICY FOCUS ON ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of
2017 defines security cooperation, in part, as developing a partner nation’s security capabilities.19 In order
to achieve this outcome, a country needs institutions
capable of sustaining and controlling capabilities
delivered through security cooperation programs.20
Further, to build partner nation institutions, Congress
dictates the Secretary of Defense provide to Congress
a detailed evaluation of a partner nation’s capacity to
absorb the assistance prior to program start.21 Evaluating such absorption requires a people- and context-centered focus because people operate in their
unique situations, and they are the agents and recipients of such assistance.22
Yet, the U.S. Government (USG) has never done
any systematic evaluation on its security assistance
programs.23 The lack of such a systematic evaluation
makes it difficult to establish standards for measurement, which is exactly what the law requires.24 To date,
American efforts at monitoring and evaluating foreign
assistance programs—the mechanisms for building
security cooperation—have typically been limited to
accounting for the money spent, not evaluating the
recipient’s capacity prior to program implementation.25
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The reasons for the focus on accountability of expenditures have been the pervasiveness of corruption and
waste in foreign countries; the resultant concern by
funding sources and program managers is to track
where money goes (instead of its impact), and the
requirement by law to do so.26
As a direct result of how evaluation has been framed
in this specific way, policymakers are disadvantaged
in that these analyses do not provide a significant
understanding of a partner nation’s ability to absorb
the capacity delivered at the unit, organizational, or
institutional level.27 AFRICOM decision makers face
the same disadvantage, as they must align their theater
campaign plan and the security cooperation activities
they are responsible for with what a country and its
units can absorb.28 This alignment is especially important since the likelihood of providing assistance to
partner nations with low absorptive capacity actually
reduces American influence and makes it unlikely it
will achieve program outcomes.29
Nowhere in security cooperation policy documents is absorptive capacity defined; nor, it turns out,
in think tank research either, which is where almost
all of the discussion surrounding absorptive capacity
related to security cooperation has resided. Yet, most,
if not all, studies conclude that security cooperation
efforts should be prioritized based on partner nations
with sufficient absorptive capacity. How, then, does
one evaluate absorptive capacity? This is an especially relevant question if the emphasis on helping
partner nations is based on their sufficient absorptive
capacity. There is a consistent call on what needs to
be done with reference to the need for an evaluation
of absorptive capacity, but voices demanding to know
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what absorptive capacity actually is or how to assess
absorptive capacity are absent.
For example, in a 2016 RAND study focusing exclusively on defense institution building in Africa—using
Liberia and Libya as its two case studies—researchers
concluded successful absorptive capacity by a partner nation is correlated to the degree of governance
in the partner nation.30 Efforts helping partner nations
to achieve good governance support the objectives of
the U.S. Army’s strategy for building partner capacity.31 The 2016 study indirectly alludes to a definition
of absorptive capacity by using the status of a nation’s
governance capability as a proxy for evaluating its
antecedent to absorb capacity, not the actual absorptive capacity.32 Their research suggested that for countries that have weak governance, it is of the utmost
importance to consider absorptive capacity before
a decision is reached to provide foreign assistance
because the partner nation may face such severe difficulties, thereby making foreign cooperation difficult
and risky. It is well known that achieving a high level
of absorptive capacity is difficult because it requires an
intense level of exposure to the new knowledge, but
once achieved, if indeed possible, having good absorptive capacity helps to thwart the construction of overly
ambitious goals set by funding sources and program
managers.33
Another recent RAND study has reinforced the
importance of absorptive capacity in successful foreign
assistance to build partner capacity. In an exhaustive
2013 study covering 20 years of data on 29 countries
around the world, RAND researchers found that
building partner capacity is causally dependent on
aligning such delivered capabilities with the partner
nation’s absorptive capacity.34 They concluded that
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the strongest and most consistent correlation for success, besides alignment of interests and objectives, is
the ability for the partner nation to absorb the goods
and services provided. While this RAND study did
not define absorptive capacity, it identified the kinds
of knowledge—none of which is macroeconomic—
needed in an evaluation of it. The study concluded that
the DoD must be able to determine the baseline absorptive capacity of a partner nation, which includes, but is
not limited to, understanding the following: existing
equipment in use, organizational structure and characteristics, readiness, the scope of existing training, technical sophistication, education, language abilities, and
doctrine.35 Having sufficient absorptive capacity of
these and other organizational aspects is a key requirement for security cooperation success.
ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY: MECHANISMS AND
CONTEXT
The phrase “absorptive capacity” has its roots in
the sciences where it is used in biology, chemistry,
physics, metallurgy, agriculture, food science, forestry,
and atmospheric sciences, to name a few. Absorptive
capacity—in the physical sciences—involves the use of
mathematical modeling to answer outcome questions.
For example, at what point will the structural integrity
of a skyscraper no longer be able to withstand the effect
of an earthquake? How much vitamin C can a human
assimilate into their body before its effect becomes
positive or, at the other extreme, its effect causes an
overdose? When will the percentage of carbon dioxide
become so high that it will cause a negative effect to
the health of humans? How much salt can be leached
into farmland before crops die? Absorptive capacity, at
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some point, became a metaphor in the social sciences
of economics and aspects of political science, both relying heavily on mathematical modeling and concerned
with outcomes such as the gross domestic product
(GDP) of a country.
In the economic context, absorptive capacity is
a measurement used to determine when a country
reaches the marginal rate of return to economic growth
falling below an objective, analyzed at the macroeconomic level, or the linkages between macroeconomic
and microeconomic levels.36 In political science, for
example, it could be used to address how many more
countries the European Union can admit into its membership before it losses its effectiveness and efficiency.
The field of psychology was the likely transfer source
for its adoption by the managerial sciences. Psychology includes a mathematical and experimental orientation, but also a humanistic and clinical side, which
is an orientation conducive to individual and grouplevel process inquiries.37
In the realm of management science, absorptive
capacity is a theoretical construct; that is, something
that explains human behavior that is not yet able to be
observed directly. Absorptive capacity is an abstraction that unfortunately has been reified—taken for
granted but without an understanding of what it actually means.38 It no longer has a meaning at the level
of individual or group absorption of knowledge.39
This reification is why the policy and think tank literature does not define it. The problem with reification is that a word or phrase, such as “absorptive
capacity,” can be used to mean anything misplaced;
that is, a meaningless substitute for something that is
assumed to be concrete.40 Such would be the case when
an unquestioned assumption mistakenly has applied
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the macroeconomic dimension of absorptive capacity
to the level of individual and group behaviors, as is
the case when dealing with societies and institutions
like foreign militaries and governments. To correct this
misplacement, this chapter uses the following definition of absorptive capacity as a starting point, which
originated in management literature in the early 1990s:
The premise of absorptive capacity is that the organization
needs prior related knowledge to assimilate and use new
knowledge. Accumulated prior knowledge increases
both the ability to put new knowledge into memory and
the ability to recall and use it.41

This definition has two behavioral mechanisms that
potentially could be observed: the taking in of new
knowledge and then use of the new knowledge. Figure
1-1 conveys this two-mechanism feature of absorptive
capacity.

Figure 1-1. Basic Behaviors of Absorptive Capacity.
This 1990 conceptualization of absorptive capacity
has three implications. First, absorptive capacity occurs
at multiple levels— the individual, the organizational,
10

and interorganizational—and each subordinate level
contributes to the superior level’s capacity.42 The key
for understanding a partner nation’s absorptive capacity, then, is to understand absorptive capacity at the
unit level where individuals and groups work, and
how absorptive capacity flows upward and outward
into the organization and across to other organizations. The bottom-to-top flow of absorptive capacity also occurs in the reverse, from top-to-bottom.
Second, what the individual person or unit already
knows prior to contact with new knowledge affects
their degree of absorptive capacity. Individual and
organizational knowledge is therefore the currency of
absorptive capacity. Third, that the cumulative effect
of decisions made within a unit and its organization,
as well as those between organizations, is their path
dependency, which shapes their degree of absorptive
capacity.43 Path dependency is essentially the narrowing effect that an individual’s and an organization’s
past decisions have in shaping the degree of openness
or flexibility in how one considers the factors involved
with decision-making in the present.44 A well-known
yet extreme example of the narrowing effect is the
long-standing use of the QWERTY keyboard instead
of the adoption of an alternate keyboard configuration
that may be more efficient.45
By the early 2000s, scholars began to delve deeper
into the original 1990 idea of absorptive capacity.
Keeping in mind that absorptive capacity is a multilevel phenomenon, this newer conceptualization
divided absorptive capacity into four components:
knowledge acquisition and knowledge assimilation
as the subcomponents of taking in new knowledge,
and transformation of knowledge into routines, and
exploitation of knowledge to extend its organizational
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expertise, as the subcomponents of using new knowledge.46 The acquisition of new knowledge means one
can identify knowledge external to one’s self and organization as new and relevant rather than ignore, deny,
or distort it. Assimilation refers to the extent that individual and organizational frames of reference, norms,
schemas, and routines allow one to understand the
new knowledge; if one does not have the background
to place the new knowledge into a context relevant to
existing cognitive frames, then the new knowledge will
not be absorbed. Transformation refers to the extent to
which the new knowledge changes the status quo and
becomes integrated into routines. Exploitation is the
ability to use existing or develop new organizational
know-how to implement and integrate the routines
necessary to operationalize the new knowledge.
By the early 2010s, scholars began understanding
absorptive capacity as a complex activity with internal components that are interactive, and that it occurs
within a multidimensional external framework, both
internally and externally moving through space and
time. As to spatial orientation, the four internal components of absorptive capacity were envisioned as highly
interactive, not necessarily sequenced in a linear fashion, and connected by social and material translations
made by individuals communicating with other individuals.47 Externally, as mentioned above, absorptive
capacity occurs at multiple levels of human activity:
within a single individual, within one’s organization
by individuals working in units, and in relationships
between individuals from different organizations who
interact from within their units representing their organizations to another organization. Most of the empirical
research at these levels has occurred in the management field; typically, with for-profit organizations.
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What scholars now recognize is the simultaneous
interplay across these levels of analysis in how absorptive capacity affects the flow of knowledge and decision-making.48 At the core of this multilevel system,
however, is the role of the individual and the manner
in which absorptive capacity is exhibited within and
through that individual, and his or her communicative
interaction with other individuals.
Absorptive capacity also flows through time; that is,
it has a temporal component. In a recent article within
the security cooperation literature, the author notes
that absorptive capacity occurs across three sequential
stages of security assistance:
1. At the front end of the requirement planning
process, a determination of whether the endstate (i.e., the outcome that is supposed to result
from delivery of goods and/or services provided) is sustainable;
2. Monitoring and assessing during the engagement stage, i.e., seeing whether the process of
U.S. implementation can be absorbed by the
partner nation; and,
3. Completion of the specific program, long-term
monitoring through dynamic feedback loops,
the identification of impediments to absorptive
capacity and solutions to overcome them.49
Figure 1-2 depicts the multidimensional complexity of
absorptive capacity and its evolution from the initial,
more simplistic conceptualization.

13

Figure 1-2. Complexity of Absorptive Capacity
Behavior.
ANTECEDENTS OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY
Recently, scholars have identified environmental
factors affecting an individual’s, an organization’s,
and interorganizational abilities to possess a high level
of absorptive capacity.50 For example, antecedents
(precursors) of absorptive capacity must be considered
as critical enablers. Antecedents include the need for a
positive management philosophy that ensures porous
organizational boundaries so that employees can be
open to and identify new sources of knowledge from
outside of their particular organizational unit and
“silo,” and receive such knowledge from those who
have identified it. Similarly, it behooves management
to identify those personnel within their organization
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who can further identify employees playing roles as
boundary spanners, individuals who are particularly good at translating new knowledge into existing
knowledge contexts; as well as identify employees
who are gatekeepers, individuals who control access
to knowledge. When boundary spanners and gatekeepers do not share knowledge, boundaries become
opaque and absorptive capacity for those who rely on it
becomes low. When boundary spanners and gatekeepers do share knowledge freely and openly, boundaries
remain porous and absorptive capacity has the potential to become high.
Organizational features also contribute to effective
absorptive capacity. In addition to the pathways that
help disseminate knowledge, many other internal features of organizations can have a positive or negative
effect on absorptive capacity; but these features are
not well studied, though they are suspected as being
important considerations.51 These internal features
include the design of the organization and its internal
units, the size of the organization, the informal and
formal communication networks, and the reward and
punishment policies. There are also external features
surrounding an organization that come into play.52
Such external features include how an organization
has generally viewed and treated knowledge originating from sources external to it, which is an indication
of its path dependence. Path dependency occurs not
only within a partner nation’s context but also within
the American funding source and program manager’s
context.
For a sense of how the phenomenon of path dependency operates, an example from the American context
is provided. Some observers have identified historical
elements that DoD and civilian security assistance
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programs use in the planning of sustainable solutions.
These elements represent the effect of path dependency
on the ability of institutions to change.53 Two elements
have been identified in this regard: visibility and viability.54 The motivation for visibility is to promote
goodwill toward the United States, while the motivation for viability is to have sustainable economic outcomes. Reinforced by path dependency, DoD places
more emphasis on access and influence (i.e., visibility),
while civilian agencies put more emphasis on sustainability (i.e., viability).55 Examples of civilian agencies
are the partner nation’s civil society and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) providing goods and
services.56
In another example of American path dependency,
observers have questioned the reliability of focusing
exclusively on governance as a critical success factor
and, instead, shifted the focus on the orientation of the
American actor involved with foreign assistance. The
economist William Easterly, while discussing efforts to
combat poverty in less developed countries, identifies
two very different path dependencies framing foreign
assistance. He suggests that U.S. efforts tend to fail
when designed and implemented by those with the
“big plan,” those he calls “planners” who focus on the
“delivery model,” whereas efforts that tend to succeed
occur when projects are designed and implemented
by those he calls “searchers,” who create sustainable
solutions by adapting to local conditions, understanding what really works at the ground level, and creating
dynamic feedback mechanisms with those in receipt of
goods and services.57 Examples of planners are project and program managers within the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), the Department
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of State, DoD, the U.S. Army, and combatant commands. Examples of searchers are NGOs.58
Similarly, how a partner nation has viewed and
treated alliances within its national security apparatus,
other government entities outside of the national security institutions, as well as foreign non-security organizations are key indicators of how path dependency
can affect absorptive capacity. Nevertheless, it is not
only how knowledge is treated across organizations;
it is also how individuals are viewed and treated, and
interrelated, because who they are and where they are
organizationally aligned affect absorptive capacity.
When individuals within partner nation organizations
view and treat individuals from other organizations as
threats, then low levels of absorptive capacity result. In
the same vein, when individuals within organizations
view and treat individuals from other organizations as
allies, then high levels of absorptive capacity can be
reached.
Other path dependency factors can have a moderating effect on absorptive capacity. The culture, both
organizational and national, can have a significant
positive or negative effect on absorptive capacity. One
such key factor that can influence the effects of culture
is the style and norms of communication and interrelatedness between individuals, including the practices,
values, and beliefs assumed.59 When cultural differences are extreme, absorptive capacity is expected to
be low. When they are closely aligned, it is expected
to be high. In addition to relatively static influences
of culture, there are dynamic features in the environment that affect absorptive capacity. These include
the political, economic, and technological differences
between organizations and the level of stability of
these differences.60
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How individuals, units, organizations, and institutions adapt to these dynamic features is indicative of
their absorptive capacity. In the United States, when
the environment is chaotic and unstable, absorptive
capacity is often hoped for and used in order to be
innovative, to seek new solutions or new ways of doing
business.61 Instability can trigger the need for high
levels of absorptive capacity. However, in other countries such as those in Africa, instability may narrow
the organization’s viewpoint, decrease flexibility in
new approaches, and result in low absorptive capacity. If an American, who assumes instability can ignite
absorptive capacity, applies this assumption to a country where instability diminishes absorptive capacity,
then this error in judgment would be an example of
mirror imaging.62 An accurate evaluation of absorptive
capacity would reduce the chances for making mirror-imaging judgments.
ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY: THE IMPACT OF
BOUNDARIES
How new knowledge is encountered by individuals within and between organizations is a function
of the relationship between these individuals and
the unit and organizational boundaries where they
and the knowledge crosses.63 Boundaries are defined
within the context of human behavior: boundaries are
socially constructed conceptual distinctions created
intentionally to foster specific patterns of behavior by
one set of individuals that are different from other sets
of individuals.64 The management value of boundaries
is their control over individuals, units, and organizations by establishing specialized patterns of behavior
by which one devotes his or her energy, distinct from
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other patterns of behavior within other boundaries.65
Unfortunately, what could be considered a positive
feature of boundaries—deeper specialized knowledge
for the organization—is also a negative feature because
it retards the needed effort of integrating knowledge
across boundaries.66
Ease of boundary crossing varies from open
to restricted, and is subject to the influences of the
antecedents and effects of external context discussed
above. Detecting the existence and recognizing the
character of a boundary are therefore key competencies for organizational members who evaluate the
absorptive capacity of individuals, units, and organizations. The reason is because communication across
boundaries requires an understanding of a common
linguistic basis: the structure of expressions, sentences,
and paragraphs (syntax); the meaning of these elements (semantics); and the knowledge of how these
meanings can be applied to understand each actor’s
world and shape action (pragmatics).67 When there is
a large difference between two linguistic bases, there
is great difficulty in moving knowledge across boundaries, because each party has difficulty understanding
the other’s meaning, which has the effect of lowering
absorptive capacity.
When boundary-crossing challenges become
intense and divisive, the search for a unifying common
knowledge necessary for absorption seems unlikely.
What needs to occur in this case, or even in cases
where boundary challenges are not so extreme, is to
create a shared artifact—conceptual or physical—that
can be used to help negotiate the different interests and
meanings by laying down the foundation for introducing new knowledge to either side. What is needed is
an artifact that can preserve the worldviews of both
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the person carrying knowledge through a boundary
and the person on the other side of the boundary, the
expected recipient, while at the same time provide
enough flexibility to overcome the limitations of path
dependence and increase absorptive capacity. Such an
artificially created artifact is called a boundary object.68
Creating boundary objects to fit such a need can be
a tremendously difficult task. There are many examples of boundary objects. A representative sample of
the types of boundary objects that have been studied includes charts,69 machines and machine parts,70
metaphors,71 narratives,72 stories and storytelling,73
production development,74 biological samples,75 and
simulation technology.76 All these boundary objects
typically come into existence because of specific organizational problems that individuals involved in crossing boundaries experienced in the course of sharing
new knowledge. The challenge is then to create boundary objects that operate at the intersection of the two
disparate knowledge communities. Boundary objects
that achieve a pathway for new knowledge to be
exchanged and understood will facilitate higher levels
of absorptive capacity than those that fail.
Cultural contexts may be too extremely different to
establish and maintain boundary objects as a mechanism for transiting boundaries to increase absorptive
capacity. Creating such common ground may not be
possible or likely. For example, other countries sometimes fear the idea of a centralized, federal government,
an idea that Americans take for granted, so assumptions about new knowledge by one side will not be
valid by the other. In a country like Libya, many have
a deep-seated mistrust of having a centralized government because of path dependency, the fact that the history of a centralized government reminds its citizens
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of the negative effects and inequality by its past totalitarian regime and colonialism.77 However, what can be
done is to construct common procedures and interpretations, rather than an underlying common ground,
with the receiving individuals and organizations of
new knowledge. Called a trading zone, this artificially
created cultural artifact operates at the local level,
within the context of the recipient.78 Trading zones
are symbolic spaces where differences in beliefs and
actions will not appreciably change, yet the zones are
designed so they are mutually recognizable, provide
valid procedures, and standardize interpretations.79
Establishing and maintaining a trading zone supports
higher levels of absorptive capacity.
Beyond the role of boundary objects and trading zones, how and whether knowledge successfully
crosses boundaries to be absorbed is highly dependent on the political, organizational, and social power
of the individual sending knowledge across boundaries as well as those who are the recipients.80 Power
is defined as the ability to achieve a desired outcome,
and it is a fundamental motivation by individuals
and units within organizations, as well as the motivation for achieving higher order organizational goals.81
Power relations operate within units of an organization, across organizations and stakeholders.82 As a
result, powerful individuals—like those with positional authority—can have a significant impact on the
absorptive capacity process. This effect occurs through
individuals acting alone or influencing others acting as
boundary spanners and gatekeepers, and those operating within the boundary, where boundary objects
and trading zones can be artificially constructed and
cooperatively constructed. Identifying sources of
power, then, becomes a key competency to identify
prospects and strategies for understanding absorptive
21

capacity. Figure 1-3 summarizes how antecedents and
boundary effects surround the hierarchically diverse
and temporally phased nature of absorptive capacity,
which is involved in the processing of new knowledge
into absorbable and usable knowledge.

Figure 1-3. Absorptive Capacity: Antecedents and
Boundary Effect.
THE ROLE OF PERSPECTIVE-TAKING TO
DETECT ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY
The next part of this chapter is introduced by way
of analogy. In the domain of national security and
domestic law enforcement, the goal of intelligence
analysis is to provide decision makers with the knowledge they need to take action, if any. The creation of
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such knowledge can be broadly explained as a threestep process. The first step is for the intelligence analyst
to understand how the phenomenon manifests itself in
contextually relevant conditions. In other words, the
first step is to understand the threat. Up to this point
in this chapter, the phenomenon of absorptive capacity
has been revealed in some detail, displayed in Figures
1-1 through 1-3. The second step for the intelligence
analyst is to understand how various sensor-based
resources available to him or her can detect the threat;
this is an important step because understanding how a
phenomenon is evolving in real-time is a dynamic situation and, quite often, sensor-based information does
not completely detect or explain the threat behavior.
However, at a minimum, the analyst must understand
the collection sources and methods available, their limitations and capabilities, the information provided at
the moment, and the degree to which that information
supports or discounts the existence of a threat. To evaluate absorptive capacity also requires understanding
how one observes or detects it. The third step is making
inferential judgments based on imperfect and limited
data and determining how it applies to understanding
and expressing the threat conditions.
To recap, there are a lot of moving parts to understanding absorptive capacity, an extremely complex
phenomenon that occurs as a human activity, and
one in which aspects may be transparent or invisible—aspects almost guaranteed to be interdependent.
Detecting absorptive capacity, like the intelligence analyst’s second step, requires an understanding of how
the phenomenon presents itself. In terms of absorptive capacity, the U.S. service or civilian member of
the DoD, the U.S. Army, or other security cooperation
actor must be able to detect the absorptive capacity of
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individuals in partner nations. Such detection involves
perspective-taking. Briefly, perspective-taking is the
ability to understand how other’s think and act, putting oneself in the shoes of the other, in order to detect
their level of absorptive capacity. Perspective-taking
provides oneself the ability to diagnose socially interactive contexts, another reason why it is an important
antecedent to assessing absorptive capacity.83
Scholars have recently taken a deeper look into
the components of perspective-taking. First, perspective-taking is very specific to the other person being
perceived.84 The uniqueness, the context, and the
transparency and complexity of the other person will
shape the demands upon perspective-taking. Second,
perspective-taking consists of three components: cognitive, emotional, and perceptual.85 Cognitive perspective-taking has to do with how one understands the
other’s perspective, and how that perspective relates
to the other’s goals. Emotional perspective-taking
judges the degree of similarity between the two—the
one doing the perspective-taking and the one being
assessed—to include how interpersonal relations
are viewed, how establishing and maintaining professional and personal friendships are viewed, and
what is socially acceptable or not. Perceptual perspective-taking is the self-assessment, by both actors, of
their ability to use perspective-taking on the other, and
the communication mechanisms—verbal and nonverbal—for making such assessments.
How perspective-taking relates to absorptive
capacity can now be made explicit. The cognitive and
emotional components of perspective-taking help
the one doing the perspective-taking of “seeing” the
knowledge being conveyed and how the new knowledge is positioned by the other person to be absorbed.
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The cognitive and perceptual components, meanwhile, help the one doing the perspective-taking to
“believe” what he or she is seeing.86 This relationship
implies that absorptive capacity operates recursively;
that is, as a recurrent or repeated process, with perspective-taking.87 The perspective taker can hopefully
see and interpret the absorptive capacity of the other,
but only to the extent the perspective taker’s own level
of absorptive capacity from seeing and believing will
afford. Accuracy of detection and interpretation are
key competencies for both absorptive capacity and
perspective-taking. Thus, perspective-taking is a necessary antecedent for the detection and understanding of how others take in knowledge, and how their
antecedents to absorptive capacity such as beliefs,
goals, and intentions affect them.88
CONTEXTS THAT INFLUENCE
PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
Culture, like absorptive capacity, is a theoretical construct that is not directly observable, but only
detected and interpreted by physical, communication,
and behavioral symbolic forms.89 One challenge that
immediately comes to mind is that differences in society, economics, and social norms make it very difficult
to see the other person accurately; in fact, scholars have
known for a long time that failure to take the perspective of the other person results in the failure to understand their background and expectations.90 Moreover,
the direction of causality can be reversed as well. A
second compounding challenge is that individuals
within units of organizations—affected by its unit and
organizational culture—see the world through that
unit’s frame.91 This means that the U.S. actor, who is
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embedded within his or her unit’s framework, has an
especially difficult time taking the perspective of the
individual within the partner nation unit’s framework.
A seminal American example from the 1950s
demonstrates this well-known phenomenon: vice-presidents from a large organization, ranging from departments such as marketing, engineering, manufacturing,
research and development, and sales, were given a
hypothetical problem to solve, but they were asked to
assume the vantage point of the president of the organization.92 Each provided a solution, but each solution
was centered on their department’s culture and capabilities, not the view that the president would have
spanning across functions. The vice presidents were
not able to take the perspective of another, yet the
survival of the organization was dependent on them
taking a different perspective. A key factor in why perspective-taking is so difficult is that humans, operating
in organizations of any type, have their unique “life
world”93 or “thought world.”94 Life or thought worlds
are the socially constructed assumptions, procedures,
norms, and goals that individuals possess, and individuals within units typically share. To achieve successful
perspective-taking requires one to value the diversity
of knowledge, to recognize and accept that other persons may have different ways of thinking and acting,
and to engage in inferential and judgmental cognitive
processes.95
For an example of how life or thought worlds come
into play, scholars have investigated whether perspective-taking is affected at a systemic level. In one
interesting study, the cultural differences between
American and East-Asian cultures were contrasted.96
China has a collectivist culture whereas America has
an individualistic one. The results of the study indicate
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that in cultures focused on interdependence between
its members, perspective-taking is enhanced, whereas
cultures focused on independence have a more difficult time being effective at perspective-taking. In a
different study about the effects of culture, three East
African countries (the Republic of Kenya, the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, and the Republic of
Zambia) and three West African countries (the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Republic of Ghana, and
the Republic of Sierra Leone) had a very high level of
collectivism.97 While not all African countries were
included in the study, the results are informative. In
this same study, American culture had a very high
level of individualism, which strongly suggests that
Americans have a difficult time gaining insight into
the perspective of others.
Another relevant aspect of this study is the value
placed on power distance. Power distance is the degree
people working in organizations view the centralization of authority within the management structure,
whether it is a high or low barrier to freedom of decision-making at any hierarchical level.98 The study concluded that the West and East African countries had
a high power distance, while Americans exhibited a
very low power distance. These conclusions mean that
perspective-taking in the face of significant cultural
differences will demand competencies perhaps not yet
routinely exhibited by Americans.
In contexts such as Africa, where multicultural
perspective-taking is needed, the kind of competencies required by Americans include not only regional
expertise, but also, more importantly, self-awareness, personal, and interpersonal social skills.99 More
advanced perspective-taking competencies are needed
as well. These include knowledge extraction skills,
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interpretation skills, and an understanding of how
other cultures have framed the individual’s model of
reality.100 How one achieves these basic and advanced
competencies becomes important. An individual must
be able to leave their ego at the door in order to see
the cognitive processing and emotional context of the
other; he or she must be willing to exert the effort necessary to understand the knowledge processing activities of the other; and the individual must be proficient
at inferential thinking, tapping into relevant experience, and detecting and interpreting nonverbal cues.101
Like absorptive capacity, there is an antecedent
dispositional factor to perspective-taking: being willing and motivated to engage in perspective-taking.102
This dispositional factor is important because perspective-taking is not only a cognitive activity, it also
involves the existence and influence of relationship
activities between the one doing the perspective-taking and the one being observed.103 Perspective-taking
also allows one to detect and understand the power
motivations of the other person, which is especially
relevant if hidden agendas and agreements with other
actors exist.104 For example, during the Cuban Missile
Crisis in 1962, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, sent President John F. Kennedy two proposals. The first one
was influenced by a hidden agenda, but the second
was not. It was the second one that Kennedy accepted,
because an advisor to Kennedy, Llewellyn “Tommy”
Thompson, who had lived with Khrushchev and his
wife in the Soviet Union, had intimate knowledge of
Khrushchev’s interests, motives, and behaviors, and
was able to identify the second proposal as the one that
allowed Khrushchev to be perceived domestically as a
winner by withdrawing from Cuba.105 Hidden agendas
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and agreements are common behavioral patterns associated with corruption.
In addition to the perspective-taking’s antecedent
dispositional factor, there are cognitive and emotional
antecedents.106 Cognitive antecedents include one’s
cognitive complexity, emotional regulation, working
memory, level of and triggering context of anxiety,
time pressure involved, and cognitive load. Emotional
antecedents include the level of one’s emotional intelligence and flexibility in operating in the role one is
placed.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ABSORPTIVE
CAPACITY AND PERSPECTIVE-TAKING
Evaluating absorptive capacity is a complex, recursive human activity intimately dependent on perspective-taking. First, how absorptive capacity in another
person and units of organization manifests themselves,
as discussed above, must be known. Second, perspective-taking provides the seeing and believing capabilities needed to detect absorptive capacity. Antecedents
and context affect perspective-taking. Its antecedents
include dispositional, cognitive, and emotional factors, while cultural contexts include differences in
life/thought worlds, extent of individualist versus
collectivistic culture, and view toward power within
organizational contexts. These antecedents and cultural contexts affect how one takes in perspectives and
how one diagnoses the absorptive capacity of others.
Third, the incoming information resulting from perspective-taking then succumbs to one’s own absorptive capacity in interpreting and using the incoming
knowledge. The level of complexity of the absorptive
capacity of one’s self will be dependent on his or her
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cognitive and emotional context, which requires one to
be able to assess one’s absorptive capacity in context.
Although not further discussed in this chapter, the
recursive feature of absorptive capacity will trigger the
repetitive process of perspective-taking by the other
person who needs it to assess one’s absorptive capacity
of the other, and on and on the iterative relationship
between absorptive capacity and perspective-taking
will continue.107 The recursive nature of communication behavior between two people is a natural feature
of human communication, providing the foundation
for evaluating absorptive capacity based on perspective-taking.108 Figure 1-4 summarizes the overall complexity of evaluating absorptive capacity, building on
information in Figures 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3, and what it
takes to understand the absorptive capacity of other
individuals, units, and organizations.
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Figure 1-4. Complexity of Evaluating Absorptive
Capacity.
COMPETENCIES FOR DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS
There is broad agreement that the key to achieving sustainable solutions in Africa and elsewhere is
an accurate evaluation of the partner nation’s unit
and organizational absorptive capacity. Because the
security cooperation community has typically framed
absorptive capacity in macroeconomic terms, this
chapter’s function has been to reframe absorptive
capacity at a human scale. In so doing, it has identified
three major competencies as being necessary to evaluate absorptive capacity:
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1. Understand the factors associated with absorptive capacity in and between individuals, units,
and organizations of specific partner nations;
2. Understand an individual’s competency in perspective-taking of that absorptive capacity; and,
3. Have and/or develop an analytic skill of inferential judgment to fill in the uncertainty gaps from
less than complete knowledge gained through
perspective-taking of absorptive capacity.
This chapter has explained the evaluation process
as well as what it takes to carry out such an evaluation
process since, at this point, no one has come forth with
the competencies required for project and program
managers to evaluate absorptive capacity. While this
chapter does not provide specific instructions on procedures, or how to measure such procedures—neither
does it attempt to narrow such an application to apply
only to Africa—what follows next are proposals for
developing these competencies. Improvements entail,
for the most part, reliance on educating DoD, the U.S.
Army, and supporting personnel; although improvements can be supplemented by on-the-job experiences.
Understand Absorptive Capacity
The proposed way ahead involves a new type of
thinking; first, in terms of leadership expectations
about learning, how to do things differently by conceptualizing progress in terms of process, not on
achieving an immediate outcome. Second, in terms of
employees and other supporting personnel following
through with such expectations, an interdisciplinary
and self-developmental approach is needed. However, such an approach will be challenging, and it will
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take time to make significant progress. Regarding the
first type of thinking for leadership, this will mean a
commitment to becoming a learning organization. A
learning organization is one in which new ideas are
embraced, which can be very challenging for employees who are expected to follow established policies,
rules, and procedures. The need for the U.S. Army to
be a learning organization is becoming exceedingly
more important.109 A learning organization is the antidote to path dependency, the former difficult to create,
the latter difficult to overcome.
Leadership can use two key levers to help employees become a learning organization. One is ensuring
that the capacity and capability for reflection and
analysis exist in order to pay attention to the mechanisms involved with absorptive capacity and perspective-taking; and the other, since boundaries are such
a key component of knowledge considerations for
absorptive capacity and perspective-taking, is taking
steps to make boundaries more open and porous.110
Both leadership efforts will be challenging, because in
the DoD and uniformed military services, especially
the U.S. Army, there is a tendency to create a one-sizefits-all approach to learning; instead, what is needed is
an approach designed around the situational context.111
Why such a focus on situational context is needed is
especially relevant for Africa, because what Africa
needs for achieving a sustainable solution requires
individuals to have an improved knowledge of oneself, the other person (the principal involved), and the
environment in which the other person operates.112
Attention is now turned to the civilian employees,
service personnel, and contractors who will be in the
business of evaluating absorptive capacity, and require
an interdisciplinary and self-developmental approach.
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Returning to the intelligence analysis analogy mentioned earlier, one requirement is to understand the
components of the threat, which, in this case, is the
understanding of the interdisciplinary components
of absorptive capacity as depicted in Figures 1-1, 1-2,
1-3, and 1-4. This is a knowledge acquisition process:
something that can be learned through the design and
implementation of an educational program. Expertise
from NGOs—both U.S.-based and partner nationbased—that live and work in the partner nation could
be invaluable and desirable sources of contextual
information for such a program. Other sources are
principals of the partner nation’s civil society such as
individuals within academia, foundations, polity, and
professional associations.
Understand Perspective-taking
Regarding the second type of thinking, the more
complex requirement is to understand how to make
use of and improve one’s perspective-taking in order
to detect absorptive capacity. Perspective-taking, like
the intelligence analysis analogy, is the method by
which an evaluation of absorptive capacity occurs
based on perceived information of absorptive capacity.
While perspective-taking can be learned, it also can be
improved through experience.113 For perspective-taking, four focus areas are recommended for self-development: paying attention, suspending judgment,
figuring out what is important, and being open to new
knowledge. These four areas are discussed next.
Paying Attention.
The mechanisms by which individuals pay attention to elements in their social and organizational
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environment consists to a large degree of selective
attention, attentional vigilance, and executive attention.114 Selective attention is the motivation and process
by which an individual focuses his or her information
processing energy on some particular aspect in his/her
environment at any one time. In real world conditions,
the effects of information overload and ambiguity in
one’s personal context confound the degree to which
one can pay attention to any one aspect of their environment.115 Being aware of these confounding effects
and measures to mitigate them would be an imperative to improving selective attention and, therefore, a
necessary competency. In real world conditions, individuals have to be aware of and pay attention to many
aspects in their environment simultaneously; this is
called mindfulness and is a highly desirable competency.116 Attentional vigilance is spending sufficient
time focusing and considering the meaning of something or someone in one’s environment and, therefore, also an important competency. How much time
one spends depends on the individual, but the more
important indication of sufficiency of time is the depth
of understanding achieved. Of course, the effects of
information overload and ambiguity will be present.
Finally, executive attention is a higher order conceptual process by which one incorporates the knowledge
gained through selective attention and attentional vigilance into one’s decision-making about the meaning
and implications of the environment.
Suspending Judgment.
The results of what one pays attention to in selective attention and attentional vigilance succumb to the
human tendency to judge the other person. This calls
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for individuals to suspend judgment on what they
think is right or wrong.117 As discussed above, many
aspects are involved in absorptive capacity where
fundamental differences exist between Americans
and Africans, which makes it easier for the former
to make judgments about the latter, and of course, it
works in reverse as well. Being able to pay attention
without making a judgment is a competency in which
the individual listens and observes to the maximum
extent possible to achieve the best understanding of a
situation.
Deciding on Importance.
Deciding what is important from what one understands is another key area that supports effective perspective-taking. What makes something important to
understand is usually something one does not already
understand. Indications of confusion are then sources
to focus energy to clarify. Specific sources of confusion
are the appearance and recognition of contradictions.118
Effort spent on resolving contradictions is one pathway
to developing a competency of self-development.119
Open to New Knowledge.
Finally, how one applies the new insight from
new knowledge will determine whether new learning
occurs. Either an individual fits new knowledge into
an existing cognitive frame or his/her cognitive frame
expands or shifts, thereby creating a new way of seeing
the world.120 The components of absorptive capacity
also affect the self in determining whether frames of
reference remain the same or change over the course
of time while interacting with one’s social world. This
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is the recursive nature of perspective-taking discussed
above.
Inferential Judgment
Since perfect knowledge of the human behavior domain is not possible due to the limitations of
bounded rationality in organizational settings, dealing with uncertainty is a normal feature of everyday
and scientific life.121 An accurate understanding of
absorptive capacity in others (and one’s self) and one’s
perspective-taking is not immune to this limitation.
Dealing with uncertainty generally affords individuals two options: one is to attempt to eliminate it, while
the other is to manage it.122 Because the context of partner nations, such as many of those in Africa, manifests itself in a multitude of complex dimensions, as
discussed above, the latter is deemed achievable and
therefore, most appropriate. In order to manage uncertainty, one needs an abundance of meta-cognition: to
be sensitive to what one thinks is known, what one
thinks is not known, what one thinks is happening in
the environment one is paying attention to, what one
thinks is driving the behavior of others, and where
one thinks the events unfolding in the environment
are headed.123 Meta-cognition, the ability to detect and
accurately interpret one’s own thought processes, is
a critical competency to assess one’s inferences and
performance.
The means by which one manages uncertainty is
dependent on the methods one uses to handle inferences made about the world. An inference is the character of the cause-and-effect relationship an individual
makes about the world, whether implicit or explicit.124
Inferential judgment is a cognitive journey, moving
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upwards on a “ladder of inference” that begins by the
individual naming the data or phenomenon he or she
observed; next, it develops into ways of describing the
named thing or related things based on its meanings,
and then further develops by applying these meanings
onto the interpretations of the actions and communication behavior of others, and finally terminates with a
conclusion about the meaning of the broader event or
behavior.125 There are an abundant number of opportunities during this inferential journey for reasoning to
stumble as one moves from the lowest data level to the
highest conclusion level.
The challenges in making accurate inferential
judgments abound but it is in this analytic space that
evaluating the limitations of what we know about
absorptive capacity and perspective-taking reside.
Examples of key analytic challenges include not examining the validity or rigor of the inferences one makes;
placing too much importance or too little importance
on a specific piece of data or phenomenon; interpreting
conflicting information in a way that merely reinforces
one’s view of the world instead of challenging it; relying on inferences that are difficult for others or one’s
self to examine; and not taking advantage of analytic
techniques that reside in the social sciences.126
One way to improve the construction of valid inferences from perspective-taking of the other person’s
absorptive capacity is to consider alternative explanations as to why the event or behavior observed is
interpreted.127 Another way is, when confronted with
explanations that conflict with one’s view of the world,
to work through the conflict using critical thinking to
accommodate a different view of the world.128 Another
way to assess one’s inferences is to ask others what
they think and listen to the logic of their inference
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development, compare it to one’s own, and discuss
where there are differences.129 Faulty inferences lead
to overconfidence and inaccurate conclusions about
events and behaviors, which lead to faulty evaluations of absorptive capacity.130 All of these suggestions
require a sufficient competency in meta-cognition.
Figure 1-5 summarizes the competencies needed to
evaluate absorptive capacity. The first skill is to understand the complex nature of absorptive capacity and perspective-taking, and why perspective-taking is the key
method for detecting it. The second is to improve one’s
perspective-taking abilities through both education and
experience to pay attention, suspend judgment, figure
out what is important, and incorporate new insights.
The third is to use the analytical skills associated
with inferential judgment, especially meta-cognition,
which is an awareness of how one’s inferences are constructed and evaluated, in order to manage the uncertainty associated with incomplete knowledge of others’
absorptive capacity and one’s perspective-taking.
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Figure 1-5. Competencies for Evaluating Absorptive
Capacity.
CONCLUSION
Countries in Africa, like others in the world, have
their complex natures and characters. Perhaps, as an
extreme example of a continent, Africa has a combination of historical and contextual factors that make it
especially unstable and difficult to stabilize, thus creating a security vacuum in parts of the continent. In unstable situations, American efforts at security cooperation
have focused on strengthening institution building.
Policy guidance and those charged with implementing a theater strategy have called for better outcomes.
Studies by think tanks have confirmed that evaluating
absorptive capacity prior to cooperative engagement
is critical because security assistance efforts into countries with a low absorptive capacity will fail and have
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a negative blowback toward the United States. It is no
longer a question of what needs to be done; it is now
the question of how to do it. This is especially important because statutory change dictates the requirement
for the DoD, geographic combatant commands, and
the U.S. Army to evaluate a partner nation’s absorptive capacity prior to the start of security assistance
programs.
No one in the defense community has spelled out
who should, and what is needed, to evaluate absorptive capacity at a human scale. Policymakers and think
tanks alike have assumed that “absorptive capacity” is
a well-known and well-formed concept, derived from
a macroeconomic lens. This chapter has attempted
to correct this fallacy of misplaced concreteness by
reframing absorptive capacity based on its conceptualization in the management sciences and incorporating
a competency-based approach. Temporal and spatial
factors relating to absorptive capacity were overlaid,
and finally, antecedents were incorporated. Perspective-taking was introduced and explained along with
its mechanisms and antecedents by which the evaluation of absorptive capacity is made.
The important relationship between absorptive
capacity and perspective-taking was made explicit, as
well as the recursive nature of both. Recommendations
were made for leadership and the implementers: the
employees, uniformed service members, and contractors who will be the ones evaluating the absorptive
capacity of individuals, units, and organizations in
partner nations. Leadership responsibilities included
creating the vision that evaluating absorptive capacity is a process that will take some time to implement
successfully. Those who do the evaluating will need
three fundamental competencies: to learn about the
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multi-dimensional and interdisciplinary nature of
absorptive capacity and perspective-taking; to develop
the interpersonal skills to pay attention, suspend judgment, determine what is important, and integrate new
knowledge; and, to reflect upon, accurately assess, and
modify their inferential judgments as they move from
data observation to conclusion.
From a strategic perspective, the 2017 NDAA’s
requirement for evaluating absorptive capacity prior
to initiating security cooperation programs has been a
forcing function for the DoD, the U.S. Army, the future
of military foreign aid within geographic combatant
commands, and this chapter’s reframing contribution.
In doing so, this chapter specifies the characteristics of
and linkages between absorptive capacity and perspective-taking, as well as the competencies where further
developmental work is needed. It offers military and
civilian leaders the potential opportunity to moderate
security cooperation programs by those variables specific to a particular partner nation; and more importantly, the partner nation units, and its key individuals.
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CHAPTER 2
BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY (BPC) IN
AFRICA: THE GENERATING FORCE AND
THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY
EDUCATION
Thomas E. Sheperd
INTRODUCTION: DEFINING THE PROBLEM
The term “building partner capacity” (BPC) has a
long history in the Department of Defense (DoD) since
entering its lexicon in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review.1 Since then, BPC has become a useful term of
art throughout the DoD and among Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) as they develop and execute
theater-level strategies in support of U.S. national security objectives. In 2011, Army doctrine defined BPC as:
the outcome of comprehensive, interorganizational
activities, programs and engagements that enhance the
ability of partners for security, governance, economic
development, essential services, rule of law, and other
critical government functions.2

Although that definition does not appear in the updated
version of the relevant doctrinal publication, it does
emphasize the breadth of effort and activities involved
in building capacity for security and the interagency
coordination necessary between the DoD and other
organizations involved in such an enterprise.
Over the years, BPC and Africa appeared made
for each other. U.S. foreign policy embraced the concept of “African Solutions for African Problems,”
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a notion predicated on the idea that African states,
using their inherent resources, would be the primary
means for dealing with African security issues. Multiple U.S., African, and partner programs, going back
to the African Crisis Response Initiative, the French
Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities,
and the Africa Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance (ACOTA) program, labored under the goal
of creating a capable body of African troops that, by
themselves, would have both the capability and sustained capacity to intervene in security crises on the
continent in a manner consistent with U.S. and international interests and values.
This approach proved to be easier said than done.
In the past decade, a number of studies recognized that
the United States has had difficulty building sustainable capacity because the DoD BPC enterprise has been
overly focused on tactical capability generation based
on a “train and equip” mentality.3 In 2016, the Center
for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) discussed the
impact of this approach. CALL observed, particularly
with respect to Africa, that the available legal authorities address efforts “only at the tactical and operational
levels; more focus is needed at the institutional level.”4
This is a major point; a short-term focus hampers institutionalization of capacity in partner nations’ military
processes and practices that ultimately enable them to
deploy and resolve security crises in their own nation
or elsewhere on the continent. The establishment of
sustainable processes and practices, in many cases,
means changing the way of thinking of partner nations’
militaries, a very difficult, and certainly a long-term
undertaking. It also means that such activities cannot
be solely embarked upon and achieved through the
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efforts of U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), or even U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM).
BPC has been viewed largely as a theater shaping activity (Phase 0) based on the assumption that
building the capability and capacity of partners
enables weak states to overcome deficiencies so they
can effectively manage their own, and regional, security problems.5 In these terms, BPC is an economy of
force option that generates non-U.S. means to mitigate
threats, and thereby lowers the probability that U.S.
forces will have to be deployed in large numbers to
resolve a situation through the use of military power in
any of its manifestations. More recently, the DoD focus
has been on enabling the security partner to deal with
instability on its own, thereby BPC becomes inherently
a security force assistance (SFA) task focusing on the
development of sustainable autonomous capability
and capacity.6
However, such lines of attack miss some important points of emphasis in the definition provided previously. First, the stress based on the new provisions
regarding security cooperation in the fiscal year (FY)
2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is on
outcomes, or results, focused on strategic ends; not on
shaping activities, which are ways. While Phase 0 activities are important, sometimes critical, the essential
aspect is not whether a training plan was executed successfully, or an accounting of the number of personnel
trained or the exercises conducted, but on how did the
activities conducted by the U.S. Army, or other entities, contribute to the achievement of theater security
objectives. Second, by emphasizing outcomes, there is
a need for clear and precise measures of performance
and effectiveness for evaluating whether progress is
being made toward attaining those theater objectives.
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Granted, such measures are difficult to construct, but
the NDAA mandates that the Army has the means to
conduct such assessments across the spectrum of activities within the scope of security cooperation, which
includes professional military education (PME).7
PME can be an effective tool for transforming militaries and generating sustainable capacity because it
provides a means of changing the way military personnel think about problems.8 The U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) succinctly captures this
point in one of its recent reports: “Professional military education is the key to the development of the
nation’s armed forces.”9 The U.S. Defense Department
has long been interested in PME systems and Africa.
AFRICOM’s first U.S. Army War College (USAWC)
and the Command and General Staff College Alumni
Symposium in 2012 focused on the benefits of PME as
one of its plenary sessions.10 Additionally, PME curricula and the formation of military schools and development programs are included in current country plans
for African nations.11
However, despite this interest and investment in
African PME, the question remains: How well does
DoD understand the PME systems that it is dealing
with in Africa? Has DoD developed the means to help
African PME systems evolve as educational institutions, ensuring successful outcomes and sustainable
capacities in the face of a dynamically changing security environment? The emphasis, again, is on outputs
or capacity, not on capability, which a former senior
DoD official defined as a complex and interlocking
system of inputs.12 Therefore, without a detailed, highly
developed understanding of partner nation PME systems, the effects of generating educational capacity in
a partner are likely to be ephemeral and not linked to
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specific U.S. strategic goals and priorities in the present and future security environments.13
OBSERVATIONS
The purpose of this section of the study is to offer
an assessment of the U.S. security cooperation community’s level of understanding of African PME systems
and to determine how this knowledge translates into
PME-centered BPC engagements. The methodological
approach used a combination of academic research,
participation in engagement activities in the field, and
independent field research in selected African nations
and with U.S. military personnel. In addition, using
four baseline assessment questions, the author examined four PME case studies, two British-based legacy
PME systems and two French-based legacy PME systems, focusing in particular at the highest level of
PME in each country. The wider implications regarding how AFRICOM and USARAF conduct BPC in
Africa became evident during the course of the study
through this combined approach. The paper presents
a set of observations, examines their implications for
AFRICOM and USARAF BPC efforts, and makes recommendations for enhancing BPC, especially PME
BPC engagements with African partners.
During the course of the study concerning U.S. BPC
doctrine, U.S. BPC efforts, and African PME systems,
the following observations were made.
U.S. Doctrine: Army and Joint doctrine for conducting BPC activities is robust and functional.
While GAO and Congressional Research Service studies claim that BPC is not well defined, a review of
Field Manuals (FMs), Department of the Army (DA)
Pamphlet (PAM) 11-31, the Army Security Cooperation
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Handbook, and Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-13, Security
Force Assistance, provide a different view.14 These doctrinal publications, when used in combination, effectively differentiate between capability and capacity
in BPC, communicating to military planners that BPC
requires a systemic approach across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in order to be effective.15
Doctrine effectively differentiates between capability and capacity, two terms that tend to be used
interchangeably. DA PAM 11-31, Army Security Cooperation Handbook, makes the clearest differentiation
between capability and capacity. It defines capability
as, “The ability to execute a specified course of action,”
and it defines capacity as, “The ability to maintain
and employ a capability with sufficiency over time.”16
Other doctrinal publications note this differentiation.
For example, Army FM 3-22, Army Support to Security
Cooperation, makes a differentiation between capability and capacity in the geographical combatant commander’s operational design process when developing
the Theater Campaign Plan.17 FM 3-07.1, Security Force
Assistance, implies differentiation between capability and capacity when it discusses the need to ensure
long-term sustainment.18 JDN 1-13, Security Force Assistance, recognizes this differentiation when it discusses
the need for a partner’s independent sustainment of
capability over time.19
Army and Joint doctrine builds upon this differentiation between capability and capacity by promoting
an integrated approach to BPC, aimed at synchronizing these efforts across the operating, generating, and
executive direction levels of the force with respect to
both the partner and U.S. military systems. FM 3-22
specifically addresses the need to integrate capabilities across all levels of the force (executive direction,
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generating force, and operating force) to achieve BPC
objectives. It further addresses the capabilities the generating force brings to BPC.20 JDN 1-13 also specifies the
support that the organizations at these various levels
of the force bring to BPC activities when it defines the
functional activities of the executive, generating, and
operating forces and their relationship to BPC.21
More importantly, Army regulations (AR) and
doctrine specifically recognize the importance of the
institutional and generating force to the institutionalization of partner capability over time, which leads to
the development of genuine capacity. AR 11-31, Army
Security Cooperation Policy, explicitly states there is a
role in security cooperation for the institutional Army
and generating force assets.22 DA PAM 11-31 is equally
specific in its treatment of the importance of these specialized assets in terms of BPC: “These capabilities are
often [times] necessary to develop capacity at the institutional level providing the partner enough capability
to achieve desired end states.”23 This access to specialized knowledge and capabilities by the GCC and the
Army Service Component Command (ASCC) is in line
with, and builds upon, what is already stated in FM
3-22 and JDN 1-13, which identify the need for generating force capabilities in developing partner security
forces across the domains of doctrine, organization,
training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).24 This doctrinal linkage
of the institutional and generating forces to BPC is significant, given that doctrine places PME clearly in the
security force generating function.25
Given these factors, doctrine effectively provides
the needed guidance to conduct BPC. In addition, doctrine’s differentiation between capability and capacity is a critical one and crucial to success as it adds
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sustainability to BPC efforts, meaning the institutionalization of capability by the partner. By comprehending this distinction, the military planner has the
necessary frame of reference to determine which BPC
events are tactical in nature (capability generation) and
which are operational, or strategic, in nature (capacity
generation). This determination also enables the identification of the necessary means to apply against the
event and identifies where the means reside within the
force to institutionalize a capability effectively within
the partner nation.
If these steps are taken, then the probability of turning a capability into a capacity is amplified, provided
an adequate amount of time and investment is made
and sustained. Furthermore, institutionalized capacity
means a greater return on U.S. investments in security
cooperation, in terms of funding and human resource
commitment, for two reasons. First, it defines a recognizable end to security cooperation activities tied to the
desired outcomes. Second, it precisely links the BPC
activity to specific U.S. national security objectives in
the combatant commander’s area of responsibility.
Partial application of doctrine and the lack of
Generating Force resourcing inhibit a fully integrated approach to BPC. While the GCC and ASCC
apply doctrine using the Security Force Assistance
(SFA) model, the use of the executive or strategic direction, generating force, and operating force functions
is incomplete. The vast majority of observed planned
BPC engagement events are conducted in the operational force realm, with minimal engagement at the
strategic or executive direction level, and little or no
activities taking place at the generating force level. A
lack of knowledge about a partner nation’s generating function systems and lack of resourcing at the U.S.
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generating force level aggravates this tendency when
it comes to PME. The result is an incomplete approach
to conducting BPC in Africa.
Doctrinal literature is very clear: generating functions develop and sustain capabilities in the operating
force function.26 BPC doctrine emphasizes the need to
include generating functions in the ASCC commander’s mission analysis.27 Doctrine also underscores the
risk of “focusing security cooperation efforts in one
area or type of relationship at the expense of others
based on short-term goals.” Instead, to lessen this risk,
“security cooperation activities should be regarded
as providing means and ways to achieve meaningful mid- to long-term objectives with partners” and
equally, important theater strategic objectives.28 With
respect to BPC and Africa, the majority of observed
engagement activities being discussed and planned
at AFRICOM’s Synchronize the Resources Working
Group (STRWG) dealt with the operating force level
and did not include generating force function events
designed to tie together discrete tactical level security
cooperation events to institutionalized capacity.29
This focus on discrete tactical events is recognized
by the GCC. Multiple leaders admitted privately that
there is no understanding of defense institution building or PME systems within AFRICOM.30 This lack of
understanding is causing difficulties in transitioning
from short-term tactical activities, so-called kinetic
actions, dealing with immediate security threats from
violent extremist organizations, to long-term, sustainable effects.31 As one working group participant
remarked, “It’s easier to do kinetics.”32 Other personnel characterized the situation as a lack of strategic
patience in the face of demands for dealing with immediate threats.33 These comments support the conclusion
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several participants offered: that the enterprise (both
AFRICOM and DoD) is still outlining the problem of
how to pursue defense institution building, especially
in the area of defense education.34
Successful implementation of BPC, however,
requires a balance between discrete capability-generating events and longer-term integrating events focused
on institutionalizing capacity over time. This balanced
approach is consistent with the doctrinal emphasis on
the need to conduct multiple activities over time to
achieve the desired effects across the multiple functions and at various levels of the partner force.35 The
comments above indicate that there is a significant tension within AFRICOM on how to balance immediate
threats with long-term theater strategic objectives. This
overemphasis by the GCC on the tactical level of BPC,
which is understandable given the current security
environment on the continent, generates operational
risk in that it prioritizes short-term capability development over sustainable capacity development.
This tension, however, is not caused solely by current threats. Instead, pressures for immediate results
are exacerbated by the lack of knowledge and resourcing at the generating force level for the conduct of BPC.
As previously mentioned, a review of country plans
and discussions with STRWG participants on engagement events showed there is some executive direction
activity at the strategic level. The gap in focus exists at
the generating force level, as activities here are almost
nonexistent. This gap becomes especially evident
when it comes to PME-related activities that lie within
the purview of the generating force function.36
AFRICOM STRWG participants admitted they do
not understand African PME systems (more than the
existence of individual institutions), nor are AFRICOM
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or USARAF structured to absorb and execute PME-related requirements.37 This lack of knowledge at the GCC
level is intensified by the lack of requisite knowledge
at the country-team level in conducting PME analysis.
Personnel in security cooperation offices (SCOs) are
not trained and the offices are not resourced to conduct
complete DOTMLPF analyses of partner nations when
it comes to PME.38
Doctrine recognizes this condition can exist and
provides guidance that U.S. military personnel should
reach back to the generating force to take advantage
of its capabilities as a means of alleviating the lack of
operating force capability in the generating and executive function areas.39 What this means is that DOTMLPF analysis requires two steps. The GCC staff and
SCOs conduct a DOTMLPF analysis of the partner to
determine needs, and then they must conduct a DOTMLPF analysis of U.S. systems to determine where the
appropriate expertise to support these requirements,
consistent with U.S. policy objectives, is located.
AFRICOM planners understand that these two
steps exist and have reached back to the U.S. military’s PME institutions (schoolhouses) to obtain support for PME-related events in theater.40 However,
many of their requests for schoolhouse support were
denied because of a lack of available personnel; or in
some cases, because the planners did not know who
to contact within the U.S. military PME institutions to
support emerging GCC requirements, to include assistance with existing planning needs.41 The long leadtimes required for support from the schoolhouses has
the additional problem of delaying incorporation of
required subject matter experts into the planning and
execution of education-related events.42 Specifically,
DA PAM 11-31 emphasizes the use of the Global Force
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Management Request for Forces process or the Forces
Command Army Force Generation Synchronization
Tool, both of which require a clear statement of need.43
However, being able to develop a clear statement of
need, and making that need known to the appropriate schoolhouse, can be a challenge for the AFRICOM
staff and USARAF planners if their knowledge of the
U.S. and African PME systems is insufficient. Thus,
this lack of knowledge affects both AFRICOM’s and
USARAF’s ability to obtain the required resources to
support the partner nation.
Process issues are not the only problem regarding
PME support to partners. As noted earlier, another
critical issue is the inability of the schoolhouses to provide requisite support due to a lack of personnel. The
Army acknowledges that “the requirement to support
activities aimed at developing partner country institutional capabilities may exceed the Army’s capacity,”
and that PME is an area of risk.44 The reason is readily
explainable: the PME support requirement competes
with the Army’s own support requirements. Further,
while there are planning and resourcing processes in
place, as DA PAM 11-31 indicates:
These processes and their associated timelines vary among
theaters, complicating Army efforts to synchronize across
ASCCs, ACOMs [Army Commands], and DRUs [Direct
Reporting Units].45

In short, generating force institutions are not staffed or
resourced to support PME-related engagements in any
theater, let alone Africa, on the recurrent basis required
for building the necessary relationships to advise and
assist partner nation PME institutions. Thus, support for PME events by the Army schoolhouses is
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accomplished on an ad hoc basis through personal
networks, individual willingness, and individual
availability.46
This resourcing issue influences BPC planning,
and AFRICOM BPC planners recognize it explicitly.47
Granted, some personnel involved in BPC activities dispute that a resource gap exists, such as those
involved in the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative
(DIRI).48 However, DIRI is aimed at the ministerial
level; that is, the strategic or executive direction function in terms of BPC.49 Even when DIRI is combined
with other Defense Security Cooperation Agency
programs, which are all focused at building ministerial-level competency,50 there is still a resource gap at
the generating force level. This gap is reflected in the
absence of generating force activities within the various country plans for the AFRICOM region. Likewise,
the inability to access PME expertise at the generating
force level has an effect on PME-related events, such
as establishing a schoolhouse or writing a PME curriculum. Consequently, the likelihood of having a lasting
effect is diminished because the upstream activities that
need to be taken at the generating force level to institutionalize the PME capability are either not identified
or not implemented in time to ensure their integration
into the partner nation’s DOTMLPF system. This process problem may be a significant hidden driver that
could explain why the bulk of AFRICOM engagement
is all at the operating force level, which results in the
generation of tactical capability instead of generating
partner capacity.
The Army’s recent establishment of Security Force
Assistance Brigades (SFAB) will not alleviate the aforementioned problems. SFABs are an excellent means
to produce specific capabilities within partner forces.
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However, unless reach-back mechanisms are established to ensure the integration of generating functions with operating functions, then the SFAB will
also be limited in its ability to build sustained capacity, as indicated in Army doctrine.51 Limited resourcing at the generating-force level, PME schoolhouses
will affect the SFAB support needs as well. The more
sophisticated the DOTMLPF requirements are within
the partner nation, the greater the need for specific
subject matter expertise. The SFABs lack the ability to
perform high-end PME tasks and they will confront
the same reach-back limitations that the GCC currently
experiences.
In summary, the Army lacks the generating force
capability that is required for the long-term cultural change that PME is designed to foster in partner nations’ militaries, one of the essential outcomes
of BPC. This finding mirrors the judgments of a 2009
USAWC study, which concluded that GCC staffs do
not have the expertise or resources to develop comprehensive, cross-functional engagement plans because
of an inability to tap into a trained and ready pool of
subject matter experts.52 Unfortunately, the result is
the same after nearly a decade: without the generating
force support for PME integration, there will be little
enduring capability to build partner capacity above
the tactical level.53
African legacy PME systems offer different
approaches to engaging in PME-related BPC and, in
many cases, provide a foundation for institutionalizing capacity if they can be linked to effective internal
assessment and executive direction. BPC engagement
with African PME institutions is a complex endeavor.
As this study began as an effort to gauge the level of
understanding of African PME systems within the U.S.
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BPC community, it was necessary to develop baseline
data to conduct a comparative analysis. Using four
baseline questions (Figure 2-1), modified from the
U.S. Process for Accreditation for Joint Education, the
author conducted site visits in four countries specifically focusing on their highest level of PME. The baseline questions assessed both curriculum and internal
PME systems to determine how education is delivered,
how the partner nation’s national policy objectives
and the various levels of PME are synchronized, and
how education is institutionalized within the various
nations.
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1.

What is their internal guidance on PME for their respective militaries; what kind of product (graduate) are they trying to produce
as an outcome of their PME institutions?
a. What subjects do they teach?
b. How do the various Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) own or shape
the education process, or is PME treated as a training issue
and thus rests entirely within the operations directors (G3)?
c. Does written guidance to the institutions on desired outcomes exist (what the graduates are supposed to be able to
do)?

2.

What is the internal system to fashion PME into a coherent
whole?
a. What is the synchronization mechanism used to provide
learning outcome guidance to the various institutions, from
Initial entry through Senior Service College (SSC)?
b. How do they ensure their PME system is designed to develop
personnel from initial entry through SSC?
c. Do they have a regional or internal national Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) process?

3.

What is their assessment system for PME, internally for students
and externally from their customer?
a.
How do they obtain feedback from the field about their graduates and incorporate this feedback into the curriculum?

4.

How do they develop curriculum?
a. How do they ensure PME is linked to their DOTMLPF process (and do they have a formal DOTMLPF process)?
b. What is the origin of their PME system, and what model do
they follow (e.g., United States, United Kingdom, French,
Russian, or Chinese)?

Figure 2-1. PME Study Questions for
Partner Nations.
Based on these questions, several observations are
relevant. First, the colonial legacy influences the way
African states approach PME because colonialism influenced the structure of their educational enterprises.
70

There are significant differences between the structures of British and French PME legacy systems; these
differences affect how PME is taught, and how the
curriculum is fashioned for teaching. (Because of the
different legacy systems, a direct comparison between
African and U.S. PME institutions cannot be made.)
Second, when one examines the African education
systems using a DOTMLPF analysis, commonalties
between both the British and French legacy systems are
apparent in terms of how they relate to the generating
force and executive direction functions. These factors
highlight two separate and noteworthy issues affecting BPC with African PME systems; the first involves
educational capability generation, the other relates
to educational capacity development. Both of these
issues are affected by the lack of understanding of
partner nation PME systems on the part of U.S. military members and a lack of capacity to support BPC
at the U.S. generating force PME institutional level.
Educational capability generation affects the ways
the U.S. military can engage African PME institutions.
Successful educational capability generation begins
by ensuring that the relevant U.S. PME institution
experts engage with their counterparts at the African
institutions. This connection ensures that the correct
subject matter experts engage with the educational
institutions based on the educational level of the specific PME School. It clearly makes sense for military
academies to engage with military academics, staff
colleges to engage with staff colleges, and so forth, as
there is a common understanding of the educational
goals sought based on curricula and outcomes.
However, the differing developmental approaches
between the U.S. and African systems are important.
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U.S. schools teach to different levels than the African
schools, even if they have the same titles as those in the
U.S. PME system. This complicates capability development with the partner schools when assisting with curriculum development. One cannot assume that because
the U.S. and African institutions have the same title,
that the similarly named U.S. educational institution is
the appropriate one from which to seek help.
The lack of understanding of PME systems within
AFRICOM, the ASCC, and the SCOs means this distinction is missed when determining engagement options.
To illustrate this point, Figure 2-2 maps the various
PME systems in relation to the U.S. PME system and
the levels of war taught at these schools.

Figure 2-2. Mapping African PME Schools According to U.S. PME Equivalents (Army) and Levels of
War.54
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As the figure shows, there are significant differences among the various PME pathways because of the
legacy systems developed under the colonial regimes.
Having an understanding of these differences is crucial
to ensuring the appropriate U.S. experts are engaged in
curricula transfer and development activities on which
to build the foundations for establishing educational
capability. Legacy system advisors and partners also
influence how U.S. engagement takes place.
The French-based system is a bottom-up system,
in part, because of the close relationship of the French
with their former colonies. The French approach
to PME in the partner nation mirrors the system in
France, which results in close linkages between the
African and French PME schools in terms of curricula
development and pedagogical techniques (Country 1
and Country 2).55 Coopérants (specially selected French
officers assigned to assist a partner nation) continue to
serve within some of France’s partner nation institutions (Country 2).56
The main point to note though is that France follows
a building block approach to PME in these nations;
a methodology similar to the U.S. Army’s “Building
Blocks of Security Force Assistance.”57 France concentrates on the basic skill levels in its early PME system
assistance with respect to curriculum and faculty development within the partner nation schools. Education
begins at the tactical level and expands to the operational level over time. The highest level of education
in the French-based system is the Higher War Studies
Course (senior staff college level), which is an operational level school, though this school’s curriculum
does contain some elements bearing on the strategic
level. This is a reflection of the fact that French-based
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systems in Africa lack the SSC level of PME found in
the British legacy system and the U.S. system.
Depending on the educational sophistication of the
host nation system, the French coopérants can vary their
approach from a “do it for them/with them” to an
exclusively advisory role. Pedagogical techniques are
primarily passive learning and include lectures, but
small group dialogue and other active, adult leaning
techniques are growing in importance, if not in practice.58 Formal curricula products, such as course directives and lesson materials, are well developed in terms
of the products provided to students and in terms of
learning objectives. All of these points were evident
during field research in both Country 1 and Country
2.59
There is no interagency presence within either the
student body or the faculty of these partner schools.
In fact, despite the high demand for a place in Country 2’s Higher War Studies Course, the General Staff
turns many of these interagency students away.60
In Country 1, the course curriculum is too militarily
focused to merit interagency presence.61 With respect
to the Higher War Studies Course in Country 2, it uses
learning outcomes to guide its educational approach
rather than learning objectives, which implies a measurement of student performance and success for the
course. However, learning objectives are also found
within some of the course material.62
In Country 2, coopérants are in an advisory role at the
staff college level. However, the French officers use the
“do it for them and with them” method at the Higher
War Studies course level and they occupy the key
instructional billets within the school with partner officers serving as deputies. Curriculum development and
execution reflects this same distinction. In Country 2’s
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staff college courses, the partner nation develops and
executes its own curriculum in coordination with the
coopérant and the French military’s L’Ecole d’Etat-Major
(EEM/the senior war and staff college school). However, the French effectively maintain complete control
over the curriculum at the Higher War Studies course
level. They develop the curriculum; that is, they determine the subjects, and then the program is suitably
modified for African institutions before being sent to
Country 2 for review and acceptance.63 Essentially, this
process means that Country 2’s review is a formality
rather than a substantive review. In all the time Country 2 has conducted the course, it has not made a single
change to the curriculum received from Paris.64
Country 1 differs from Country 2 in the level of
direct French influence because of the state of the relationship. There are no coopérants present within the
Country 1 school system. In this instance, the French
assistance follows a “do it with them,” and “advise”
pathway. Country 1 made the decision to develop its
own staff college and curriculum. However, given historic ties between it and France, initially, the Country
1 curriculum developers chose to mirror the French
EEM curriculum closely when the French course was
located at Compiègne (EEM moved to Saumur in
2012).65 Based on long-term engagement with other
partners, Country 1 has since reestablished a relationship with the French EEM at Saumur and closely mirrors its course design and curriculum.66 Nonetheless,
changes to the curriculum are clearly under Country
1’s control; it decides which elements of the French
system it will accept based on the professional judgment of the Country 1 Staff College Commandant.67
The major significance of the French bottom-up
approach is in how the overall PME system is
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developing in the African partner nations. The French
partner nations are learning as they proceed in terms
of what they need in a PME system, at least in terms of
the levels of education. Both Country 1 and Country 2
determined on their own that the staff college level is
insufficient as they endeavor to professionalize their
armed forces. This shortcoming became especially
apparent when they had to face actual threats and discovered that a staff college-based education was inadequate for military participation in the development of
national defense policy and strategy.
As a result, both Country 1 and Country 2 are in the
process of developing higher levels of PME. Country 1
has moved to developing a School of Higher War Studies,68 and Country 2 has determined it will establish an
SSC using the French Institute of Advanced Studies in
National Defense (IHEDN) as the model.69 The reason
for this development in Country 2 was the realization
that graduates of the School of Higher War Studies
were incapable of actively and effectively aiding in the
development of national security policy and strategy.
To quote a senior staff officer:
Graduates of foreign war colleges can do policy and
strategy but they can’t plan to the same level as our local
graduates. Our local graduates can plan, but they can’t do
policy and strategy. Our problem is we get most of our
General Staff locally (these are graduates of the Higher
War Studies Course).70

Given the evolutionary pathway of the French legacy
systems, it will not be surprising if Country 1 makes
the same determination that it too needs an IHEDN
after it gains experience with the Higher War Studies
course.
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The British (United Kingdom) legacy system does
not appear to have the same depth of partner involvement that one sees in French legacy systems.71 Nonetheless, all levels of PME are present in Country 3 and
Country 4 (See Figure 2-2). Thus, there is more direct
equivalency between the British and U.S. PME systems
in terms of schools, but not necessarily in terms of curriculum, which can lead to gaps in learning between
the various levels of PME. Pedagogical techniques
are primarily passive learning and lectures, but small
group dialogue and other adult leaning techniques are
also growing in importance, if not in practice.72 Formal
curricula products for students in both Country 3 and
Country 4, such as course directives and lesson materials, are often not well developed and syllabi tend to
follow a training schedule format.73 There is an interagency presence on both the student body and faculty
of the British legacy system SSCs in both Country 3
and Country 4.74 Both British legacy system SSCs offer
an accredited post-baccalaureate degree from the local
university system. However, in terms of curricula, as
in the French based legacy system, there is a clear dual
track distinction between the civilian degree and the
military diploma.75
The British do not necessarily follow the same
advisory framework as the French. In Country 3 and
Country 4, current British assistance is more means
focused in terms of providing specific curriculum, furnishing lecturers, or supplying instructors for specific
topics vice focusing on programs designed to develop
partner faculty ability to deliver the same material.76
Thus, the British follow more of a “do it for them,” and
“advise” approach at the individual institutional level.
This demand-based approach results in British assistance concentrating on capability development instead
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of capacity development because of a minimal focus
on creating PME systems.
While one can readily distinguish the differences
between the British and French legacy systems in
terms of educational capability, there are striking similarities at the PME systemic level that seriously affect
the United States’ ability to build sustainable partner
capacity. In both the French and British legacy systems there is a lack of in-depth Chief of Defense Staff
(CDS) level attention to PME and a lack of holistic
assessment standards that marginalize the effectiveness of existing African PME systems.
Many of the previously mentioned observations
concerning curricula development and pedagogical techniques are easily manageable, but there are
two significant obstacles. Both the French and British
legacy systems are highly compartmentalized; they
are not connected to effective executive direction and
generating force functional capacity.77 This lack of connection is a serious weakness as institutional capacity
building is the most vital element in ensuring a lasting
capability.78 Additionally, lack of CDS ownership of
the system complicates DoD’s ability to build partner
capacity in PME with African nations that use these
legacy systems.
Sufficient executive direction in terms of an overarching systemic guidance on subject matter and an
assessment system designed to measure the effectiveness of graduates in relation to this guidance does not
exist. Overall, there is minimal to no systemic ownership of PME by the military leadership at the CDS level
and no culture of assessment exists that would enable
African PME systems to gauge their own effectiveness
and adapt accordingly to a changing strategic environment.79 The result is one where PME is either irrelevant
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or has difficulty adapting to meet strategic challenges
as they emerge.
The first common critical issue is a general lack of
quality systemic level PME guidance in Africa. In all
four countries, Chief of Defense (CHOD) and CDS ownership of PME varied widely. Representatives in each
country mentioned that there is guidance for PME, but
this guidance is given verbally directly to school commandants, is very school specific, and does not include
mechanisms to tie the educational enterprise into a
holistic system.80 In many cases, the observations and
guidance focused on general topics for inclusion in the
curriculum, were not linked to educational outcomes
or objectives, and were tactical in nature.81 CDS education and curriculum guidance was uniformly intuition—judgment based vice evidence based—and was
generally not written or captured by the wider educational enterprise.82 The comment “guidance is more
along the lines of the current graduating class seemed
to be lacking in topic x,” or “we need to teach more of
topic y,” were common themes when discussing the
quality of guidance received with staff and faculty in
all four countries.83
Each country did report that the General Staff
provided some oversight to the PME schools, but the
quality of the interaction varied widely between the
schools and was not necessarily dependent on whether
they were a British or French-based legacy system.
This curriculum or resourcing dialogue followed the
same generic topical format as the verbal CDS guidance.84 Again, minimal to no direction is captured in
writing with the exception of Country 2, where the
General Staff guidance is in writing but only focuses
on “competencies to be covered” at the Staff College
level.85 However, while this level of oversight varied
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between simply focusing on resourcing to engaging in
generic curriculum dialogue, the key commonality is
that the oversight only dealt with the PME schools on
an individual basis.
It is this cumulative emphasis on the individual
PME School, in terms of guidance, oversight, and outside engagement, that leads to the biggest common
shortcoming within African PME enterprises regardless of their foundational legacy system. At the risk of
mirror imaging, there are no Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)-like processes or other
system-wide mechanisms, such as the U.S. Army’s
The U.S. Army Learning Concept for Training and Education (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
[TRADOC] PAM 525-8-2), designed to tie together the
disparate parts of African PME into a whole.86
The OPMEP, TRADOC PAM 525-8-2, and other
documents of this sort provide the clear executive
direction functions of strategic planning, assessment
of readiness, and review and analysis in terms of
required human capabilities needed to achieve current
and future mission requirements.87 These types of documents are critical to the systemization of PME in that
they provide the CHOD and CDS an enterprise-level
blueprint for how the various levels of PME work in
conjunction with each other to provide a required
body of knowledge, in terms of both curriculum and
pedagogy, needed to meet operational requirements
for the force from initial entry into the future.88
Given the incomplete nature of the guidance
received and the distinct lack of formal guidance
documents, school commandants in both legacy systems have wide latitude to interpret what to teach
and how much to teach to their students.89 This latitude becomes a problem in that it exacerbates the
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compartmentalization of African PME systems. Representatives at all levels were unsure of how their school
linked to the other schools of their respective PME
enterprises.90 Thus, significant assumptions are made
about what is being taught where and to what extent.
This level of uncertainty carries through to knowledge
about curriculum changes at the various schools and
how these changes may affect education throughout
the respective African PME enterprises.91 For example,
Country 3’s SSC had no knowledge of the 100% curriculum review that was taking place at the staff college,
which prevented an analysis of how this change would
affect their assumptions concerning baseline knowledge of future students.92
These factors underscore that systemization is the
missing element in African PME. Systemization is critical to effective capacity building in that it provides
for the sustainability required to turn an operational
capability into an operational capacity as differentiated
by Army doctrine and other key practitioners.93 This
absence of systemic guidance means that African PME
lacks both the vision and means to create the self-sustaining and adaptive education foundation required to
effectively sustain operational capabilities over-time.
In short, African PME institutions have difficulty performing their generating force function of supporting
the operating function, through the personnel it educates for the operating force, with the integrated generation of the knowledge needed to conduct the range
of tasks associated with current and future missions.94
This lack of systemization interacts with, and is related
closely to, the absence of a culture of holistic assessment in all four case studies.
One of the key functions of the OPMEP in U.S. PME
is it sets standards for military accreditation in order
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to ensure PME is providing the requisite knowledge
needed for the force.95 Military accreditation places the
military component of the curriculum on an equal footing with the civilian requirements for higher degree
accreditation. Accreditation is based on the in-depth
review of the standards set for faculty, curriculum, and
assessment of student learning outcomes, and course
and program performance through the institution
level as certified by outside inspection of the schools
in question. This holistic assessment acts as a validation mechanism to ensure the curriculum and teaching
methodologies are current and effective in developing
the students for performance in the field. Accreditation
also provides a signal to the CHOD when the other
aspects of the total force are not supporting the education system with the appropriate resources to meet
the mission. In short, accreditation through assessment
is the tool that lets the CHOD and CDS know that the
generating force functions of training and education
are actually providing the operating force with the
requisite knowledge required to conduct the range of
tasks associated with present and future missions.
Without the setting of standards and military
accreditation, as is done in a U.S. system through the
OPMEP, there is no mechanism to drive assessment
beyond the individual student performance level at
each school. None of the institutions in any of the four
countries conducts assessments beyond the individual
student level, which are conducted solely for the purpose of creating graduate order of merit lists.96 Neither
are there formal ways to seek out and incorporate lessons learned from field operations into tactical, operational, and strategic level education and curricula in
any of the legacy based PME systems in this study.97
When combined with the use of program learning
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objectives, instead of outcomes, and no direct, formal
feedback loops from the field to monitor graduate performance, schools have no way of knowing whether
their curriculum is practical.
The low level of CHOD and CDS involvement
in PME as an educational endeavor vice a training
endeavor further serves to hamper wider assessment
as it is too easily viewed by the PME institution leadership as someone else’s responsibility.98 Given the low
level of CHOD and CDS ownership of PME that comes
from military accreditation through an OPMEP-like
process, the African leadership has no way of knowing
whether the PME system is providing the right products, in the right quantities, at the right time because of
incomplete metrics for measuring success. The overall
result is one where curriculum too easily stagnates and
loses relevancy.
This stagnation is especially the case with the
British legacy-based systems due to their more independent and hierarchically functioning bureaucracy.
Interestingly, the French-based systems are more open
to change as a robust French lessons-learned system
permeates changes to the Higher War Studies Course
and French partnerships with African PME institutions and defense enterprises. This exposes French
system schools to changes in curriculum and educational approaches even if they are developed through
the lens of French needs and not specifically the partner nation experiences. Furthermore, the bottom-up
development of the French legacy system leaves more
space for learning within the participants. For example, Country 2, in addition to realizing the need for
its own IHEDN, is also incorporating PME and PME
guidance into its Defense White Paper currently under
development.99
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In terms of BPC, the U.S. focus on tactical capability, even at the educational institution level, does not
result in institutionalized change. The shortcomings in
resourcing for the generating force and lack of expertise in the SCOs, GCC, and ASCC inhibits AFRICOM
and the ASCC from effectively conducting holistic
BPC across the executive direction, and the generating force and operating force functions. Because the
United States cannot effectively engage holistically,
institutionalizing capacity, especially through African
PME systems, will be difficult to achieve.
Change is difficult even when systematization,
accreditation standards, and holistic assessment exist.
The U.S. experience in curriculum changes and the
debates following the events of September 11, 2001,
leading up to the Iraq surge in 2007, serve to illustrate
the slowness of change even when impetus and mechanisms exist. Without change mechanisms, systematized coordination between schools and searching out
and incorporating lessons learned creates a bottom-up
approach to PME improvement that can be easily road
blocked by a bureaucracy that may not have the capacity to understand the improvements that need to be
made in the system, or fear the accountability that an
OPMEP and standards bring. This situation results in
African military education enterprises that are locked
at the tactical or operating force level, are viewed as
training, and are not especially capable of institutionalizing knowledge and doctrine brought about by
exposure to U.S. engagement activities.
IMPLICATIONS
Given the proceeding observations and findings,
there are important implications regarding how U.S.
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BPC doctrine, the U.S. approach to BPC, and the structure and character of African legacy PME systems affect
U.S. BPC policy and strategy. Two major implications
present themselves. The first deals with the effect that
the difference between the two legacy systems has on
U.S. efforts. The second, and more important implication, deals with the wider strategy of BPC in relation to
overall U.S. defense policy and strategy.
Implication 1
The character of the Host Nation PME system
influences the operational approach to PME capacity
building. As has been already identified, the bureaucratic and intellectual structures inherited from the
legacy system of an African PME institution significantly influences how PME is conducted from an enterprise standpoint. This means that this structure needs
to be taken into account as the United States develops
PME assistance and other BPC efforts targeting that
partner nation. Education is expensive and represents
a significant investment in partner nation and U.S.
BPC resources. Currently, given Africa’s global priority level, the United States seeks to affect change and
build capacity on a regional basis. PME legacy systems
have a significant influence on the viability of using a
regional approach.
Working with the British-based systems is going to
be more problematic and transactional in character due
to their more independent and hierarchical bureaucracy. The British-based systems are much more institutionalized within the potential partner nations without
any embedded outside assistance, such as the French
coopérants inside their legacy systems. This means that
African bureaucracies that use the British system will
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need to be convinced of the need for change in order to
generate the will to change and improve. In short, they
have to realize there is a problem in the first place. If
that outcome does not occur, there is no will to make
changes at the systemic level.
This obstacle is evident in engagements within
Country 3 and Country 4. Country 3 participants, following detailed discussion and dialogue, realize where
change needs to take place in order to build a holistic
PME system, but they are faced with the need to create
the sense of urgency required within the higher levels
of the bureaucracy first.100 While this opens space for
building holistic PME systems, U.S. efforts also need
to focus on assisting the partner nation with realizing
the need for change. Country 4 is in a similar, but more
entrenched position. The hierarchy inside Country 4
is locked into tradition and does not see the need for
change despite operational setbacks in the field and
parliamentary opinion otherwise.101 Under these circumstances, the use of learning objectives instead
of outcomes and the British assistance approach of
“doing it for them,” in the form of lectures and instruction, can serve to exacerbate the sense that everything
is fine within these PME systems.102
Under these circumstances, taking a regional
approach to PME capacity building is inhibited by host
nation attitudes and lack of will to change. Regional
approaches are seductive on the outside in that the
partner will see this approach as validation of the
effectiveness of its PME system. This validation will
drive the bureaucracy to want to use U.S. assistance as
a means to bolster and otherwise continue the status
quo. This result is not conducive to the regional generation of capacity in the form required for the integrated
generation of the knowledge needed to conduct the
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range of tasks associated with current and future missions. As a result, U.S. efforts in this environment need
to focus on generating the realization of the need for
change in order to start working systemically within
their PME systems. Until then, engagements will likely
be transactional in nature and focus on providing specific blocks of knowledge that are useful at the operating force level with the realization that knowledge
transfer will be transitional.
These circumstances do not completely rule out
a regional approach to issues and BPC. Instead, they
change the timeline and shape of U.S. efforts in the
form of having to use two distinct, but integrated lines
of effort to achieve capacity over time. First, U.S. BPC
planners and SCOs will need to foster within the partner nations a realization that there is a valid need for
change within their PME systems. This step is required
to establish the baseline conditions for institutionalization of knowledge over time that will promote and ultimately result in a regional educational approach. As for
engagement on specific topics or subject matter, U.S.
efforts to work on a regional basis will have to be taken
through multiple independent bilateral programs. It is
the U.S. security cooperation planners and SCOs who
will have to ensure that the cumulative effect of these
bilateral engagements move toward the institutionalization of U.S. desired knowledge and procedures over
time. The integration of both lines of effort requires a
heavy reliance on measures of effectiveness in order to
keep the United States from becoming a means to an
end for the African nations in question.
The United States may stand a better chance of
affecting regional level change in a French-based
legacy system provided it targets its efforts appropriately. This increased probability exists because of how
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the French approach partnership shaped institutional
and bureaucratic development. France’s bottom-up
approach to building capability, combined with its
embedding of expertise in the form of the coopérants,
has created an environment where there is a common
basis of doctrine and staff procedures inside Francophone Africa. This common base enables French-based
systems to cross-fertilize one another in terms of educational objectives and outcomes.
As such, France, in cooperation with select African
partners, is pioneering regional PME schools such as
the Higher War Studies Course in Country 2, which
has an increasing demand regionally and currently
involves 21 other nations.103 Furthermore, the experience gained in Country 2 forms the basis for the Higher
War Studies Course under development in Country 1.
It is these regional schools that provide the window of
opportunity for achieving U.S. regional BPC goals in
terms of PME curriculum improvement and teaching
techniques in addition to and in coordination with
currently ongoing bilateral efforts. Partnering with the
African states sponsoring the regional schools provides
a central injection point for assistance and knowledge.
More importantly, the commonalities created by
the French approach means the United States may be
able to build systems that institutionalize knowledge
and doctrine more quickly in a French-based system.
The need for strategic-level advice and assistance in
terms of policy and strategy development and strategic education exists inside the French-based system as
exemplified by Country 1 and Country 2’s efforts to
improve policy and strategy development as well as
raise the level of PME. There is no need to convince
the potential partners on the need for change. They
already desire it themselves.
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This belief in the importance of change is important as it means changes in PME structure, in terms
of accreditation and pedagogical techniques, become
ways to achieve already desired outcomes and makes
PME a resource generator to assist them in meeting
their goals of developing effective policy and strategy.
This self-realization of need means there is greater will
on behalf of the potential African partner for appropriately targeted U.S. assistance. Already habituated
to the French approach of “doing it with them” means
that there is greater probability of the partner nation
internalizing U.S. executive direction and generating function level assistance that can effectively combine ongoing U.S. tactical-level efforts into a holistic
system. In short, there is greater space to turn capability into capacity, provided U.S. engagement activities
are enduring and seen as adding value based on commonality of interest.
Implication 2
U.S. structural issues inhibit certification of BPC
activities under Section 333 of the FY 2017 NDAA.
The observations and implications related to the character of the African PME system are environmental
in terms of U.S. BPC activities. That is, these issues fit
firmly within the environmental and problem frames
of the operational design process for theater security
cooperation engagement and can be dealt with in the
security cooperation planning process. A better understanding of the environment, including the DOTMLPF
framework of the potential partner, means a more complete reframing of the problem for the United States
that should lead to adjustments in the operational
approach to achieve the United States’ desired effects.
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However, issues relating to incomplete application of
doctrine due to insufficient resourcing of the generating function in the U.S. system are structural issues
within the U.S. BPC system that, if not dealt with, will
continue to have a significant impact on the United
States’ ability to conduct BPC activities effectively in
terms that relate to the NDAA requirements.
The U.S. Congress favors BPC, but it is equally
interested in outcomes, meaning the effectiveness
of security cooperation programs in relation to U.S.
strategic objectives.104 As previously identified, U.S.
BPC doctrine clearly differentiates between what it
means to build capability and what it means to build
capacity. Furthermore, doctrine promotes an integrated approach to BPC that brings all executive direction, generating force, and operating force functions
together into a holistic system designed to institutionalize capacity within a partner nation.105 It is this systemic approach, utilizing the entirety of the U.S. force,
which adds sustainability to BPC efforts through the
institutionalization of the partner’s capability.
Further, the U.S. Congress is looking to DoD for
the systems and processes needed to create sustained
effects from U.S. security cooperation investments.
Section 1205 of the Act, and more importantly, Section
333, clearly support the approach described above. Not
only does the NDAA demand the security cooperation
enterprise focus on the effectiveness of BPC efforts,106
it further requires the Secretary of Defense to certify
to Congress and report that U.S. programs, down to
the specific country level, contain institutional capacity
building and also the specific measures for the sustainment of security assistance programs and the specific
strategic objectives that these programs support.107
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It was clear to many participants at the AFRICOM
STRWG that the purpose of Section 333 is to press DoD
to show how its activities fit together in a systemic fashion that result in a long-term positive outcome for U.S.
investment in security cooperation programs.108 This
congressional intent means that DoD has to be able to
explain how it makes deliberate choices concerning
when and where to conduct simple capability generation events, which are periodic and have ephemeral
effects, versus long-term capacity building which
institutionalizes the effects of U.S. engagement activities across the force. Given current circumstances, U.S.
security cooperation is tactical in nature and cannot
promote a holistic capacity-building approach utilizing the entirety of the strategic (executive direction),
operational (generating force), and tactical (operating
force) forces.
This current approach to security cooperation is
not an ends-driven strategic approach but is a meansdriven strategic approach, which is inconsistent with
the intent and requirements of the FY 2017 NDAA. As
identified, the bulk of U.S. theater engagement focuses
on generating tactical capability for immediate problems. Furthermore, insufficient resourcing of the generating force, especially in the Army schoolhouses,
combined with knowledge shortfalls among the SCOs
and security cooperation planners serve to lock the
GCC in at the tactical level of engagement by necessity. Without the ability to incorporate the generating
force into security cooperation, a holistic approach utilizing systemic measures of effectiveness is not possible. Hence, AFRICOM and USARAF, and therefore the
DoD, cannot meet the reporting requirements of the
2017 NDAA. Thus, without addressing the structural
issues inhibiting the U.S. approach to BPC, the DoD
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enterprise, including GCC, ASCC, and the U.S. Army,
will have great difficulty in justifying BPC activities
to Congress. The result could have serious consequences for ongoing and future U.S. BPC efforts from
a Congress that is clearly looking for effects-based, not
performance-based, metrics.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Successful implementation of BPC requires a balance between discrete, capability-generating events
and longer-term integrating events focused on institutionalizing capacity over time. Achieving this balance takes an integrated approach to BPC that brings
all executive direction, generating force, and operating
force functions together into a holistic system designed
to institutionalize capacity within a partner nation over
time. The following three recommendations serve to
address the current shortcomings in U.S. efforts that
inhibit the GCC from effectively following an integrated approach to BPC in Africa.
Recommendation 1
Doctrine is solid; the challenge is to implement
it fully and reinforce the use of doctrine in the conduct of building partner capability and BPC in the
GCC and ASCC. Building partner capability or partner capacity is a strategic choice that requires the integration of the entirety of the SFA model in planning
and execution of engagement activities. Planners need
to ensure that the entirety of the model is addressed
in developing country engagement plans by deliberately looking at the upstream and downstream activities required at the institutional (generating force)
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and strategic (executive direction) levels of the force
needed to institutionalize capacity over time.
Following the planning timelines and guidance
contained in the section “country objectives” contained
in FM 3-22, Army,109 specifically linked to each level of
the SFA model, will assist in determining the demand
signal and specific support requirements from the generating and executive direction functions of the force
to help build sustainability of the U.S. investment over
time. Following doctrine will also provide the needed
information to show the linkage of U.S. engagement
efforts to U.S. interests and highlight how the GCC
and ASCC are institutionalizing capability of time—
both issues that are critical data points for meeting
congressional certification requirements contained in
the NDAA.
Building capability over capacity needs to be based
on deliberate choice, not by lack of knowledge. Events
targeting immediate capabilities need to be addressed
specifically as such and be deliberately differentiated
from areas where the GCC and ASCC intend to develop
capacity. Short-term engagements for building presence or relationships need to be further factored into
the SFA model across the levels of the force. This is a
commander’s call, but short-term relationship and tactical unit building are not sustainable over time without specific linkages to concrete strategic outcomes as
demanded by Congress through the NDAA. Granted,
immediate and emergent problems demand capability generation, but planners also need to approach
these situations from the perspective of what needs to
happen to build capacity over an extended period as
the situation clarifies itself in relation to a clear statement of U.S. interests and long-term policy objectives.
Taking this approach, focusing on measures of effects
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in relation to U.S. interests and objectives, will assist
planners in differentiating between capability-based
and capacity-building events to DoD and Congress.
Solely focusing on operational force activities without linkage to generating force and executive direction
activities is a tactical approach that in many cases risks
focusing on partner wants versus the requirement to
institutionalize capability in order to gain strategic
return on the U.S. investment. This aspect becomes
especially critical when conducting PME-based activities, such as developing a branch specific school for
a potential partner, which have significant future
requirements to ensure the school is functional beyond
its opening. Given that developing institutional capability is perhaps one of the more complex forms of
engagement, especially when it comes to using PME to
institutionalize capability, using measures of effects to
inform planning is critical to recognize changes in the
environment and execute appropriate branch plans
according to doctrine. This perspective is critical as
well to developing the demand signal to inform the
Army, DoD, and Congress of the resources required to
conduct BPC activities over time.
Failing to have a holistic BPC approach to these
issues, as facilitated by doctrine, means the DoD will
not be able to seize the opportunity to shift from building immediate capability to BPC when they arise. It is
at the executive direction and generating force levels
that is the best indication of a partner’s will to build
and sustain systems and thereby indicates its true
value as a partner. When the United States is viewed
as nothing but a means by the engagement partner,
then there will be little return on investment and the
United States will not be able to meet the intent of the
2017 NDAA or DoD Directive 5205.82, Defense Institution Building.
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DoD BPC guidance, Army BPC guidance, and Foreign Area Officer training should serve to reinforce the
utility of doctrine. Revisiting doctrine to reinforce the
difference between capability and capacity as well as
emphasizing BPC in Foreign Area Officer and Army
planners’ courses will assist in reinforcing its utility
as a tool for developing and conducting holistic and
integrated theater security cooperation strategies and
country plans. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), Joint Staff, and Army-level guidance and oversight of GCC and ASCC security cooperation engagement plans and programs should specifically include
information be reported in accordance with Army and
Joint BPC doctrinal structures to show how engagement activities transition from discrete tactical events
to the institutionalization of capacity. This means
ensuring GCC and ASCC plans incorporate all levels
of the force (operational, generating, and executive
direction functions) in BPC planning in a synchronized
and coherent manner. This step will further reinforce
the use of doctrine and help the DoD develop U.S. systems and processes to assist the Secretary of Defense in
certifying that security cooperation activities meet the
mandate and intent of NDAA Section 333.
Recommendation 2
Make BPC a priority in senior leader engagements at the GCC and ASCC commander level; institutionalization of capacity requires greater direct
commander-level involvement with partner nation
counterparts. The lack of African CHOD and CDS
ownership of African PME systems, especially in terms
of accreditation and assessment, inhibits GCC and
ASCC efforts to institutionalize knowledge generated
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from security assistance engagements effectively. It is
beyond the SCO to generate the sense of ownership
needed to institutionalize the effects of U.S. engagement. Moreover, interest flows both ways. GCC and
ASCC commanders and key staff officers are very good
about asking potential partners about what capability
they require, but fail to follow-up at the requisite level
with the host nation to ensure that institutionalization
of effects is a priority with the African partner. This
lack of commander-level follow-up is a subtle form of
mirror imaging on our part. Leaders fail to ask these
questions because they are habituated to working
with the robust generating force and executive direction functions present in the U.S. system. Institutionalization of effects from capability generation leading
to capacity only begins if it is a priority with the partner nation’s CHOD and CDS. Given the hierarchical
nature of African militaries, the lack of CDS interest
can only be fixed with direct engagement by the equivalent level U.S. commander.
Direct questions from the AFRICOM and USARAF
commanders dealing with the issue of how the partner nation will sustain U.S.-provided capability shows
institutionalization is important, demonstrates commitment, and provides an opportunity to begin the
detailed work within the African system to engage at
the generating force level, which is needed to bridge
strategic engagement with tactical engagement effectively. As such, PME and other institutional level
requirements identified in doctrinally-planned security
assistance engagement, even when discussing immediate capabilities requirements, must be included in
the talking points for U.S. senior leaders. By showing
the U.S. commander cares about institution building in
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all of its details, especially in terms of PME standards,
partner nation CHODs and staffs will take note.
This senior-level attention by the CHODs and their
staffs provides two benefits to the United States in
terms of BPC efforts. First, it provides the United States
an indication of the partners’ will to engage in PME
and put forth the effort to sustain their own systems
and capabilities in conjunction with U.S. assistance.
Second, if the will is present, it opens a window for
the SCO and security cooperation planners to engage
with the requisite elements of the partner nation staff
to begin the process of institutionalizing U.S.-provided capability over time. In short, if it matters to the
AFRICOM commander, it could matter to the CHOD.
If it matters to the CHOD, then it does matter to the requisite institutions and staffs in the partner nation. The
linkage and level of interest help overcome bureaucratic inertia that can prevent even a well-intentioned
partner’s efforts to institutionalize capacity.
The commander’s ability to influence the CHOD
and staffs will be especially important in getting
OPMEP-like processes and procedures begun with
respect to systematizing and accrediting PME. Given
the hierarchical character of African militaries, generating the will to change from the top is a key element in
addressing the missing systemization in African PME
that prevents the institutionalization of knowledge
generated by U.S. capability building events. Furthermore, these effects help establish the conditions for
the effective use of the resources outlined in the third
recommendation. All of these efforts combine to set
the conditions for creating actual educational capacity in African partners that enhance the sustainability
of current U.S. tactical capability generation efforts as
required by the 2017 NDAA.
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Recommendation 3
Generating force support for BPC, especially
PME, requires adequate resources; therefore, there is
a need to create Strategic Outreach offices (SOO) at
key Army educational institutions to provide expertise and reach back for use by the GCC and ASCC.
As noted earlier, PME can be an effective tool for transforming militaries and generating sustainable capacity
because it provides a means of changing the way military personnel think about problems.110 Consequently,
PME is a critical element of institutionalizing U.S. BPC
efforts for the long-term as it embeds knowledge and
procedures inside the partner nation’s DOTMLPF processes. However, due to lack of sufficient resourcing
at the generating force level, the institutional Army
schools are unable to support GCC and ASCC needs.
This shortfall leads to an ad hoc approach to PME-related BPC that inhibits a holistic approach to institutional-level capacity building. For a small investment
of resources, the Army can improve this situation by
creating BPC capability in terms of PME engagements
by developing SOOs at its key educational institutions.
Current resourcing shortfalls within the generating
force contribute to the tactical character of AFRICOM
BPC engagements. Army schools are regularly unable
to support GCC and ASCC requests for assistance
with host nation schools and are unable to participate
in BPC planning activities that can assist in identifying the upstream activities required to institutionalize
knowledge and doctrine across the partner force. Failure to include the generating force in the form of the
higher Army schoolhouses in BPC, especially when it
comes to PME-related activities such as the establishment of PME schools, produces increased risk for GCC
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and ASCC BPC efforts by reinforcing the transactional
and ephemeral character of U.S. security cooperation
engagements. The United States has a reputation of
promising much, assessing more, and delivering very
little; thus the emphasis is on the tactical level of capability generation as partners concentrate on what they
can obtain from the United States through short-term
transactional engagements. This condition effectively
minimizes the ability of the GCC to institutionalize
capacity over time because the U.S. efforts become
strategic means, vice ways, for our partners, thus
affecting the overall DoD enterprise’s ability to meet
the certification and reporting requirements specified
in the 2017 NDAA.
PME is a complex, systems-oriented problem set
that requires DRU subject matter expertise to assist
BPC planners in integrating PME into theater campaign plans. Title V hiring authorities provide an
excellent tool to ensure that the right expertise in the
form of former military and civilian practitioner-educators staff the SOO. These offices will provide the
specific subject matter expertise required to address
the knowledge gaps identified in the GCC, ASCC, and
SCO structures with respect to understanding, assessing, and engaging with partner nation PME systems
and the wider generating force and executive direction
level activities. These aspects are all long-term propositions that are currently beyond the capability and
capacity of the GCCs, ASCCs, and SCOs.
Most importantly, creating an SOO at the Army’s
flagship educational institutions (the U.S. Military
Academy, Army University, and the USAWC) gives the
Army a holistic BPC capability by providing appropriate expertise from the tactical, that is, the SFAB, through
the strategic level (see Figure 2-3). It formalizes and
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actualizes the doctrinal linkage of operational, generating force, and executive direction functions without
seams or gaps. SOOs would directly support the institutionalization of the tactical capability generated by
the SFABs, the potential institutional-level capability
generated by the Africa Military Education Program
(AMEP), and the potential strategic-level capability
generated by the DoD’s Ministry of Defense Advisors
(MoDA) Program and the Defense Governance and
Management Team’s (DGMT) activities. By conducting detailed curriculum mapping using the SOO, the
GCC can engage selectively, in accordance with its
theater objectives, to institutionalize knowledge generated from U.S. operational force and other engagements across the partner force. Additionally, given
the focus on BPC in U.S. policy and strategy, the SOO
would also provide a central point for the collection
of lessons learned, the enhancement of doctrine, and
the development of curriculum to support the wider
Army educational enterprise.
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Figure 2-3. Integrating Generating Force PME Assets
with SFA Brigade Activities = Holistic Army BPC
Capability.
Having a centralized resource simplifies coordination within the U.S. Government (USG) enterprise
and enhances the Army’s ability to track the demand
signal for PME-related BPC support for both mission
and budget purposes that is available across the GCCs
and ASCCs globally. It also provides a needed structure that can assist in eliminating the ad hoc nature
of current PME-related support requests from across
the DoD enterprise. Granted, given the joint nature of
U.S. PME, other institutions can support BPC efforts in
Africa. However, the Army should be the first choice
for African PME-related BPC assistance, given African
militaries are Army-centric, and the security problems
originate on land.
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Additionally, PME can be an effective tool for
transforming militaries and generating sustainable
capacity because it provides a means of changing the
way military personnel think about problems. As such,
PME is a critical element of institutionalizing U.S. BPC
efforts for the long term, as it embeds knowledge and
procedures inside the partner nation’s DOTMLPF
processes. Thus, PME serves as the bridge that links
discrete tactical level BPC events to the creation of
strategic consciousness through executive direction
assistance, thereby creating a complete system. Creating the SOO provides the institutional-level generating force support for BPC needed to engage with
PME systems. It further provides the wider DoD with
a pool of subject matter experts who can assist other
DoD BPC programs across the generating force and
executive direction functions. In short, it is this institutional-level capacity building that locks-in the benefit
of U.S. engagement and provides a blueprint to show
to Congress how U.S. efforts, especially Army efforts
with the newly created SFABs, tie together to institutionalize capacity over time across the operational
force, generating force, and executive direction functions as the 2017 NDAA requires.
CONCLUSION
The concept of BPC and its associated activities
have been in the military lexicon for more than a
decade.111 However, despite BPC’s long-term presence
as a tool of U.S. national security policy and strategy,
the United States has had difficulty building sustainable capacity amongst its partners. This difficulty in
building capacity is because BPC efforts have overly
focused on tactical capability generation based on

102

a “train and equip” mentality.112 This approach has
especially been the case in Africa where the short-term
capability focus has hampered the institutionalization
of capacity.113 This is the character of the current problem facing U.S. BPC efforts in Africa.
The focus on immediate capability is understandable, especially when potential partners are dealing
with immediate security threats. However, this loss of
focus on long-term strategic gains means the effects of
U.S. efforts are ephemeral and creates a dynamic where
the United States potentially has to rebuild capability
almost constantly. This is because the United States
is not effectively addressing problems from an institutional perspective. Turning a capability, the ability
to perform a mission or function at a discrete point in
time, into a capacity, the ability to perform a mission
or function over time, is dependent on institutionalization of knowledge and skills inside the partner
defense systems. Systemization of outcomes means
working at the generating force level to ensure knowledge, skills, and procedures are embedded throughout
the DOTMLPF functions of the partner nation. U.S.
military doctrine clearly makes these linkages between
the operational and the generating force. This linkage
is exactly what is missing from current U.S. BPC efforts
in Africa.
There are multiple reasons for this situation in
relation to Africa. First, institutional capacity building is neglected due to a distinct lack of means, physical and intellectual. This is a structural issue inherent
within the U.S. system. Operationally, a distinct lack
of knowledge about partner nation generating force
systems and a lack of resourcing of the United States
generating the force expertise required to support BPC
by the GCCs means the upstream activities that have
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to happen with the partner to institutionalize outcomes are either not identified or happen too late in
the process to have an effect.114 This is especially the
case when dealing with complex systems and topics,
such as PME.
Second, this lack of intellectual and physical means
at the GCC and ASCC is influenced by issues inside
African partner systems. Education is a key component of the transformation and generation of sustainable capacity. However, AFRICOM cannot effectively
leverage PME as a tool for change. From an actual conduct of BPC activities standpoint, the character of the
partner nation PME legacy system influences how the
United States needs to engage. There are significant
differences in how a British-based legacy system and
a French-based legacy system operate.115 These differences need to be clearly understood in order to match
the correct U.S. BPC tools with the partner system so
that institutionalization occurs.
In addition, AFRICOM faces a significant common
systemic issue between the various systems. PME in
Africa is generally treated as training. There is a distinct lack of CHOD and CDS ownership of PME. African PME systems lack effective executive direction
and are not supported by cultures of assessment that
influence the continued relevance of African PME
educational outcomes in the face of a rapidly changing
strategic environment.116 Systemization is the missing
component in African PME that prevents the institutionalization of knowledge.
These factors combine to create a dynamic where,
given current circumstances, U.S. security cooperation is tactical in nature and cannot promote a holistic
capacity-building approach utilizing the entirety of the
strategic (executive direction), operational (generating
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force), and tactical (operating force) force. This is not an
ends-driven strategic approach; but is a means-driven
strategic approach, which is inconsistent with the intent
and requirements of the 2017 NDAA. The result could
have serious consequences for ongoing and future U.S.
BPC efforts because Congress is not convinced that
U.S. interests and objectives are being met and that a
suitable return on investment is achieved.
Dealing with these issues is critical to ensure the
success of BPC as a method to achieve U.S. strategic
goals in Africa. The solutions to these issues lie easily
within doctrinal and resourcing aspects of the U.S.
DOTMLPF system, especially with how the United
States conducts BPC and how the Army resources
BPC. By fully implementing doctrine, with GCC and
ASCC commanders making institutional BPC a priority, and creating SOOs at flagship Army educational
institutions the probability of achieving defense institution building is increased.
Fully implementing and reinforcing doctrine,
particularly the planning guidance contained in FM
3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, develops
the resourcing demand signal to inform the Army,
DoD, and Congress of the resources required to conduct BPC. More importantly, it forces the linkage of
U.S. engagement efforts to U.S. interests and highlights how the GCC and ASCC are institutionalizing
capability of time—both issues that are critical data
points for meeting congressional certification requirements contained in the 2017 NDAA. The Army and the
OSD’s specifically demanding BPC information that
is reported in accordance with Army and Joint BPC
doctrinal structures, such as the SFA model, will help
develop U.S. systems and processes to assist the Secretary of Defense in certifying that security cooperation
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activities meet the mandate of NDAA Section 333 by
ensuring GCC and ASCC plans incorporate all levels
of the force (operational, generating, and executive
direction functions) in BPC planning in a synchronized
and coherent manner. PME is a critical tool in showing
how the GCC is institutionalizing capacity.
Having the GCC and ASCC commanders making
institutionalization a key area of emphasis in their
engagement with counterparts addresses the lack of
CHOD and CDS ownership of PME. Asking specifics
about how tactical capability is being institutionalized
shows that it matters. Generating the will to change
from the top is a key element to addressing the missing
systemization in African PME that prevents the institutionalization of knowledge generated by U.S. capability building events. Making progress in engendering
cultures of assessment, which benefits the entirety of
the force and not just PME, will not happen without
CHOD ownership. Direct GCC and ASCC commander
focus on institutionalization further opens the space
for the SCO to work with the partner generating and
executive direction functions and helps gauge the level
of partner will to sustain the effects of U.S. BPC activities. These data points are critical to assisting the GCC
in ensuring they have a holistic approach to BPC that
incorporates all levels of the force (operational, generating, and executive direction functions) in BPC planning and execution in a synchronized and coherent
manner, again feeding into the Defense Department’s
ability to certify BPC activities in accordance with the
law.
The positive gains of implementing these previous recommendations can come to naught if the Army
does not address the resourcing issue for the generating force. Creating the SOOs at the Army educational
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institutions is critical to dealing with the lack of knowledge and establishing reach-back assistance at the generating function level. Establishment of the SFABs does
not address the generating force functions required
to institutionalize capacity. This can only be done by
using the right expertise over the long-term. Creating the SOOs provides this sorely lacking expertise,
provides a structure that can assist in eliminating the
ad hoc nature of PME-related support requests from
across the DoD enterprise, and enhances the Army’s
ability to track the demand signal for PME-related
BPC support. More importantly, the SFAB and SOO in
combination give the Army a holistic BPC capability
that formalizes and actualizes the doctrinal linkage of
operational, generating force, and executive direction
functions in BPC without seems or gaps. It is this type
of capability that will enable the GCCs and ASCCs to
meet the intent of NDAA Section 333.
Institutional capacity building is the key to locking-in the benefits of U.S. capability generation activities in Africa. PME is a critical element of partner
institutional capacity. However, as this chapter indicates, institutional level capacity building is neglected
due to a distinct lack of means. Thus, current U.S.
efforts, for all intents and purposes, follow on an operationally based means driven approach in terms of
BPC. As was previously noted: “we do the tactical very
well.”117 However, this is also a liability; it is a nonstrategic approach that places future BPC activities at risk
because it cannot answer the requirements demanded
by the 2017 NDAA. By making some relatively small
changes in procedure at the GCC and ASCC in terms
of how they plan for BPC and how they socialize BPC
with partners, combined with a small Army investment in resources, enables a shift to ends-driven BPC
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approaches at little cost. These changes are critical in
dealing with the partner generating force, particularly
in terms of PME capacity generation. These are low
cost, low risk options to put BPC back on the strategic
track and meet the intent of the 2017 NDAA.
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CHAPTER 3
STRENGTHENING AFRICAN PUBLIC HEALTH
SYSTEMS: THE STRATEGIC BENEFITS OF
CIVILIAN-MILITARY PARTNERSHIP
Catherine Hill-Herndon
INTRODUCTION
In his 2007 testimony announcing the establishment of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), thenU.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates said the
new command would “oversee security cooperation,
building partnership capacity, defense support to
nonmilitary missions and, if directed, military operations on the African continent.”1 The first of these missions is critical for the attainment of U.S. defense aims
and the success of the U.S. Army’s global mission, as
security cooperation provides strategic access to partner nations, enhances the Army’s readiness, training
and leader development activities, and improves situational awareness and expertise in the area of operations through engagement.2 While public health is
not usually thought of as an element of security cooperation, it is a major component of building partner
capacity in that it contributes to U.S. partners’ abilities to function effectively in the areas of governance,
essential services, and economic development. It is
an indisputable truth that virtually every nation that
wants to thrive socially, politically, and economically
cares about the health of its population. Therefore,
working with partner militaries and governments on
challenges in which the U.S. Government (USG) has a
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clear, shared interest, such as public health, especially
pandemic and disaster preparedness, is a sound basis
for establishing trust and building solid relations with
partners in the AFRICOM area of responsibility.
Now in its 2nd decade, with the changing security environment on the continent, AFRICOM has
had to address the rising threat of violent extremism.
Although there is no irrefutable evidence as to the
direct cause of violent extremism, it tends to take root in
impoverished countries and when societies are under
extreme stress.3 Public health can make an important contribution in efforts against violent extremism,
given the impact that investments in health systems
can have on economic growth and development in
partner countries, and in alleviating the societal stress
that allows it to take root. These connections are not
lost on U.S. policymakers, who consider these factors
critical in the attainment of U.S. national security objectives, by protecting our citizens from disease, as well
as promoting global economic wellbeing and a stable
international order. As first noted as far back as the
2000 National Security Strategy, “Besides reducing the
direct threat to Americans from disease, healthy populations internationally provide an essential underpinning for economic development, democratization
and political stability.”4 A World Health Organization
(WHO)-sponsored study observed that health sector
investments have significant economic returns in addition to their contribution to general economic development.”5 This study points out several reasons why
public health activities have broader effects in societies. For example, investors are more likely to put their
money in countries where workers are healthy and
productive.6 Economists who have studied the issue
consider improved health outcomes a major factor in
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East Asia’s rapid economic development through the
second half of the 20th century.7
While there are important benefits gained by
paying attention to public health issues, there is enormous risk in ignoring them. Infectious disease outbreaks, in recent history, have cost millions of lives.
The human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and the
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) alone
have claimed the lives of more than 35 million people.
An estimated 50 million people died of influenza in
1918.8 More recently, the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West
Africa demonstrated unambiguously that the United
States and other nations face the challenge of infectious
disease as a global community. The potential for economic and social disruption from a major disease pandemic is enormous. Yet investments in preparedness
and planning for pandemics are inadequate.9
In his February 2017 remarks at the National Press
Club, Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National
Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases, noted
that every U.S. president since Ronald Reagan has
addressed one or more pandemic outbreaks. Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush faced
HIV/AIDS, while President George W. Bush had the
additional challenge of the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) outbreak. Administrations have
also dealt with the emergence of West Nile Virus in the
United States, in addition to other contagious diseases
such as Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, Swine
Flu, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, Anthrax, Chikungunya, Ebola, and Zika. As Fauci asserted in his
remarks, future epidemics and pandemics of these diseases, and ones we do not yet know, will occur in the
future.10 No nation is immune from this possibility and
all must be prepared.
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The ability of U.S. partners and allies to respond
effectively to a disease outbreak has political, economic, and social implications for their populations.
HIV/AIDS is an example of a pandemic with consequences far beyond its immediate health impact.
In the 1990s, HIV/AIDS’ effect on African militaries
brought health and security concerns together at the
highest levels of the USG. In 2000, the United Nations
(UN) Security Council passed Resolution 1308, asking
member states to consider voluntary HIV/AIDS testing for peacekeeping troops, the first ever UN resolution on a health topic.11 In the early years of President
George W. Bush’s administration, concern about how
HIV/AIDS was undermining the effectiveness of African militaries led to the inclusion of the Department of
Defense (DoD) as one of the implementing agencies for
the U.S. President’s Emergency Relief Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR).12 Yet, it is not only U.S. presidents
and international organizations that have paid attention to the impact of disease outbreaks.
The U.S. DoD policy and military doctrine address
the need for U.S. military readiness in the public health
sector. As specified in the DoD Instruction (DoDI)
6000.16, “Military Health Support for Stability Operations,” medical stability operations (MSOs), are a “core
U.S. military mission.” The policy states the DoD Military Health System should be:
prepared to perform any task assigned to establish,
reconstitute, and maintain health sector capacity
and capability for the indigenous population when
indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals cannot
do so.13
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The geographic combatant commands are specifically
charged with the following tasks related to MSOs,
including:
a. Identify MSO requirements.
b. Incorporate MSOs into campaign plans; theater
security cooperation plans; military training,
exercises, and planning, including intelligence
campaign plans; and intelligence support plans.
c. Engage relevant U.S. Government departments
and agencies, foreign governments and security
forces, IOs [international organizations], NGOs
[nongovernmental organizations], and members of
the Private Sector in MSO planning, training, and
exercising, as appropriate, in coordination with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], the
USD(P) [Under Secretary of Defense for Policy], and
the ASD(HA) [Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Health Affairs].
d. Submit MSO ideas and issues to the Commander,
U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), for further
exploration as part of the joint experimentation
program.
e. Ensure unity of command and unity of effort for
health engagement activities within their command
and subordinate theater of operations.14

The above guidance focuses on health sector capacity and capability in a particular type of operation, but
that may be changing. Specifically, WHO defines health
systems as “all the activities whose primary purpose is
to promote, restore and/or maintain health” as well
as “the people, institutions and resources, arranged
together in accordance with established policies, to
improve the health of the population they serve.”15 It
appears the DoD is expanding its lens to take in more
of the elements outlined in the WHO definition. Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences
(USUHS) experts writing recently in the Joint Force
Quarterly noted, “systems engagement is more aligned
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with U.S. projection of soft power,” and that given budgetary challenges, “it is even more essential that Global
Health Engagement not only meets the needs of partner nations but also produces maximum benefit to the
broader policy objectives of the United States.”16 Nonetheless, historical traditions are not easily abandoned.
Traditionally, the U.S. Army’s involvement in
public health activities has concentrated on preparedness (including research, development, and
surveillance) and response. The rationale for Army
involvement in each area differs, but sometimes they
intersect. In the case of preparedness, which includes
U.S. military preparedness and that of its partners,
there are compelling reasons for the Army to work
with African military counterparts. African countries
are routinely challenged by major disease outbreaks.
In 2016, there were several major disease outbreaks in
Africa alone, affecting nine nations, including Nigeria
(measles), Ghana (cholera), Central African Republic
(cholera), South Sudan (cholera), Somalia (measles),
Kenya (cholera), Burundi (cholera), and Angola/Democratic Republic of Congo (yellow fever).17 Even more
predictable health issues are a challenge for troop readiness. During the deployment of U.S. forces to Liberia
in 2014-2015, a response mission, the Army recognized
the biggest health threat to U.S. forces was not Ebola,
but malaria.18
THE EBOLA CRISIS (2014-2016): AN OVERVIEW
There are many accounts of the challenges that
West African governments and the international community faced with the 2014 Ebola outbreak.19 The governments of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, recently
emerged from decades of conflict, were severely
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strained. Notably, in August 2014, Liberian President
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf declared a state of emergency,
citing the need for “extraordinary measures for the
very survival of our state and for the protection of the
lives of our people.”20 She faced a severe political crisis
and fired several government ministers who refused
to return to Liberia to address the outbreak.21 The Liberian economy was also hard hit. After seeing gross
domestic product (GDP) growth of 8.7 percent in 2013,
Liberia’s economy contracted by 0.7 percent in 2014,
and showed zero GDP growth in 2015.22
Before the 2014 outbreak, USG programming for
infectious disease in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone
was limited. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had bilateral PEPFAR programs in
Liberia and Guinea, and Sierra Leone was part of a
regional program. Guinea joined USAID’s President’s
Malaria Initiative program in 2011. In 2014, the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was
providing limited technical support to Sierra Leone,
but was not present in Guinea or Liberia.23 Additionally, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research’s U.S.
Military HIV Research Program (MHRP) had worked
in Nigeria to develop research capacity for more than
10 years.
AFRICOM had also engaged in global health activities on the continent, and long-term collaboration and
capacity developed through a variety of programs was
critical in the Ebola response. For example, AFRICOM’s
Disaster Preparedness Program (DPP), implemented
in part by the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian
Assistance Medicine (CDHAM) and the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency,24 assisted “African PNs [partner
nations] to prepare for, respond to and mitigate disasters, as well as to develop strategic partnerships on
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the continent.”25 Several West African countries at risk
from Ebola in 2014 had already engaged in the DPP,
including Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo. Each of those countries had exercised
their national disaster/pandemic preparedness and
response plans by mid-2013. After the outbreak, Senegal specifically attributed their ability to contain the
limited outbreak they experienced to work done in
partnership with AFRICOM and CDHAM under the
DPP program.26 When they discovered Ebola cases in
Lagos, Nigerian officials activated the country’s DPP
plan and brought the outbreak under control.27 Liberia became a DPP participant in 2013; unfortunately,
it had not yet conducted its national exercise until
after Ebola emerged.28 CDHAM also conducted programming under the West African Disaster Preparedness Initiative from March to December 2015 within
the DPP framework, as a transition from Operation
UNITED ASSISTANCE (OUA). The purpose was to
apply lessons learned in the Ebola response to improve
national disaster management capacities and foster
regional collaboration, communication, and coordination, primarily within the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS). Walter Reed’s MHRP
platforms in several countries conducted Ebola testing.
MHRP sites in Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Tanzania, and
Mozambique ran phase II Ebola vaccine trials.29 Lastly,
AFRICOM continues to support periodic activities
of the African Partner Outbreak Response Alliance
(APORA). APORA partners include African nations,
DoD agencies, AFRICOM, and USG civilian agencies,
including USAID and the CDC.30
Nigeria’s experience during its Ebola outbreak
underscores the importance of long-term commitments to partner capacity. In addition to the work
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done with Walter Reed and DPP, Nigeria’s effective
response was facilitated by its experience in polio
eradication, working with long-term partners such as
the CDC, along with NGOs, including Rotary International and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, to
enhance Nigeria’s disease surveillance system. These
partnerships meant Nigeria had the trained personnel
and resources to recognize and shut down the Ebola
outbreak quickly, and a plan in place to deploy them
for other infectious disease outbreaks.
Nonetheless, former President Barack Obama’s
September 2014 announcement the U.S. military would
join a USG surge in OUA, to fight the epidemic, was a
turning point. The deployment of the 101st Airborne
Division had several important benefits. Liberia badly
needed the Ebola Treatment Units, and the announcement the U.S. Army would build such a unit for health
care workers was a key factor in the ability of international NGOs (INGOs) and local health officials to
recruit and retain medical personnel. The air bridge
from Senegal was essential for bringing in personnel,
equipment, and supplies, particularly given regional
and commercial travel restrictions. Training for Liberian first responders was critical as well.31 Finally, the
DoD’s research and development was the source of the
most knowledge of, and virtually all countermeasures
for, Ebola.32
The psychological impact of the arrival of the 101st
Airborne Division on the morale and the resolve of the
Liberian government, medical community, and population cannot be overstated. One observer maintains:
Military engagement symbolized the commitment of
international resources and a demonstration of goodwill,
halted the exodus of INGOs from the region, encouraged
a professional response with structured command
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and control arrangements, and provided high-quality
treatment facilities, which reassured international
agencies that deployed professional staff to the region.33

Military forces from the United Kingdom, China,
Canada, France, and Germany also responded to the
2014 Ebola outbreak. In 2016, The Lancet reported,
“These forces were seen by many as a game changer
in the Ebola response.” The study found “the deployment of foreign militaries was vital to convincing several non-governmental organisations to maintain or
establish operations in the affected countries.”34
OUA was a watershed event for the Army and
AFRICOM, but it followed decades of DoD activity in
the health sector in Africa and other parts of the world.
Globally, Army and Navy laboratories, including
in Africa, play an important role in force protection,
and contribute significantly to disease surveillance
and detection more broadly. For example, in West
Africa, the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit No. 3
(NAMRU-3) in Cairo, based in Egypt since 1946, has
had activities throughout the region, including in West
Africa.35 For over a decade, NAMRU-3 has maintained
a detachment in Accra, Ghana where it works in close
collaboration with the U.S. interagency, including the
CDC. These organizations and their activities were the
foundations on which the successful Ebola response
was built.
OUTBREAK LESSONS LEARNED
Since 2015, the USG has exerted considerable effort
to take the lessons of the Ebola outbreak into account,
and to agree on new procedures and planning to avoid
delays and confusion in the future. In this context, one
important lesson is how an infectious disease outbreak
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can turn into a situation requiring a broader response.
The State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual, which
governs State’s operations, includes epidemics as
a possible cause of a disaster in its policy guidance
for USG provision of humanitarian assistance.36 In
West Africa, however, recognition that the situation
had turned into what WHO described as a “broader,
multidimensional crisis” came very late, delaying an
effective and timely response.37 An earlier decision to
trigger traditional disaster/humanitarian mechanisms
might have reduced the risk of a broader outbreak, and
potentially saved many lives.
A University of Sydney study (2015) concluded:
adverse health events must be recognized as equivalent
to other disasters for their potential to cause or exacerbate
humanitarian crises. Health actors must not preclude
multisectoral collaboration with humanitarian, and if
necessary, military actors even if an event is framed as a
health crisis.38

This was certainly true in the case of Ebola. Jeremy
Konyndyk, then-director of USAID’s Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA), said recently that “no one
in the USG had a monopoly on the capacities needed
to stop the transmission.” In his view:
calling it a disaster put it into an operational framework
that pulls everything together: military, civilian, NGOs.
It also brings in more flexible tools, including funding
streams and authorities within the USG.

He continued, “We also must note the political significance and impact of the U.S. Government putting its
credibility on the line to do something.”39
The response to a complex health emergency,
which is more likely to be a slow-onset crisis, requires
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a different planning response than a natural disaster
with a sudden onset. Policymakers and planners must
recognize that in a health crisis, strategy and guidance
need constant reevaluation. After a hurricane, or an
earthquake, the event itself is over when relief efforts
get underway. Responders will encounter a range of
consequences, but the original nature of the disaster
will not change. Disease is different. At the start of an
outbreak, responders may not know the exact cause,
source, or epidemiology of the disease. Policymakers
and planners must continually reassess assumptions,
based on the data, to ensure the response remains effective and appropriate. Former CDC Director Thomas
Frieden emphasized this at a recent conference, noting
that responders in a health emergency “must be adaptive.”40 Public understanding of the nature of an emerging infectious disease may not reflect the science, and
decisionmakers, planners, and responders across the
USG should lead in this regard.
The character of the U.S. military intervention occasioned significant interagency debate within the USG,
leading the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis’ (JCOA) study of OUA to conclude, “debate about
the nature and extent of the USG response consumed
critical time while the crisis worsened.”41 Much of the
debate was over the nature of military support. There
were policy concerns about the exposure of troops to
the disease and a debate over the potential role of military personnel in the provision of medical care. The
weeks of debate over the DoD’s role concluded with
decisions that were, in the end, largely consistent with
the internationally agreed-upon Guidelines on The Use
of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster
Relief, also known as the Oslo Guidelines.
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Forty-five UN member states, including the United
States; the European Union; the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO); the Western European Union;
several UN agencies, including the Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees and the WHO; and
INGOs and universities, including the International
Committee for the Red Cross, agreed to the Oslo
Guidelines, negotiated in 1994 and revised in 2007.42
The Guidelines differentiate between direct and indirect assistance, defining direct assistance as “the faceto-face distribution of goods and services.” Indirect
assistance is “at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting
relief goods or relief personnel.”43 According to the
Guidelines:
Military and civil defence assets should be seen as a
tool complementing existing relief mechanisms in order
to provide specific support to specific requirements,
in response to the acknowledged “humanitarian gap”
between the disaster needs that the relief community is
being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet
them. Therefore, foreign military and civil defence assets
should be requested only where there is no comparable
civilian alternative and only the use of military or civil
defence assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The
military or civil defence asset must therefore be unique in
capability and availability.44

Moreover, one of the key principles in deploying
military and civil defense forces is that:
humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian
organizations. Insofar as military organizations have a
role to play in supporting humanitarian work, it should,
to the extent possible, not encompass direct assistance,
in order to retain a clear distinction between the normal
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functions and roles of humanitarian and military
stakeholders.45

There is also an acknowledged role for infrastructure
support.
Although USAID trains its staff based on the Oslo
Guidelines, there appears to be limited interagency
awareness of these agreed-upon principles.46 Broader
understanding of, and interagency planning based on,
these guidelines could speed the decisionmaking process in a future emergency. At the same time, the Army
and AFRICOM should continue to consider when and
if a U.S. military medical response is appropriate. The
military has considerable capacity to respond medically. Virtually all the preventive, diagnostic, and therapeutic medical countermeasures fielded in the Ebola
epidemic were either directly or indirectly a product of
the U.S. military’s acquisition process and its medical
research and development activities.47 Some interviewees considered the inability of military researchers to
lead vaccine trials, for example, a significant missed
opportunity.
During OUA, AFRICOM recognized the need for
a deeper understanding and expertise in their area
of operations.48 AFRICOM faces several challenges in
building and sustaining expertise, including the relative newness of the combatant command, the 5-year
limit on civilian tenure, and the lack of African liaison
officers outside of the Combined Joint Task ForceHorn of Africa in Djibouti.49 Moreover, particularly
in smaller countries, the number of host government
counterparts with the technical backgrounds and
in some cases, English skills, to handle global health
engagements may be limited. These individuals and
their staffs can be overwhelmed by the multiplicity of
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USG actors. At the country level, the country team, in
this context, is an invaluable resource. The team is also
an excellent mechanism for overseeing coordination;
deconflicting planning, programs, and training; and
ensuring policy coherence and sustainability. Regionally, AFRICOM’s approximate counterparts at the
State Department, the Bureau of African Affairs, and
at USAID, the Africa Bureau, are also important partners. Continued efforts to coordinate at the regional
and country levels will ensure AFRICOM’s health
engagement efforts fall within the broader USG policy
framework and will help avoid program overlap and
confusion.
Routine work with U.S. civilian agencies will also
facilitate emergency response, as was the case with
the Ebola outbreak.50 Several interlocutors identified
the lack of civilian agency understanding of military
response capabilities and limitations as a challenge. In
recent years, the interagency has made considerable
progress on civilian-military coordination. However,
many civilian agency offices involved in the Ebola
response, particularly at the action officer level, had
not had significant contact with military counterparts.
As the outbreak worsened, they did not include military options in their planning, and were not sure of
the right questions to ask the DoD to determine what
might be possible. Even once the USG began its internal debate over whether or not to deploy the U.S.
Army in response to the epidemic, there was considerable discussion over what its role would be. Army and
AFRICOM success in future deployments depends on
planning and exercising what they can do to respond
to future health emergencies.51 The converse is also
true: the Army and AFRICOM need to understand the
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authorities and capabilities of their USG partners in
responding to a public health emergency.
The U.S. CDC has an emergency operation system
that activates in response to disease outbreaks and
other health crises. The State Department, through its
Operations Center, also has established coordination
mechanisms for natural disasters, disease outbreaks
and other civilian emergencies. In 2016, USAID’s
OFDA issued “USAID/OFDA Guidance on Indicators for Programming in Response to a Public Health
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).” These
guidelines govern a potential OFDA-led response to an
isolated disease outbreak declared a PHEIC by WHO,
in addition to OFDA responses to infectious disease
outbreaks in the context of a natural disaster or other
complex humanitarian emergency.52 Sustained collaboration, including policy coordination and exercises,
across these functions will enhance the effectiveness of
the entire interagency in future emergencies.
Outside the USG, there are several fora where the
global health community has established shared global
and regional goals and objectives, agreed to by countries, regional organizations, and international organizations, to strengthen health systems. Using these
goals as a basis for Army and AFRICOM planning
and programs will ensure those programs support
broadly agreed-upon objectives, and facilitate collaboration with and commitment of other stakeholders
and partner governments. The first and foremost of
these shared goals are the International Health Regulations, which 196 UN member states, the United States
included, have accepted and agreed to implement.53
Another mechanism is the Global Health Security
Agenda (GHSA), a partnership of almost 60 nations
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and others, including international organizations and
NGOs. Its purpose is:
facilitating collaborative, capacity-building efforts
to achieve specific and measurable targets around
biological threats, while accelerating achievement of
the core capacities required by the International Health
Regulations, the World Organization of Animal Health’s
Performance of Veterinary Services Pathway, and other
relevant global health security frameworks [emphasis
added].54

Sixteen of the members are African countries, of
which 10 have posted their own national roadmaps
for improving capacity on the GHSA website, making
them readily accessible.55 African countries that have
shared their roadmaps include Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, and Uganda.56 Additional GHSA members in Africa include Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. In
coordination with the interagency, AFRICOM and the
Army should steer health engagement activities to fit
within the GHSA to ensure those activities are appropriately focused, sustainable, and support broader
U.S. goals.
As Africa’s regional and subregional institutions
expand their reach and capacity, AFRICOM should
consider them as potential partners. For example, the
African Union (AU) recently established its Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (AU CDC), based in
Addis Ababa. The United States contributed $10 million to establish this organization; other support has
come from WHO, INGOs, and China, which built the
AU CDC headquarters building.57 In 2016, the AU CDC
issued its Regional Strategy for Health Security and Emergencies: 2016-2020 to help African countries detect and
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respond to priority diseases and public health events.
Efforts to date include mapping laboratory diagnostic
capacity across member states and identifying gaps.
The organization has also established Africa-wide
guidelines for standardizing and strengthening laboratory activities.58 The AU CDC is working closely
with U.S. CDC, but there is plenty of work to do, and
the Army and AFRICOM could usefully participate in
these initiatives.
In future emergencies, African partners will look
to the United States, and AFRICOM, for partnership
and support. Within the USG, civilian agencies have
the lead on global health engagement; close collaboration allows the DoD to play its important and appropriate role effectively.59 Efforts to improve interagency
coordination remain a priority. The DoD’s key role
in PEPFAR is an example of an effective, interagency
approach. From its start in 2003, the DoD has been a
partner in PEPFAR’s efforts to combat HIV/AIDS,
with a focus on countries where the military is engaged
on HIV/AIDS issues. According to PEPFAR:
Members of the defense forces in 13 PEPFAR focus
countries have been the recipients of DoD military-specific
HIV/AIDS prevention programs designed to address
their unique risk factors. . . . In these 13 countries alone,
military programs have the potential to make an impact
on more than 1.2 million people, including active-duty
troops, their dependents, employees, and surrounding
civilian communities.60

The DoD will also continue to play a useful role
through the Joint West Africa Research Group, established in 2015, which is a collaborative initiative to
support surveillance and clinical capabilities to detect
and respond to infectious disease. The DoD partners
in this effort include the U.S. MHRP at the Walter
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Reed Army Institute of Research, Walter Reed Program-Nigeria, the Austere Environment Consortium
for Enhanced Sepsis Outcomes at the Naval Medical
Research Center, NAMRU-3 (Ghana Detachment), and
other military, government, and academic institutions,
including the Sabeti Lab at the Broad Institute of Harvard and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and
Nigeria’s African Center of Excellence for Genomics of
Infectious Diseases.
The debate over the military’s medical role in
response to a pandemic continues within the DoD
and in the interagency. Senior leadership must resolve
outstanding force health protection policy issues.
Important questions regarding quarantine, transport
of patients, and disposal of remains are still under
discussion. Substantive policy discussion and decisionmaking now would facilitate science-based policymaking in a crisis. Once established, policies should
be well socialized with the DoD leadership, the U.S.
interagency, and Congress. Public affairs planning, in
terms of messaging, is also essential.
INITIATIVES FOR THE LONG-TERM
Sustained, routine engagement on health issues
with partner military and government officials benefits
AFRICOM, the Army, and broader U.S. national interests. For AFRICOM, health engagement is an excellent
way to understand and support partner governments’
capacities and response capabilities. Such engagement contributes to AFRICOM’s depth of knowledge
and experience in Africa, and gives soldiers experience in permissive environments.61 Planning, and
consistently exercising plans with partners, including in Africa, contributes to a solid knowledge base,
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clear policy guidance, effective interagency coordination mechanisms, and science-based decisionmaking
and planning. Global cooperation in the health sector
also provides opportunities for collaborative research
and development in emerging infectious disease, and
development of effective countermeasures. All of these
activities enhance U.S. capacity to respond to a major
global pandemic.62 Nonetheless, OUA was a single
event for which, as previously described, the U.S. military and other organizations were able to respond
effectively.
In the aftermath of the West Africa Ebola outbreak,
AFRICOM, through a joint planning team established
in 2015, developed a pandemic influenza and infectious disease contingency plan that took into account
lessons learned during the OUA deployment. As part
of this process, the planning team made several key
recommendations for Phase 0/steady state activities
to AFRICOM leadership that, if fully implemented,
would significantly contribute to preparedness, both
for the United States and for our partners.63 The recommendations are:
•
•
•
•

Assessing partner health and medical capability/
infrastructure.
Security force assistance with key partners focused
on force health protection, biosecurity, biosafety,
biosurveillance, and crisis response.
Disaster preparedness exercises with partners.
Participation
with
the
GHSA
to
ensure
64
synchronization.

The following are specific suggestions for follow-up action by the Army and AFRICOM to address
some of the issues and challenges raised above, and to
support the key objectives stemming from the lessons
learned exercise after OUA. Throughout the lessons
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learned literature, and during interviews with officials
both inside the DoD and in the interagency, it is clear
that, despite AFRICOM’s interagency emphasis, coordination continues to be a challenge.
First, to provide an appropriate, overall framework,
AFRICOM should develop a consolidated, shareable
theater-wide health engagement strategy that sets
objectives, priorities, and guidelines for appropriate,
sustainable DoD activities supporting broader U.S.
and global health policies and strategies. This strategy
should be based on a discussion of command goals,
objectives, and suitable activities and should be part
of the Theater Campaign Plan. An emphasis on early
and interactive interagency regional coordination,
as is now the case with country teams, would clarify
agency roles, promote civilian agency understanding
of the DoD’s interests and objectives, ensure coordination of overlapping USG activities with country and
regional partnerships, and facilitate development of
individual country plans. AFRICOM may find it helpful to consider Pacific Command’s approach, based on
its Health Theater Security Cooperation Plan, in which
the command sets priorities for health programs and
activities in the theater.
The JCOA study on Defense Institution Building
recommends AFRICOM use its annual African Strategic Dialogue with deputy chiefs of mission, USAID
mission directors, and defense attachés (DATTs) to
“reduce geographic command-interagency bureaucratic friction.” The annual dialogue is a useful forum;
however, it does take a very broad approach. Alternatively, the USUHS Center for Global Health Engagement (CGHE) could provide an excellent forum for
a focused, detailed discussion of health systems
strengthening. AFRICOM could consider a CGHE-led
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discussion with interagency and other key international partners, the results of which would serve as a
basis for drafting a theater-wide strategy. Such a conference would build on the Global Health Engagement
training workshops that CGHE holds for AFRICOM
planners and staff. Within the Army, an Army Medical Building Partner Capacity (BPC) conference to
share and discuss best practices could be useful, possibly hosted by the Army Medical Command at Fort
Sam Houston, Texas. Participants could include U.S.
Army Africa (USARAF) and the other five Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) supporting the
regional combatant commands: U.S. Army South, U.S.
Army North, U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Army Central,
and U.S. Army Europe. Moreover, given the role of
European-based INGOs in humanitarian assistance
and disaster response in Africa, AFRICOM could also
consider participating in ongoing preparedness planning with those stakeholders in Geneva, in cooperation with the U.S. Health Attache’s office at the U.S.
Mission to the UN in Geneva.
Second, AFRICOM should ensure planners systematically take into account interagency-approved
strategy documents to provide a broader USG perspective on the bilateral relationship and direction of
USG programming. AFRICOM policy is to tie activities to the Department of State’s country-level Integrated Country Strategies and the Bureau of African
Affairs’ Joint Regional Strategy. These strategies reflect
interagency agreement and the depth and breadth of
USG expertise. Efforts in 2015 to ensure AFRICOM
planners have ready access to these documents should
facilitate this process. In countries with USAID programs, AFRICOM should routinely review USAID’s
5-year Country Development Cooperation Strategies,

140

which outline the “development context and overarching U.S. foreign policy and national security considerations.”65 USAID strategies are usually drafted jointly
with the host government and include an assessment
of the host government’s development strategy and
priorities.
Third, AFRICOM military planners should prioritize efforts to cooperate more closely with significant international organizations and NGOs, perhaps
through its existing APORA initiative. AFRICOM
would have to agree with the interagency on the nature
and direction of this cooperation, and incorporate the
results into the regional strategies discussed above.
One important potential partner is the AU and, specifically, the organization’s newly established AU CDC,
in collaboration with the U.S. CDC. As noted earlier,
the AU CDC has released its Regional Strategy for Health
Security and Emergencies: 2016-2020. Further work with
ECOWAS, already an AFRICOM partner, including
through its West African Health Organisation, could
also be very effective. Additionally, in coordination
with the CDC, AFRICOM should consider participation in the African Society for Laboratory Medicine (ASLM), a virtual organization headquartered in
Addis Ababa, with WHO and AU support. In 2015,
more than 20 African health ministers issued the Freetown Declaration, calling for international stakeholders to “establish resilient tiered laboratory networks,
regularly measure progress with a standardised score
card, and effectively integrate these networks into disease surveillance and public health institutes.”66 The
organization’s goals for 2020 are:
•

Strengthening laboratory workforce by training and
certifying laboratory professionals and clinicians
through standardised frameworks;
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•
•
•

Transforming laboratory testing quality by enrolling
laboratories in quality improvement programmes to
achieve accreditation by international standards;
Developing strong, harmonised regulatory systems
for diagnostic products as defined by the Global
Harmonization Taskforce; and,
Building a network of national public health reference
laboratories to improve early disease detection and
collaborative research.67

This is another area where AFRICOM’s participation and engagement with African partners would be
useful in its capacity-building activities.
Fourth, the National Guard State Partnership
Program (SPP) can be an important contributor to
public health engagement with African nations, and
there is widespread interagency support for expansion of the SPP in Africa. There are 12 existing SPPs
in AFRICOM’s area of responsibility.68 The recent
AFRICOM offer to the National Guard Bureau to give
State Partnerships the “first right of refusal” on security cooperation activities, and to continue to expand
the program, is an excellent initiative.69 As the effort
progresses, SPP health engagements should be systematically integrated into broader AFRICOM programming, and AFRICOM should submit a request
for additional funding for SPP activities, to include
additional training days for unit rotations, in support of these operations. The National Guard has
long-established relationships with partner countries,
which puts them in an excellent position to provide
needed regional expertise. They are also responsible
for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in their
own states, making them a natural partner for African militaries that play that role in their respective
countries. One senior State Department official noted
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that host governments also appreciate the continuity
that SPPs represent, and in some cases find it easier
to work with the DoD through the smaller National
Guard organizations.70 AFRICOM might leverage SPP
partnerships elsewhere for additional access in Africa.
Where there is an established SPP with a partner in
Europe, or Asia, for example, and that country has a
partnership of their own in Africa, cooperation on a
trilateral basis might be possible.
There are DATT Offices and Offices of Development Cooperation in only 34 of AFRICOM’s 54 countries. Forward deployment of additional National
Guard personnel would help bridge the gap between
capacities in country and at AFRICOM and USARAF
headquarters. These officers would improve coordination at the country team level; deepen existing relationships with African partners; and support and maintain
the access afforded by training and other activities.
Networking National Guard personnel with the planners in a systematic way could also help offset the gap
in African liaison officers in AFRICOM headquarters.
Moreover, AFRICOM should also consider, under
its broader theater health cooperation strategy, how
to maximize the impact of the State Partnerships and
ensure those programs support disaster preparedness
goals. During OUA, INGOs called for deployments
of personnel trained in biohazard containment.71 The
United States has a robust Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE)
capacity within the National Guard. Through the
SPP, this capacity could be leveraged in Phase 0 training and preparedness activities. In 2015, for example,
Nigeria asked for support in establishing a Nigerian
military bioresponse capability for high threat pathogens. Walter Reed Program-Nigeria is responding to
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this request.72 The United States is engaged in Uganda
along similar lines. Other African governments may be
interested. National Guard CBRNE units could train
and exercise African bioreponse teams, so that African militaries would have this capability, alleviating
pressure on U.S. resources in an emergency.73 At the
same time, the DoD should continue to develop policy
to allow for possible deployment of National Guard
CBRNE capacity in response to a future pandemic
outbreak, if called upon. Finally, AFRICOM should
ensure all SPP activities support a broader, sustainable
theater-wide strategy.
Fifth, functioning Emergency Operations Centers
(EOC) are critical to an effective emergency response,
and AFRICOM could usefully support the establishment of additional emergency operations centers and
training of personnel. The CDC is building health EOCs
in several GHSA countries. AFRICOM should coordinate with CDC and other U.S. agencies to identify
priority non-GHSA countries where whole-of-government EOCs, to include health ministries, would make
a contribution to preparedness. Host governments
would benefit from having the center themselves, and
by the discussion and policy decisions they would
make in determining where to locate and how to organize operations. These activities would also benefit
AFRICOM, as they would establish relationships with
counterparts in the U.S. interagency, and between the
host government and other stakeholders. The SPP
National Guard partners would be a good choice to
take the lead on such a program, given their role in
disaster response in their home states, as noted above.
Sixth, AFRICOM, through the SPP, could consider training on mobile health platforms using
smart phones during exercises with EOCs. The
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joint USAID-DoD-Department of State-Department of Health and Human Services Inspectors General September 2015 report to Congress
on OUA pointed to delays in data collection.74
The findings attributed these delays to a lack of communications capacity in the three affected states, forcing health care workers to depend on paper files, which
significantly slowed transmission of information. At
the same time, the three ministries of health lacked sufficient capacity to collect, share, and analyze data from
the field.75 During the epidemic, USAID supported
development of an open source health data collection
system in Guinea.76 The Nigerian government credited
mobile health technology with significant reductions
in reporting times.77 The U.S. Army Telemedicine and
Advanced Technology Research Center has developed
the Global MedAid Engagement Toolkit, which was
field-tested in West Africa during the Ebola epidemic.
This application supports medical personnel in the
field when connectivity is limited.78
Seventh, with respect to logistics planning, it is
worth considering how AFRICOM’s planned West
Africa Logistics Network might support a U.S. or international response to a health or other disaster. The network, scheduled to start operations in late 2017, will
consolidate existing transportation channels, creating
a light logistics hub to support troops deployed in
Africa.79 In a natural disaster, USAID’s Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance ordinarily calls on its established network of NGOs and commercial contractors to
support distribution of commodities, equipment, and
supplies. The Ebola outbreak, however, significantly
disrupted commercial transportation services into and
within West Africa. Therefore, as part of discussions
with partner nations, AFRICOM should consider, in
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coordination with the interagency, provisions in the
agreements establishing the hub to allow for importation and intratheater transport of emergency personnel, equipment, and supplies. AFRICOM could work
toward an interagency-supported agreement with relevant regional organizations, for example, ECOWAS.
Such an agreement could include guidelines to trigger
the use of the network in an emergency, to include
easing customs requirements and tariffs, and other
barriers to a rapid response. AFRICOM and ECOWAS
could agree, for example, that needed drugs on the
WHO Essential Medicines List and Formulary or
drugs consistent with WHO Guidelines for medicine
donations would be automatically eligible for duty
free import.80 AFRICOM and its African partners could
likewise agree to activate the network for this purpose
based on a disaster declaration by one or more partner
nations or the relevant regional organization, and the
U.S. Ambassador.81
Eighth, the SPPs could also consider planning and
training on safe burial practices with African militaries. USAID’s OFDA has no authorities to allow it to
support safe burial practices in a disaster. Addressing
burial practices was key to breaking the transmission
cycle of Ebola, for example, and would be an important element in response to any major disaster or disease outbreak.
Ninth, where feasible, medical readiness training exercises and humanitarian assistance programs
should be linked to broader health systems strengthening and public health goals. For example, one possible approach is the one Pacific Command took in
its 2015 exercise Task Force Forager. In this exercise,
several of its Subject Matter Expert Exchange activities
were linked to WHO and USAID programs supporting
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achievement of the UN-agreed Sustainable Development Goals.82 The proposed AFRICOM-wide health
engagement strategy could identify medical readiness
training exercises that also support broader public
health goals.
Tenth, interagency and NGO participation in exercises focusing on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is essential, and exercises should test how
AFRICOM is able to ensure adequate and timely
information sharing among Army systems and those
of the interagency, external partners and host governments.83 AFRICOM has committed to incorporating
crisis response in its exercises, as a way of assessing
security force assistance (SFA) in this area. With the
participation of interagency action offices and international organizations, exercises could consider potential
decision points and guidelines to inform DoD policymakers in a future event. Building on the unprecedented NGO request for military intervention in West
Africa in 2015, AFRICOM could host tabletop exercises
at Washington think tanks or other fora that included
the participation of UN organizations, INGOs, and
U.S. interagency partners. For exercises in theater, it
would be valuable to encourage participation beyond
that of civil-military liaison personnel, to include
action offices. AFRICOM could invite officers from
relevant civilian agencies present at post to participate
in regularly scheduled exercises. These officials would
provide a useful perspective and would benefit from
contact with military counterparts. Inclusion of nonUSG stakeholders is also consistent with AFRICOM’s
approach.
Lastly, there are a number of DoD elements working in the global health area. The DoD’s new internal
Global Health Engagement Council should improve
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coordination, reduce overlap and redundancy, and
help identify DoD health engagement priorities. Joint
Staff represents the combatant commands at the Council. The Joint Staff Surgeon’s Office is responsible for
representing the combatant commands; AFRICOM’s
active involvement in this process should enhance
coordination with other DoD elements. More than one
interagency official noted that an apparent disconnect
between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
and AFRICOM hampered AFRICOM effectiveness
during the Ebola outbreak, as it lacked timely information about Washington deliberations.84 In the case
of health engagement, this coordination issue might
be improved by active AFRICOM involvement in the
Council. Additional coordination improvements could
be gained through AFRICOM’s interagency Consolidated Health Engagement Working Group that is an
AFRICOM-led forum in which the DoD and U.S. interagency partners coordinate medical engagement activities on the continent consistent with AFRICOM’s line
of effort concerning humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief.
There are important strategic benefits of supporting the strengthening of health systems. These include
the access that joint, interagency, interorganizational
and multinational work on health issues offers; the
opportunity for AFRICOM to enhance relationships,
expertise, and effectiveness that these partnerships
provide; and the need to be ready to provide humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or respond to a disease
outbreak. AFRICOM should continue to incorporate
lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak into planning
and programming, looking for ways to work with African partners and allies to build health system capacity in advance of an emergency, and to improving its
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ability to respond in the event of one. AFRICOM and
Army leadership should take an active role in global
health engagements, consistent with AFRICOM’s
unique structure and mission, and the challenges
facing its partners. Recognition of its unique mission
was reflected in the AFRICOM Commander’s recent
testimony to Congress, in which General Thomas
Waldhauser cited AFRICOM’s cooperation with State
Department and USAID to “address the root causes
of violent extremism, lack of accountable government
systems, poor education opportunities, and social and
economic deficiencies to achieve long-term, sustainable impact in Africa.”85
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CHAPTER 4
THE FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2017 NATIONAL
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT (NDAA)
AND U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION IN
AFRICA: CONFRONTING EXPECTATIONS AND
REALITIES
William M. Wyatt
A collection of well-intended programs and authorities nested under the umbrella term “security cooperation,” and meant to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals
in Africa, suffer from a plethora of authorities and
diverging interests, coupled with a tendency to rely on
short-term goals, an undertrained and understrength
workforce, the absence of reliable data to assess efforts,
and conflicting guidance. Additionally, there appears
to be an overwhelming propensity among those
involved in security cooperation to assume outcomes
are under U.S. control. This flawed assumption occurs
in the absence of the recognition that regardless of
what the U.S. Government (USG) does, far too often
outcomes are in the hands of the partner or events
beyond its control. Moreover, security cooperation is a
long game. There will always be short-term needs and
programs to address them. However, USG success in
helping to improve security within Africa requires a
unified, long-term, consistent effort on the part of all
actors: the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID). These actors must be willing
to accept factors beyond their control and the reality
that U.S. goals may diverge from those of our African
partners.
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Although the Department of State has primacy
for foreign policy, the State Department and the DoD
work together on many programs that fall within the
realm of security cooperation; there are no clear plans
or messages, let alone consistent goals across the entire
USG security sector enterprise. Rather than a coherent
national plan for security with partners, the USG deals
with a multitude of programs and authorities spread
across multiple USG organizations. With so many
funds, authorities, and offices involved, few USG officials have a grasp of the numerous factors involved in
managing security cooperation, to include timelines
for planning and executing programs, the equities of
the numerous individuals and agencies, or even how
these factors affect one another.1 Nevertheless, one can
easily find countless anecdotes of the DoD and U.S.
Army successes in implementing security cooperation
programs across Africa. The problem is that, given
the challenges listed above, security cooperation success is often an end state reached through serendipitous means rather than because of a comprehensive,
well-conceived, planned, resourced, and executed
effort on behalf of U.S. foreign policy. Past successes
and a radically new approach to security cooperation
under the fiscal year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) signal the possibility of improved
coordination and outcomes to achieve U.S. policy goals
in the future.2
There is a need for clarity in U.S. foreign policy, in
part stemming from a dramatic shift in who controls
resources for Africa in the security sector arena.3 Section 1206 of the FY 2007 NDAA (later called 2282 and
now in the 2017 NDAA termed Section 333 programs)
dramatically expanded security cooperation programs,
specifically train and equip programs in Africa under
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the label of building partner capacity (BPC). These Title
10 security cooperation programs focused heavily on
counterterrorism and have greatly increased the DoD’s
role in security cooperation across the globe. In financial terms, the Department of State directly administers just 40 percent of the security sector budget, with
the DoD now controlling the remaining 60 percent vice
the less than 20 percent it controlled in 2006.4
Another challenge in defining security cooperation
and related concepts is that there is not a common lexicon or consistent definitions that the USG organizations understand or use.5 BPC, security force assistance
(SFA), foreign internal defense, security assistance,
and defense institution building are but a few of the
applicable terms. For this discussion, however, the
study will focus on security cooperation, which is an
umbrella term that essentially indicates all the DoD
interactions with foreign defense establishments.6 This
includes both Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.),
National Defense-funded activities and programs,
as well as State Department Title 22, U.S.C., Foreign
Assistance programs where defense department personnel serve as the executive agent. Therefore, the primary focus of this chapter is any activity over which the
DoD personnel have some purview. These activities
also include, but are not limited to, Section 333 Train
and Equip, military-to-military exchanges, Defense
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Awareness and
Prevention Program, foreign military sales, foreign
military financing, International Military Education
and Training (IMET), excess defense articles, military
exercises, and several other programs.
Additionally, the Department of State and the DoD
security cooperation and security assistance programs
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play a major role in helping to attain U.S. foreign policy
aims across Africa. These efforts contribute to professionalizing African security forces, combating terrorism, building U.S. diplomatic ties with African bilateral,
regional, and continental partners, and increasing
partner capacity.7 Given significant increases in activity, the number of programs available and the fiscal
expenditures for security cooperation activities since
2006, a review of existing and recent historical efforts is
worthwhile to document the impacts and, potentially,
the efficacy of U.S. security cooperation in Africa.
The principal questions this chapter seeks to
answer are as follows: How do security cooperation
programs further U.S. national security interests? Do
they aid partners in achieving their own goals? What
happens when those goals diverge or a partner has its
own designs on use of capabilities and defense-related
equipment? Are security cooperation efforts effective?
If a partner receives U.S. assistance and then does not
participate in a mission or security efforts that Washington desires, is that a failure of security cooperation
or of diplomacy? Alternatively, is it simply a national
prerogative and the result of factors beyond the control
or influence of the United States? The answers to these
questions demand a substantive examination of many
programs and, perhaps, even the entire approach to
security sector activities in USG policy toward Africa.
Assessing the value and impact of a broad array of
traditional security assistance and security cooperation
programs is fraught with hazards; often considering a
program a success or not depends on one’s perspective. Further, efforts to capture partner satisfaction
with programs reliably or accurately are rare or haphazard at best.8 Consequently, the study will examine
U.S. and partner expectations, experiences, points of
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view, and results of security cooperation programs.
Expectations are an ever-changing dynamic, which
when overly ambitious on either side can result in perceptions of failure, regardless of the actual outcomes.
Assessing U.S. security cooperation in Africa is not a
simple metric or single measure, but rather it requires
a specific evaluation of each relationship and its circumstances to determine where and when our efforts
achieve the goals that the USG established for its partners and itself. As one recent U.S. Army assessment
observed:
While the task may seem clear, it is anything but simple.
The large number of activities and actors, authorities,
funding sources, varied agencies, country team agendas,
and regional politics all conspire to create a difficult
environment in which to execute a meaningful plan.9

KEY CHALLENGES TO U.S. ARMY SECURITY
COOPERATION IN AFRICA
Prior to the FY 2017 NDAA, despite concerted
efforts on the part of the State and the DoD to link
them, U.S. security cooperation and security assistance programs were, at best, frequently disjointed
or loosely linked and bore little resemblance to any
unity of effort.10 Additionally, prior to the aforementioned legislation, the limited authorities for security
cooperation frequently hampered or at least limited
the effectiveness of security cooperation programs and
often prevented leveraging one program with another.
The U.S. security cooperation community, specifically
the Departments of State and the various DoD components focused on Africa (Office of the Secretary of
Defense [OSD], U.S. Africa Command [AFRICOM],
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the regional service components and security cooperation offices [SCOs]), also tended to take very parochial points of view regarding design, implementation,
execution, and evaluation of U.S. security cooperation
programs. Despite the State and the DoD positions
arguing to the contrary, many efforts were overwhelmingly focused on the near-term (3 to 5 years, at best),
rather than long-term strategic goals and objectives in
the interest of the nation.
While the United States will always have shortterm foreign policy goals, especially in Africa, where
the USG responds to unanticipated conflicts far too frequently, the security cooperation community within
State, DoD, and USAID must also articulate, formulate,
and advance long-term policy as well. If there is little
focus on the future, the USG will be unable to escape
the never ending crisis mode in its policy toward
Africa. While some events abroad are clearly out of U.S.
control, the security cooperation community can still
set conditions or help shape outcomes to some degree
with security cooperation engagement. Consequently,
security cooperation is an essential component of U.S.
foreign policy in Africa.
In spite of an overwhelming focus on the shortterm, there has been recognition of the need to “play
the long game” in security cooperation, particularly at
the OSD level. The creation of the Defense Institutional
Reform Initiative (DIRI) is one example that there is
attention on shaping the security environment long
term. Other defense institutions such as the Center
for Civil Military Relations (CCMR), the Africa Center
for Strategic Studies (ACSS), and the Defense Institute
for International Legal Studies and their programs are
clear indications of commitment to shaping over the
long term. While this commitment is clear, it is far from
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overwhelming. ACSS has faced dramatically declining operating budgets for several consecutive years,
greatly constraining its ability to reach its target audience of defense and security professionals in Africa.
Planning and programs at the combatant command
level are a different story. The U.S. AFRICOM does
have staff working on programs that address long-term
needs. However, while U.S. AFRICOM holds annual
meetings with its security cooperation professionals
from the staff and in our embassies across Africa, as
well as an annual planning conference specifically
focused on security cooperation programs, it devotes
the preponderance of its effort to near-term concerns
tied to countering terrorism. This is most evident in
the Command’s 2017 Posture Statement and articulated in its Theater Campaign Plan, which has five
lines of effort. One, neutralize al-Shabaab and transition African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to
the Federal Government of Somalia. Two, degrade
violent extremist organizations in the Sahel/Maghreb
and contain instability in Libya. Three, contain and
degrade Boko Haram and the Islamic State in Syria
(ISIS)-West Africa. Four, interdict illicit activity in the
Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa with willing and
capable partners. Lastly, build peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response capacity of
African partners.11 All, save the last line of effort (build
peacekeeping capacity and humanitarian and demining assistance), are focused on either counterterrorism
or countering criminality. None of these lines of effort
focuses on institution building, professionalization,
or collaborating with African militaries not involved
in the counterterror campaign or contributing to the
peacekeeping effort.
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This is not a claim that U.S. AFRICOM entirely
ignores partners who fall outside their lines of effort.
Nor does it mean the command never integrates longterm considerations into its planning. This is not an
indictment of the command for being shortsighted.
Rather, this is a case of addressing the immediate at
the expense of the future elsewhere. It is far easier to
avoid conflict then it is to intervene and end it. Critics
will note that these assertions challenge the focus of
the lines of effort and point out that AFRICOM does
employ ways and means to these lines of effort. This
is a fair point, but it is not the issue. The concern is
that while focused almost exclusively on these narrow
lines of effort and those African partners who contribute to the fight, the command will neglect African partners not currently involved in those lines of effort. The
obvious counterpoint to this complaint is that the USG
lives in a world of limited resources and one cannot do
everything. However, the command need not devote
significant resources to an issue to demonstrate its
importance.
In terms of how the DoD and the USG identify
priorities, much of Africa, including long-established
security cooperation relationships and close partnerships, will only become a priority or important when
on the verge of crisis or a direct or proximate threat.
This approach is risky. While countering terrorism,
particularly in the Sahel region, for example, may be a
priority today, the security environment in other parts
of Africa is ever changing. Twenty years ago, the focus
was in Central and East Africa on failed states and
genocide. Thirty years ago, the liberation struggle was
still in full bloom in Southern Africa. One could make
a legitimate case that a different USG diplomatic and
or security approach in both Mali and Nigeria a decade
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ago could have led to far different and more peaceful
outcomes than the bloody wars with al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other groups in Mali and
Boko Haram in Nigeria. In both those cases, a newly
emerging U.S. AFRICOM and disengaged Department
of State missed or ignored the warning signs. France
and neighboring West African states had to intervene
to prevent AQIM from overrunning all of Mali. Restoring order today is a far more difficult challenge after
Boko Haram spread its insurgency across borders and
affected multiple Lake Chad Basin states.
The existing U.S. AFRICOM lines of effort largely
ignore Phase 0 (shaping operations) across much of the
continent in favor of an overwhelming focus on counterterrorism efforts.12 Some U.S. officials may argue that
this is necessary, as terrorism has metastasized across
large swaths of the continent, and occupies much of
the national security debate and dominates foreign
policy concerns. Further, on the issues where U.S.
AFRICOM has a counterterrorism focus, it does plan
to use all aspects of security cooperation to combat the
problems. Unfortunately, the concentration on counterterrorism has already resulted in diminishing attention and resources for many countries with no direct
link to the command’s combat-focused lines of effort.
Large parts of the continent that once garnered attention for security concerns are now secondary or tertiary
interests. This includes South Africa, where reduced
staffing levels hinder security cooperation; and Liberia
and Ghana, where extensive U.S. diplomatic and security cooperation investments are at risk from a lack of
attention.13 Additionally, other nontraditional security
cooperation partners interested in greater cooperation
like Zambia cannot get U.S. AFRICOM or U.S. Army
Africa’s (USARAF’s) attention. With limited resources,
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this is not difficult to understand. However, this orientation will lead to future problems resulting, in part,
from neglect for Phase 0 in non-focus countries. Weak
civil and governmental institutions, uneven economic
growth, and unbalanced population pyramids with
an emerging and massive youth bulge will challenge
existing security and defense institutions within the
coming decade. Not only will established security sectors like South Africa or Tanzania see problems emerge,
but governments and security institutions where weak
governance is already prevalent today will not be able
to cope with the coming demographic, economic, and
resource challenges.
Now is the time to engage countries such as
Zambia, Benin, Liberia, Botswana, and Rwanda—not
after they become problems. Many of our African partners continue to seek external mentors and partners,
particularly those without colonial-era baggage. U.S.
AFRICOM and the U.S. Army can remain engaged
with non-line of effort countries in an effective way that
does not require additional resources. However, withdrawing resources from SCOs and Title 10 and Title
22 programs sends signals to partners. Security and
diplomacy require engagement and long-term commitment. The U.S. Army, U.S. AFRICOM, the Department of State, and the entire USG take risks whenever
they assume relative peace and quiet in one country or
region is everlasting. In the meantime, if the U.S. presence diminishes, Africans will find other partners to
meet their needs. Will it be the U.S. Army or the People’s
Liberation Army? While Beijing’s assistance is seldom
the preferred option for Africans, in the absence of a
U.S. presence, it is an option. China’s policy of non-interference in internal affairs can and will result in outcomes anathema to U.S. interests. Chinese interests
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alone are not a valid reason to engage in security cooperation with African partners. However, shaping the
security environment for long-term peace and security
is a valid reason and one the USG has articulated in
numerous policy and strategy documents.
DIVERGING INTERESTS
The Department of State tends to concentrate too
heavily on a “what have you done for me lately”
approach, in that it has a laser focus on troop contributing countries for peace operations across Africa, as
if shaping operations in Phase 0 have little to no role
in foreign policy. To be fair, phases of operations is
a DoD concept, not a diplomatic planning concept.
Additionally, the advent of the term Phase 0, the rationale for which first appeared in the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review is also the manifestation of a clear conflict between existing Department of State primacy for
foreign policy and a growing DoD role in diplomacy.14
“Shaping” activities at the theater level, which are
“performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends
and allies,” certainly have the appearance of the DoD
inserting itself into diplomacy.15 This tension, recognized or not, is nonetheless present regardless of how
many times the combatant commander or other U.S.
AFRICOM general officers tell diplomats that the command is a supporting effort, not the lead actor in Africa.
The Africa Bureau at the Department of State has
limited staffing and a mission to get Africans into
peacekeeping to keep American forces out of peacekeeping missions in Africa. This has resulted in an
over concentration on training peacekeepers (even
in countries not active in peacekeeping), supporting
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existing peace operations (Somalia, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic,
Mali, Darfur and others), and on other interventions in
conflict zones, vice pre-conflict efforts. True, the IMET
and African Military Education Program (AMEP) programs focus on pre-conflict. However, the amount of
funding for these programs is a pittance when matched
against what the State Department and the DoD spend
annually on conflict interventions in Africa. This is not
an entirely fair comparison as intervention in conflict
zones is, by its very nature, exponentially more expensive than prevention. Nonetheless, after more than a
decade of focus on interventions, funding levels for
prevention efforts are flat.
The State Department is not alone with this shortterm focus. The existence of Section 1206 (2282, 333)
funding and authorities in the DoD budget since 2007
has led to another perversion with the DoD forced
to spend these funds in annual appropriations. The
program, intended to address immediate or emerging threats, has also become bogged down in bureaucratic processes within DoD and at the Department of
State. When Congress first introduced the Section 1206
authority and funding, a security cooperation officer
or a staff officer at the combatant command or service
component command could review the single page
of congressional guidance, consult the host nation,
develop a proposal, and submit it to the combatant
command. After State reviewed and concurred, provided congressional notification was not a consideration, the program could move forward in a matter
of weeks, as Congress envisioned. However, as time
has progressed, both the State and the DoD have introduced progressively more constraining requirements
that have reduced the effectiveness of the program
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and, too often, effectively prevented security cooperation officers from even making proposal submissions within the combatant command’s prescriptive
deadlines.
BUILDING A DEDICATED SECURITY COOPERATION WORKFORCE
Security cooperation encompasses full-spectrum
support to allied and foreign partners and is a complex
endeavor. Understanding the legal authorities, funding
sources, needs of partners, U.S. foreign policy goals, the
political environment in Washington, DC and within
partner countries, the conduct of military operations,
institution building, planning and assessing programs,
and the countless other skills and knowledge necessary
for successful security cooperation require professionalization of the security cooperation workforce. The
absence of a professional security cooperation career
field in both the Department of State and the DoD contributes to wildly divergent outcomes at the country
level. Apart from a small number of military Foreign
Area Officers, few Department of State or DoD personnel working on these programs are regional specialists
with the requisite training or experience in security
cooperation or security assistance. This is a problem
present at all levels, from Washington, DC to Stuttgart
to embassies in Africa. One should not infer that the
entire workforce is inexperienced or untrained. Rather,
the issue is that there are simply an insufficient number
of security cooperation professionals with Africa experience.16 The FY 2017 NDAA requirement to develop
a security cooperation profession within the armed
forces may eventually improve this from a Title 10 perspective, but it will have no impact on increasing the
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availability of security cooperation professionals in the
State Department or USAID.17
The shortage of trained and experienced security
cooperation professionals working in embassies in
Africa is more acute today than a decade ago when
there were far fewer SCOs in Africa and far less funding in the security cooperation arena for Africa. A tangible example of this dilution of security cooperation
capacity in general was U.S. AFRICOM’s expansion
of SCOs across the continent. When U.S. AFRICOM
first formed as a subunified command under the U.S.
European Command in October 2007, there were less
than 10 SCOs in sub-Saharan Africa. Today there are
nearly 40 offices in embassies. This expansion was
in response to demand from African partners, but it
further spread a limited talent pool and by necessity,
resulted in an influx of junior officers, including company grade officers (captains), filling security cooperation chief positions.
The deliberate, planned expansion of SCOs initially occurred at a time of increasing resources as U.S.
AFRICOM evolved from a subunified command to a
combatant command, added service component commands, and experienced a rapidly rising operating
budget even as Section 1206 Train and Equip counterterrorism funding and legal authority became available. U.S. AFRICOM struggled initially to develop a
theater campaign plan that addressed the command’s
role in Africa in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Early command guidance focused on steady
state or a continuation of existing efforts, combined
with the charge to engage with our partners. In the
absence of clear guidance (a time span that arguably
continued well past the Libyan intervention in 2011),
service components, SCOs, and even the Combined
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Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa in Djibouti all engaged
and developed relationships with African partners.
Nevertheless, the limited number of experienced security cooperation personnel led to varying outcomes
during this expansion of activities.
SCOs across Africa are overwhelmingly composed
of Foreign Area Officers in the rank of major or lieutenant colonel. Their staffs invariably include U.S.
Army enlisted personnel specialists (not experienced
Africanists) and local national staff who may or may
not have completed rudimentary security cooperation
training. The security cooperation chief in each of these
offices must report to, and coordinate with, the Senior
Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT), the
overwhelming majority of whom are assigned to the
Defense Intelligence Agency, not U.S. AFRICOM. In
addition, few embassies have a central security actor
in the mission to coordinate defense, diplomatic, and
development roles.
Another seldom-recognized development is the
degradation in the role and importance of security
cooperation professionals. Across Africa in diplomatic
missions where security cooperation officers once had
direct access to the chief of mission (COM) and or the
deputy COM, many no longer have a direct influence.
The DoD’s efforts to speak with a single voice under
the SDO/DATT concept have not always resulted in
improved security cooperation. No longer in charge of
their own programs to a significant degree and often
lacking access to the COM, doing the hard work of
security cooperation is far less appealing for experienced officers who are now incentivized to seek SDO/
DATT roles instead.
The establishment of the SDO/DATT position in 2007, intended to rationalize the DoD efforts
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at diplomatic missions, had the perverse effect of
diminishing the role and perception of SCOs at U.S.
AFRICOM and with many ambassadors. In Africa,
where arguably security cooperation meets U.S. foreign policy goals in a far greater manner than other
DoD efforts, security cooperation is now something
few experienced, talented officers aspire to do. With
a couple of notable exceptions (Kenya being the most
prominent), security cooperation officers are no longer
an important or the most important DoD actor in an
embassy. Given the vital importance of security cooperation in Africa and the increased emphasis in the FY
2017 NDAA, this is an incongruous outcome. What is
more, a Defense Intelligence Agency officer (the SDO/
DATT) writes the performance appraisals for the security cooperation chiefs, not their command. Additionally, in the Army’s case, the security cooperation chiefs
are senior rated by a lower ranking officer (the J-5; a
two-star general officer) than their peers in the same
embassy (an SDO/DATT of the same pay grade is rated
by the Combatant Commander, a four-star officer).
The FY 2017 NDAA offers potential progress for
future security cooperation in Africa with creation of
a security cooperation profession within the military.
However, while it affects the DoD, it does not directly
influence the Department of State and USAID personnel. Security cooperation is part of a larger security
sector that requires Department of State and USAID
participation. There is no profession for the security
sector writ large (defense, law enforcement, intelligence and related activities) within either the State
Department or USAID for career Foreign Service Officers. These officers may serve a tour at an embassy in
which they handle these issues, but it is not a systematic practice, nor is it a career field. All three principal
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security cooperation actors, Department of State, DoD,
and USAID, need a common baseline of knowledge
regarding the security sector, security assistance, and
security cooperation. To, in part, achieve this common
baseline of knowledge, Foreign Service officers at State
and USAID should attend training at the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies.
ASSESSING SECURITY COOPERATION IN
AFRICA
Assessing the value, efficacy, and impact of U.S.
security cooperation efforts is a demanding exercise
for a simple reason. There is a paucity of reliable data
available to make cogent assessments of the efficacy
of security cooperation programs.18 Consequently, far
too often assessors must rely on anecdotal evidence or
incomplete information to make determinations of outcomes. Worse still, both the Department of State and
the DoD tend to determine progress or success based
on what they can count, rather than the attainment
of national and theater strategic objectives. To some
degree, this is understandable. It is far easier to count
and report that the Department of State Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)
program has trained hundreds of thousands of African peacekeepers. It is much more difficult to design
metrics to answer the real question, “Have the ACOTA
trained peacekeepers had a positive effect, improved
security in country X?” Only in rare instances have
the DoD and its components undertaken detailed
assessments and certainly not with any measurable
indicators.
As an example, aside from the Combined Education
and Training Program Plan (CETPP), an annual written
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narrative assessment from the security cooperation
officer in an embassy, there are little data to determine
the success of the International Military Education
Training Program (IMET). However, the assessment
that one finds in a CETPP is very narrow. First, there
is a listing of previous IMET students in positions of
prominence. In other words, the Department of State
tracks alumni that have risen to the top of their own
militaries, but attendance in an IMET course may or
may not have played a role in their success. Moreover,
what does this metric really tell us other than the possibility that knowing a highly placed foreign military
official may garner us access or might lead to common
alignment of interests? It is useful information, but as
nearly the only means to assess the strategic impact of
IMET, it is lacking. The second element of analysis in
the annual CETPP comes from the written narrative on
the state of the training programs. The security cooperation chief is responsible for drafting this portion,
though too frequently the local national staff member
with historical knowledge writes it. These narratives
are not consistent and vary wildly based on the efforts
and experience of the security cooperation chief.
FACTORS BEYOND U.S. CONTROL
Regardless of the program, the Department of
State and DoD officials rarely acknowledge that, no
matter the activity, even the best planned, coordinated, resourced, and executed program can fail based
entirely on factors over which Washington has no
control or influence. U.S. security cooperation with
Uganda (2009-2014) to professionalize the Ugandan
People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and train its forces
for the AMISOM played a vital role in improving the
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security situation in Somalia, as the UPDF proved to
be a critical component of AMISOM offensive operations. More specifically, public health programs, Section 1206 Train and Equip programs, IMET and the
ACOTA program were critically important to the
UPDF’s operational readiness, its training, and its ability to contribute to AMISOM. However, in February
2014, despite promises to the contrary, Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni signed a draconian anti-homosexuality bill into law. The immediate response from
the Obama administration and Museveni’s reactions
led to a ratcheting up of political rhetoric and the USG
threatening to suspend security cooperation programs.
Consequently, a highly successful security cooperation and diplomatic partnership effort was at risk as
Uganda’s internal domestic interests diverged from
our own. Yet, all the while, U.S. and Ugandan security
cooperation goals remained in alignment for issues in
East Africa. President Museveni’s actions were beyond
USG control, yet they nearly had severe negative consequences for the success of a long-standing security
cooperation effort in East Africa with repercussions
well beyond Uganda’s borders.
WHAT WORKS? WHAT DOES NOT WORK?
Regardless where they work, a conversation with
U.S. diplomatic and military personnel will evoke near
universal praise and approval for IMET. In Washington, DC, at U.S. AFRICOM in Stuttgart, Germany, and
in U.S. embassies on the continent, nearly everyone will
point to IMET as a success and worthy of our time and
energy. Since its inception in 1976, IMET has indeed
been an important program in helping our partners
develop professional military personnel, exposing
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foreign military and defense personnel to U.S. values
and culture, inculcating desired norms for civil-military relations, respect for human rights and the rule of
law, as well as garnering access for the United States.
While IMET is normally a highly valued program,
it is not always the most desired or successful program
from our partners perspective. In West Africa, counternarcotic programs tend to be popular with some host
nation militaries. In other places, the foreign military
sales and or the foreign military financing program are
the most valuable security cooperation program for
our partners who rely on this funding for maintaining operational aircraft (South Africa, Kenya). Troop
contributing countries to AMISOM highly value the
Section 1206, 2282 or 333 program. Similarly, habitual
peacekeeping participants highly value the ACOTA
program. Even the relatively new (began in 2013)
AMEP is important to our African partners. The point
here is that what matters to partners are not the programs or authorities, but rather the capabilities that the
USG can provide.
In theory, the USG consults African partners on
any programs or funding it intends to offer to them.
In practice, this is a rather hit or miss proposition and,
frankly, it is far more often miss. This can be a situation as simple as selecting IMET courses for the partner, vice consulting them for their desires. On the other
hand, it may be as complicated as developing a Section
1206 (now 333) program that provides fixed wing aircraft to an African partner with no consultation with
that partner. At some point, USG help can become a
burden to a partner, even a very unwelcome burden.
There are numerous reasons why this occurs, but at the
most fundamental level, the issue is that few personnel outside the embassy have any vested stake in what
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the partner says or what it needs. Consequently, it too
often falls to the inexperienced security cooperation
officer to elicit host nation preferences without making
promises or raising African expectations. There are
many good reasons the host nation is not involved
more deeply in this process; nonetheless, a successful
program must and will at an appropriate point seek
host nation input and buy-in for any security cooperation effort. It is true that many, if not most, African
partners will seldom, if ever, turn away assistance
from the USG. The more important question is simple:
Are African partners best served with the options the
USG develops without consulting them?
U.S. ARMY SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADE (SFAB) AND THE REGIONALLY ALIGNED
FORCES (RAF)
In 2012, then Army Chief of Staff, General Raymond Odierno, introduced the concept of Regionally
Aligned Forces (RAF). Prior to the establishment of
the RAF concept, SCOs submitted a request for forces,
which the combatant command would then use to
draw troops from the joint personnel process from
the most appropriate and available service (active and
reserve components). However, General Odierno saw
the Army’s future nested in the RAF concept. His plan
was that Army units that would have long-term relationships with designated combatant commands. The
RAF brigades were to receive substantial region-specific training for language and cultural awareness, the
working theory being that this long-term alignment
and targeted training would make them more effective
in meeting demands across the range of military operations. While this concept may appear sound on paper,
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in practice it leaves much to be desired. Shortly after
the concept appeared, U.S. AFRICOM designated the
RAF as the “force of choice” for all security cooperation activities in Africa.
The most obvious problem with this design is the
limitations of a brigade-sized unit (between 1,500 to
3,000 soldiers, depending on unit type). The numbers
and variety of security cooperation activities that are
underway at any given moment across Africa is dizzying. Military-to-military exchanges alone can be twenty
or more simultaneous activities with (normally) three
to five or more soldiers as part of a Traveling Contact
Team. When considering travel time, the troop numbers easily double with the next group on its way to
Africa. This logic of course presumes that an Army
brigade has the requisite experience, skill sets, and
training necessary for full-spectrum security cooperation engagement. In many cases, this is true. However,
under the RAF structure, when seeking to undertake
this activity with a partner at anything beyond the tactical level, problems arise.
Few officers or soldiers assigned at brigade level
have experience at the operational or strategic levels of
warfare, let alone in the institutional Army. There may
be a few former recruiters or drill sergeants in a unit,
but the unit does not habitually undertake this type
of activity nor will it have a sizable number of experienced senior non-commissioned officers with operational or strategic experience. In other words, an Army
brigade may be well suited to conduct military-to-military exchanges or to train African soldiers at the tactical
level, but it is not capable to addressing the complete
breadth of security cooperation activities that support
U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region.
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The FY 2017 NDAA directs the creation of a Security
Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) within the Army. The
SFAB concept suffers from the same challenges that
beset the RAF. Even if the SFAB structure is composed
of experienced officers and senior non-commissioned
officers with institutional knowledge and experience
as well as operational and strategic experience, there is
no guarantee that the structure will have the expertise
necessary to meet broad security cooperation requirements in Africa. It cannot meet the requirements for
defense institution building enumerated in DoD Directive 5205.82.
In fact, existing Army institutions are simply better
able to understand and handle many of our African partners’ security cooperation requirement and
requests, as outlined in the second and third chapters
of this monograph. If a host nation wishes to develop
doctrine for battlefield triage, the SFAB may well be
able to provide this support through security cooperation. However, if an African partner desires U.S.
assistance in designing career paths and education
requirements for its officer corps, other U.S. Army
commands (ACOMS) are better suited to help with this
task. Similarly, the SFAB would not be well positioned
to provide ministerial and intergovernmental security
cooperation support to an African partner that wants
to develop a national security strategy. An interagency
U.S. team composed of Department of State, USAID,
and DoD personnel is more appropriate. Security
cooperation for the U.S. Army, let alone the rest of the
DoD is far broader and requires more than any traditional Army brigade can deliver.
The SFAB concept can be a useful security cooperation asset if it has permanence, includes a hybrid staff
with experienced security cooperation professionals,
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and manages to leverage resources across the U.S.
Army enterprise, and with other DoD components.
Additionally, such an organization must have at least a
two-star general officer with access to the Army Chief
of Staff as its commander or director, and develop relationships with State, USAID, OSD, and U.S. AFRICOM.
Given the importance of shaping activities for promoting regional stability and to prevent or mitigate
conflict, the SFAB can be a useful actor, provided the
Army tailors its structure, resources it adequately, and
either rescinds the RAF concept or finds ways to avoid
duplication.
SETTING CLEAR, ACHIEVABLE GOALS FOR
ENDURING RESULTS
Ostensibly, all actors within the USG seek the same
outcome: achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives. As
the lead agency for foreign policy, the Department of
State must coordinate and synchronize USG efforts
across the executive branch agencies. Since 2012, the
chosen vehicle for achieving synchronization has been
the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). However, the
ICS is a country specific plan and not a bureau-level
or department-level strategic plan. By contrast, U.S.
AFRICOM has developed a theater campaign plan
with lines of effort that span national boundaries and
cover numerous functions and regions. Consequently,
security cooperation officers must insert the combatant
command’s priorities into each ICS, simultaneously
giving deference to the ICS as it is the ambassador’s
strategy for a specific country.
Given its single country focus, the ICS is not the
panacea one might hope for in the security sector.
Nonetheless, it is a solid concept which all actors
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should embrace (U.S. AFRICOM did so at its inception back in 2012). The key is to move the ICS from
what it is to what it can become. At present, the ICS
is an exercise wherein agencies at post (in embassies)
review existing or desired programs and projects,
insert relevant information into the forthcoming ICS,
and then an officer at the embassy cobbles together the
product. In essence, at many diplomatic missions even
today (5 years after its initial introduction in 2012),
the ICS is less an integrated product that results from
a collaborative strategic planning process and more
an effort to make a coherent presentation of existing
independent efforts. As time passes, the ICS is likely to
become a more effective tool for strategic planning at
the embassy level, but U.S. AFRICOM should consider
working more closely with the Africa Bureau to build
regional strategies that mesh with the theater campaign
plan. Even more importantly, the FY 2017 NDAA, Section 1273, requires the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State to develop a strategy
for U.S. defense interests in Africa. This document will
help build unity of effort in security sector assistance
and could advance a whole-of-government approach
to security cooperation and defense institution building.19 Another valuable step would be the formation
of a DoD-Department of State coordinating committee
that can ensure consistent attention to security cooperation program execution. Offering Department of
State and USAID an opportunity to be members of
the Defense Institution Building Coordination Council that the DoD recently established might be a useful
first step.20
In addition, the Department of State, the DoD,
and USAID should create a security-sector assistance
implementation plan that establishes clear, achievable
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goals and objectives for each security cooperation program and desired end states in each country, a concept recommended 2 years ago in a Joint Staff, J-7
study.21 Further, the plan should have defined schedules and milestones to be accomplished with in-progress reviews conducted on a periodic basis. This point,
while self-evident to many casual observers, is vitally
important, as far too often success is not something that
actually achieves a foreign policy goal. Rather, the tendency is to declare success based on faulty metrics tied
to equipment deliveries, training events held, or numbers of Africans who deploy on peace operations. This
preference for the easy way is understandable, because
in many cases success may be difficult to gather data,
assess, or prove. Often an intangible or a decision by
our African partner may alter outcomes in ways over
which we exert little control or influence.
Security cooperation can and should address foreign and defense policy goals as appropriate for near
(24 months or less), intermediate (2 to 10 years), and the
long-term (beyond 10 years). For example, an immediate objective for a Section 333 Train and Equip program
may be to prepare 500 African soldiers for deployment
to Somalia, but with the clear goal of achieving the
U.S. objective for African peacekeeping. Concurrently,
this training can and should also address intermediate military goals with improving internal institutional
capacity for host nation training (by developing this
capacity at local training institutions) and for improving host nation defense capacity through preparation,
training, deployment, and peace operations; all possible as a consequence of the Train and Equip program.
Finally, this effort can address long-term objectives
with a focus on inculcating democratic values, respect
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for human rights, improved civil-military relations,
and operational experience.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the success or failure of the new direction included in the FY 2017 NDAA directly relates
to U.S. foreign policy goals in Africa. The DoD, and
more specifically U.S. AFRICOM, its service components and SCOs, have achieved many successes in the
realm of security cooperation over the past decade.
However, success is too often the result of serendipity,
not design. The FY 2017 NDAA introduces more rigor
into security cooperation processes and programs, and
requires thoughtful design of security cooperation
activities in Africa to include budgeting, managing,
and evaluating these activities.
The introduction of a security cooperation profession, streamlined authorities, and much clearer strategic guidance will likely improve security cooperation
outcomes. Nonetheless, U.S. AFRICOM must improve
the perception of the value of security cooperation work
or risk failing to attract the top talent to this critical field
of work. Further, Department of State should consider
a different approach to foreign policy in Africa with an
additional focus on the security sector, especially, the
appointment of a security sector official in each diplomatic mission. The official would be responsible for
drawing together all security sector actors, setting strategic objectives and goals, and would report directly
to the ambassador. Similarly, the Africa Bureau at the
State Department should do the same and that official
should then include USAID and the DoD members on
a panel to design security sector foreign policy. Lastly,
the Department of State and USAID should strongly
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consider at least additional training for security sector
professionals to keep pace with the DoD.
Both the Department of State and the DoD must
begin to take seriously the need for unified, long
term, consistent security efforts in foreign policy by
helping African partners develop and advance their
security sector institutions through mechanisms associated with defense institution building. Necessarily,
this entails engagement with non-priority partners, or
those not currently contributing to today’s policy priorities of counterterrorism and peacekeeping. However, continued attention predominantly to crises is
costly and inefficient in the end. Finally, all agencies
need to develop data to assess security cooperation
efforts. These elements will prove to be the most difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, both are vitally important
to improving security sector outcomes and in evaluating the U.S. contribution to those outcomes.
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CHAPTER 5
ACCOUNTABILITY: THE INTERAGENCY AND
BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY (BPC) IN
AFRICA
Genevieve Lester
The term building partner capacity (BPC) camouflages the enormity of the effort that the U.S. Government (USG) seeks to achieve under this concept. The
2011 version of Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0,
Unified Land Operations, defined BPC as:
the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational
activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the
ability of partners for security, governance, economic
development, essential services, rule of law, and other
critical government functions.1

This definition denotes that the enumerated actions
require a whole-of-government approach and interagency effort. While this publication has been superseded, the definition is still relevant and useful.
BPC is a noteworthy security activity because—in
theory—it creates opportunities for both the United
States and African nations by advancing U.S. national
security aims, and through training, guidance, and the
provision of resources it aids African forces with counterterrorism operational capability and in a variety of
other missions. As General Thomas Waldhauser, Commander, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), stated
before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Armed Services, “Africa, our allies, the U.S., and, indeed the world
will benefit from our [U.S.] actions to promote stable
and effective nation states and defense institutions in
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Africa.” He continued by stating that to achieve this
goal, the United States “must remain engaged on the
continent, investing in the capability, legitimacy, and
accountability of African defense institutions.” BPC,
he remarked, is essential to attaining U.S. policy goals
as well as “creating sustainable African solutions”
through a “whole-of-government approach.”2
The core questions here, however, are what are the
U.S. national security policy objectives in Africa, and
how could the attainment of these objectives be facilitated? Earlier chapters of this study considered BPC
with respect to its meaning and use. This chapter considers the objective of partner capacity building and
examines the question of what constitutes accountability, as this concept is ambiguous and requires
delineation if it is to be put into practice. It concludes
with recommendations that provide the building
blocks for institutions, U.S. and African, to promote
accountability.
The impetus of this chapter is the fiscal year (FY)
2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), in
particular the sense of Congress articulated in Section
1205, that:
the Secretary of Defense should develop and maintain
an assessment, monitoring and evaluation framework
for security cooperation with foreign countries to
ensure accountability and foster implementation of best
practices [emphasis added].3

This chapter introduces the interagency process that
is intended to develop partner capacity in Africa. It
describes, briefly, where the process falls short. It
draws from the NDAA language quoted above to discuss the need for accountability in BPC processes, as
an essential facet of assessment. Herein, accountability
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is defined as “ensuring that partner legal, policy and
financial commitments are achieved.”4 Finally, it
makes recommendations on how to instill accountability in institutions in Africa that will contribute to the
development and continuity of BPC in practice.
THE INTERAGENCY AND BPC IN AFRICA:
WHAT PRACTITIONERS THINK
In order to understand the environment in which
BPC activities occur, one analyst identifies the three
core responsibilities of the executive branch in the policymaking process. The first level of responsibility is
to set national security policy and ensure that all agencies adhere to it. The second level of responsibility
involves the integration of various agency programs to
“maximize achievement of national policy in a given
country.” This is normally a State Department function
carried out by an ambassador/country team, which is
also responsible for making sure that the president’s
goals are undertaken faithfully. The third level is program execution, which requires the involvement of a
broad range of agencies to implement the BPC activities designed to achieve national policy.5 The analyst
emphasizes, “It is in the area of program execution that
most of the current confusion regarding roles and missions resides, as key functions such as police training
are continually passed back and forth from one agency
to another. This is the area where some rationalization
would be most useful, ideally in the form of legislation
laying out a more enduring division of labor among
agencies.”6 Thus, agencies, both civilian and military,
interact closely when it comes to the practice of BPC.
This interagency engagement tends to be prone to friction as different policies are undertaken, with differing
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authorities and expectations, as well as variation in the
resources available.
Because of the range of stakeholders involved,
the complications and complexities of engaging in
BPC programming run the gamut. For example, the
State Department, which collaborates on BPC efforts
through its ambassador or chief of mission (COM),
confronts challenges in managing these programs
because of resource limitations or constraints. Because
the ambassador does not control the entire budget for
programming of BPC activities, he or she is not able
to exert control over the other agency involved in program execution. This gap leads to a common problem:
Often the State Department is in a weak position to design
and oversee implementation of a multiagency strategy for
the achievement of national objectives in a given country
because it lacks control over the funding.7

Additionally, the personality and priorities of the
ambassador influence program execution in partner
nations. There is an enormous variation in how these
officials deal with BPC as well. This variation may be
due to a number of factors. The embassies are physically distant from each other, with poor communication among them in terms of information sharing and
the dissemination of best practices. Additionally, the
small size of the embassy staff creates limits to observation, monitoring and assessment of activities, and
in some cases, the country team staff become personally invested in their programs and not in evaluating
how the totality of programs contribute to attaining
U.S. national security policy objectives in a particular
nation.8 In terms of the relationship between agencies
as represented in these embassies, they are personality-driven and thus can vary tremendously in the
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achievement of U.S. aims. These attributes only serve
to underscore the diversity of factors that affect program execution.
These issues have been well documented. As a
RAND Corporation report points out BPC is fragmented and thus, ad hoc and reactive.9 According to
the same report, there is an absence of strategic rationale to the programs.10 Also contributing to this fragmentation is the length of time personnel are assigned
to Africa. There is considerable turnover in personnel in positions involved in security cooperation and
associated programs, making relationship building—
the core to partnership—difficult to put into practice.
Personnel are generally assigned to their programs on
their own agencies’ assignment schedule adding to the
impact that frequent turnover has.11
Other analysts and practitioners critique internal
processes and point out the frustration of the constant
turnover of personnel, who come and go in these roles
as their careers take them elsewhere. Still others cite
the impact of “turf battles” and “stovepipes,” present all through the various processes, from the policymaking levels to operations on the ground, most
obviously represented by the U.S. embassies in country, which many have said are their own “fiefdoms.”12
On the other hand, the military is often blamed with
having minimal dedication to the mission and a general unwillingness to engage helpfully. Military in the
field are charged with not understanding the context
or culture they are operating in, and not engaging long
enough in African programs. All organizations are
blamed for not having clearly identified their objectives as part of the BPC planning process. One official
claimed that the entire process was like the “bureaucratic politics model,” ultimately the result of internal
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bureaucratic tribes battling for resources against one
another and not the result of a regularized process.13
At an extreme, the systems seems to be anarchical—
that is, with no overall governing head or institution to
which all parties are required to be accountable.14
Timing and commitment are also issues of concern to those in charge of implementing BPC activities. Nonmilitary agencies critique the short duration
of assistance on the part of the Department of Defense
(DoD). The U.S. military, according to the sources
of this criticism, has a culture of speed and mission
accomplishment.
The military is all about making something happen right
now—whether that means blowing something up, taking
a hill or seizing a port. They focus single-mindedly n
accomplishing the objective, so everyone else better get
out of the way.15

As one Foreign Service Officer observed, “Development does not work that way at all. It’s not about what
‘we’ do, but about strengthening the local government
and setting up a cooperative process.”16 He adds:
Even those few who had arguably relevant backgrounds
were too mired in the military culture of urgency to be
able to give development goals much attention. They
often did not realize that establishing the process for
building a road was often more central to stabilizing an
area than the actual construction.17

Another often-heard concern is that access to partner and large-scale activities can be difficult because
agencies may choose to exclude members of other
organizations, which may undermine the monitoring
of activities and assessment of outcomes. One example that interviewees noted is Exercise Flintlock, an
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annual regional exercise among African, allied, and
U.S. forces, which has taken place since 2005, directed
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and
undertaken by U.S. AFRICOM. The purpose of the
exercise is to bring together those forces to promote
interoperability and information sharing, but in this
particular instance, specific analytical teams from the
DoD were not allowed to participate as observers.18
Beyond the selection of who could participate, there
was no clear method of testing the exercise’s effectiveness. Whether there were assessors of the exercise
present was ambiguous, and ultimately the outcome
of an enormous expenditure of time and resources
was considered successful because it simply occurred;
it drew militaries together. There was no further outcome expected.19 While there are likely numerous benefits of conducting such exercises for building skills
and relationships, the lack of formal assessment mechanisms is exactly the issue that the FY 2017 NDAA
addresses with its emphasis on accountability and
for the dissemination of best practices to achieve U.S.
policy objectives in Africa, as well as its attention to
measurable outcomes.
This single example underscores also the issue of
the objectives of the various BPC activities. They are
uneven and may not even exist for some programs.
Again, there seem to be numerous programs occurring
where there is an unclear objective and an inadequate
assessment mechanism in place. This absence of a clear
objective for the activity makes developing metrics and
accountability extremely difficult. In one RAND Corporation study that the Joint Staff funded, the analysts
developed their own set of metrics and applied them
to a series of case studies in order to see whether the
programs were effective or not.20 This need to develop
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standards or criteria underscores the deficiency that
exists and one that Congress seeks to rectify by the
imperatives articulated in the FY 2017 NDAA.
The variation in U.S. and African stakeholders’ own
capacities and commitment to long-term activities and
investment hinders the growth of capacity building as
well. Crucially, all stakeholders involved with the BPC
mission must buy-in to this process. They must believe
in the objective. Moreover, studies of accountability
and administrative responsibility going back decades
point out that values and policy objectives are intertwined with empirical analysis. The test of successful
policy implementation becomes the measure of agreement among the stakeholders as to what has been
achieved, realizing that analysis is itself unavoidably
limited because of a variety of factors such as possessing too little information, limited time for observation
and monitoring, and political constraints. Given these
factors, program decisions are made incrementally so
they can be closely related to current policy. Each party
involved in policy implementation must have a clear
understanding of the other’s position and anticipated
movements, and adjust accordingly when they occur.
By taking incremental steps, serious or long-lasting
mistakes can be minimized.21This approach is consistent with the U.S. policy on security sector assistance,
which considers that the “up-front costs are relatively
small when compared to the larger political, economic,
and societal costs in the event that local institutions
flounder and instability ensues.”22 This point is particularly apt for the conduct of BPC activities in Africa.
Accountability within the context of BPC in Africa
should be considered as small end states along the way;
that is, as incremental steps, toward a shared objective. It also must be a venture that all join and consider
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legitimate. This requires the USG to align its priorities
and schedules to enable an integrated process. The
turnover of personnel on assignments of varied length
is an additional concern; however, in the end, conflicting or overlapping missions could end up increasing
costs and diminishing the likelihood of meeting U.S.
policy goals.
Finally, until relatively recently, Africa had little
strategic value for the United States. With the advent
of U.S. counterterrorism activities in the AFRICOM
area of responsibility, this has changed, but it has also
affected other BPC programming. While recent DoD
Directives, such as those dealing with security cooperation and defense institution building, have been
published, with respect to measurement and accountability, it has been the NDAA that has given the greatest impetus as Congress intended, as it characterized
the new chapter on security cooperation as a “reform”
measure.23 Nonetheless, USG officials involved in African affairs believe that national security issues involving the region are of low interest and priority among
decision-makers.
PUTTING ACCOUNTABILITY IN PLACE
The section of the NDAA mentioned previously,
coupled with other comments drawn from interviews
with the DoD and Department of State officials, can
be interpreted as an indictment—that up to this point
in time, BPC programs in Africa have not been monitored very effectively, or put more strongly, there
is no order to these programs and consequentially,
no accountability.24 However, such an interpretation
would be incorrect; there is order to these programs
and accountability exists, but each agency has its own
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procedures, authorities, and processes. What is lacking
is an accountability mechanism that unites the stakeholders in a legitimate and credible fashion to achieve
U.S. national security policy aims.
As pointed out in the introduction to a previously
mentioned RAND study on the U.S. Army and BPC,
without an analytical approach to the issue of BPC,
decision-makers will be forced to rely on “anecdotal
information and personal opinions.”25 This report is
not alone in articulating such a position. Other external
reports on mission objectives and metrics are helpful
in this regard and generally argue that a more systematic approach to BPC should be used. A Congressional
Research Service report noted:
While a variety of studies explore programmatic
effectiveness, very few explore what the United States
sought to achieve when engaging in a BPC effort, and
whether or not doing so led to desirable outcomes.26

In another study of BPC that the Defense Department
sponsored, the author noted:
Capacity activities are intertwined with issues of legality,
authority, responsibility, and legitimacy on every level,
from the strategic to the tactical. All capacity-building
activities have legal and legitimacy dimensions—one
of laws and rules, and of perceptions—that must be
considered in strategy, planning, and execution [emphasis
added].27

These quotes signal different issues, but they all return
to the importance of legality and accountability.
To return to the language in the relevant provision
of the FY 2017 NDAA quoted in the beginning of this
chapter, “accountability” in the NDAA necessarily
refers only to DoD activities. This narrowly written
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language elicits interesting questions about what constitutes accountability and who, exactly, conducts it.
Accountability is an ambiguous term in the legislation.
Accountability as a term and as a concept can mean
many things. It can be a goal or a constant process. It
can be an individual responsibility as accountability
for one’s behavior, or as broadly used as the concept
“accountability to the public.” In fact, accountability
is an institution requiring stakeholders to be linked
together, that is, linked together through chains of
accountability so that accountability ensures relational
stability.28
Equally important, accountability can be both internal and external.29 From this dichotomy stems a broader
framework for accountability. Internal accountability
refers to adherence to bureaucratic rules within an
agency or institution. Most institutions have a set of
rules and regulations regarding appropriate behavior
as well as administrative actions. These include, for
example, how money is handled, how the organizational hierarchy works as well as its internal processes,
legality, and recourse. Recourse includes, for example,
methods for changing an employee’s behavior to meet
standards or other requirements. Internal accountability is achieved through rules but also through norms
of acceptability that employees adhere to as part of the
contract of employment. Norms are inculcated beginning from the first day of employment and continue
to guide behavior throughout. When an employee
deviates, the agency has recourse and punishes the
employee. This example is simplistic, but internal
accountability has this straightforward effect. From
time to time, institutions reorganize, but their rules
and norms remain the same, thus insuring stability
and internal accountability.
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External accountability adheres to different criteria,
and the mechanism itself is located outside of one particular agency or bureaucracy. External accountability
requires that a mechanism be established that stands
outside the originating agency. For example, there are
many medications on the market. To move a product
from research and development into the marketplace,
however, it must receive U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. The FDA uses particular criteria to decide whether the new drug is acceptable. In
order to preempt a negative response from the FDA,
the pharmaceutical firm adheres to the regulations
prior to any review by the external mechanism. Thus,
having accountability criteria in place is crucial to
attaining successful and measurable outcomes.
While internal accountability relies on processes
and the benefits of bureaucracy, external accountability is dependent on trust and credibility. These two
features must be developed through the assessment
of a range of criteria. In order for this accountability
mechanism to be considered legitimate and credible,
it must include all partners as equal players from the
beginning. This particular point is important when
discussing BPC in Africa as the studies and interviews
conducted made no significant mention of the African partners as a responsible and accountable agent in
security cooperation planning and execution. This too
is illuminating as criteria for external accountability
could include knowledge of conditions and processes
in the specific partner nation. For example, how much
does this external accountability mechanism know in
general about a topic and beneath that, how much does
the mechanism provide detailed criteria for the activity
or service provided to the partner? Knowledge in this
context includes both institutional memory and the

200

expertise of the officials responsible for constructing
and managing the accountability mechanism. Another
criterion must be autonomy. The external mechanism
must remain exactly that—external—and it must be
free from influence in order to change behavior or alter
the rules of accountability. This element suggests that
separate assessment units must be established in the
Army Service Component Command (ASCC) or in
the institutional Army that can serve as evaluators of
accountability, but it also means that similar units must
exist in the partner nation’s government, to include the
military.
Another factor that is necessary for external accountability is temporality—when, in fact, the mechanism is
used. For example, a mechanism could review plans
for BPC before the program starts, require updates in
a particular ongoing period, or serve as an after action
activity. Most mechanisms use all three elements with
different weights assigned to each depending on the
requirement for assessing outcomes. In terms of BPC
activities, the concept of external accountability relates
directly to defense institution building. The DoD
policy on defense institution building states that the
DoD will:
promote principles vital to the establishment of defense
institutions that are effective, accountable, transparent,
and responsive to national political systems especially
regarding good governance, oversight of security forces,
respect for human rights, and the rule of law.30

Given that policy, appropriately organized external mechanisms both imply and exercise longevity,
commitment, and legitimacy, as well as a relationship between civilian and military authorities, and
the advancement of civil society. As U.S. Army Major
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General Charles Hooper remarked with respect to BPC
in Africa:
Over time we [AFRICOM] have developed, along
with our African partners, a deeper appreciation of the
importance of focusing on institutional capacity. To
support the building of institutional capacity, we focus
on resource allocation, command and control, expanding
combat multipliers such as intelligence and engineers,
and developing recruiting, training, and sustainment
programs and policies. These functions help to ensure the
readiness and independent sustainability of our partners’
forces. An underlying premise of our institution capacitybuilding efforts is that military forces must be subordinate
to civil authority and accepted as legitimate members of a
civil society based on the rule of law.31

The reminder here is on the appropriateness of an
activity and the importance of an external check on
that activity. The relationship to an external mechanism is a different type of relationship than one that
is strictly bureaucratic and hierarchical. It is crucial
to understand internal accountability because it gives
those involved in BPC an awareness of how accountability on each side works and creates expectations
for how external accountability will function. External
accountability will help improve partner capacity, as
it will give all actors legitimacy. This is important in
all matters of accountability, but it is even more so in
Africa, where credibility in the international environment is hard won. Moreover, external accountability
in the form of an institution will provide a symbolic
stability in addition to an actual one. That is, it signals
fairness and rule of law through an established institution that advances the point Major General Hooper
made: the military is subordinate to civil authority and
acts as a legitimate member of the broader society. A
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solid accountability institution can be a cornerstone for
the building of good governance and can reduce corruption, for example, concurrently.
However, the preceding also suggests that there is
an organization (that is, an outside actor) responsible
for the construction and maintenance of the accountability institution. This third way would include developing an organization in African militaries that can act
as a boundary crosser, effectively crossing the boundary between internal and external entities in order to
convey information, including operational practice,
and can translate the expectations if there is variance
between internal and external rules. In the United
States, an Inspector General performs this role. Most
USG agencies have this organization, which performs
audits, conducts investigations, ensures compliance,
and acts as an intermediary. Inspectors General are
considered a neutral party, but one firmly ensconced
within a bureaucratic structure. A statutory Inspector
General arguably adds a further source of accountability by having the additional requirement of dual
reporting. Dual reporting, for example, in the United
States, requires the Inspector General to report to his
agency head initially, but he must also report his findings to Congress.
The creation of such a mechanism in African militaries may serve the same purpose as it exists in several African police forces. An Inspector General could
serve as a go-between with the stakeholders. This
figure would have to have autonomy and legal protections from retaliation, both from inside superiors
and external stakeholders. He or she would have to be
privy to all necessary documents and information, and
a sound reporting structure would have to be set up for
him or her. Dual reporting requirements broaden the
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audience of mechanism activities and further enhance
the perception of stakeholders being good stewards of
the process, but they can also run into friction within
their home organizations if they seem insufficiently
loyal.
CRITERIA FOR ESTABLISHING AN EXTERNAL
ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM
Africa is dealing with a range of issues, not all of
them security related. While the U.S. military is focused
principally on counterterrorism on the continent, local
populations may also be working on economic development, education, public health, and institution
building in other arenas. The United States is also dealing with budget cuts, political upheaval, and uncertain
political priorities. What type of mechanism is feasible
to establish and that will meet stakeholders’ needs?
To answer this question, the following guidelines
are offered as suggested methods for constructing an
external accountability mechanism for BPC in Africa
in conjunction with the USG agencies involved in this
mission. First, members of these organizations would
have to be equals, and there would have to be an agreed
upon set of both expectations and consequences of failing to adhere to the expectations. Second, buy-in by all
U.S. and partner stakeholders is crucial to obtain and
maintain. Third, both U.S. and African governments
must establish a transparent process of assessment
and explain to both stakeholders and observers why
the decisions were made. Fourth, local knowledge and
expertise is critical for both U.S. and African officials;
members must be locally respected and as far from any
political instability as possible. Fifth, the accountability mechanism requires a resilient structure that can
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withstand both a changing threat environment and
political instability. Sixth, program objectives must be
clearly stated and criteria for evaluation must be established by the mutual agreement of the United States
and the African partner. Seventh, the institution must
be built around or with an already accepted cultural
institution or an independent body (whichever institutions are chosen to house the mechanism, they would
have to be regarded as above reproach). Eighth, all
parties must ensure strict adherence to consistent principles of accountability with recourse to sanctions for
violations. Lastly, with respect to the issue of temporality, joint accountability reviews would be conducted
prior to, during, and after the conclusion of a program
or activity; the emphasis would be based on the threat
environment.
CONCLUSION
BPC has been a focus of USG policy for many years.
This interest was reinforced through the Quadrennial
Defense Review for 2006 and 2010, as well as, of course,
to FY 2017 NDAA.32 The challenge in BPC results from
the mix of stakeholders in this space—Department of
State, DoD, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), their components and others—with
different goals, funding sources and levels, authorities, and perspectives. 33 In the words of the Center for
Army Lessons Learned (CALL) in its study of lessons
learned and best practices with respect to security
cooperation, “all [these elements] conspire to create a
difficult environment in which to execute a meaningful plan,” which must result in “purposeful activity on
the ground.”34 The practice at the operational level and
below is fraught with complications and friction points
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with other players, and other issues, such as infrastructure, and local and regional stakeholders, but it is also
where BPC activities take place. Additionally, there
are frequent organizational challenges, as mentioned
above, including personnel turnover, which hinders
accumulation of institutional knowledge as well as
relationship building.35 Chief among these complaints
is the perception that there is no accountability regarding implementation of BPC programs.
While this assertion is not correct, the focus has
largely been on financial accountability. The form of
accountability Congress seeks in the current legislation is far different and the scope of this undertaking
is immense. The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) recently identified 194 DoD security cooperation and Department of State security assistance programs that relate to building foreign partner capacity
to deal with security-related threats. As the GAO noted
in its report, “According to DOD and State officials,
no sanctioned U.S. Government inventory of security
cooperation and security assistance efforts exists.”36
Given that statement, accountability for BPC activities
will not occur immediately, but steps to improve it are
certainly necessary to assure Congress that the DoD
and other relevant departments and agencies share its
concerns.
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